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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigated social learning mechanisms and strategies relating to the 
characteristics of a model (the individual transmitting the information) and the prior 
experience of an observer (the individual acquiring the social information) in children 
and chimpanzees. Experimental designs that mirrored naturalistic settings enabled an 
investigation of how social learning mechanisms and strategies were affected by: (1) the 
characteristics of a model, (2) the prior experience of an observer, (3) continued model 
demonstrations and (4) repeated observer interactions with the task. If models provided 
viable novel solutions then their characteristics seemed ineffectual upon children’s 
copying of these solutions. Yet the characteristics of the model did influence children’s 
copying of irrelevant actions; children who observed an adult reproduced more causally 
irrelevant actions than those who observed a child. Furthermore, when a known peer 
with higher, rather than lower, past-proficiency matched a child’s original solution the 
child was more likely to continue using this solution. Chimpanzees were biased towards 
touching the tool seeded by a known conspecific with higher, rather than lower, past 
proficiency but this bias did not affect which tool a chimpanzee successfully used. Both 
species showed an ability to learn multiple demonstrated methods of success within 
their corresponding tasks and to explore beyond demonstrated methods. It is argued that 
both species show more task-behavioural flexibility than previously thought and the 
implications for this in terms of cultural evolution are discussed.  
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Chapter I  
Introduction 
Humans stand alone in the breadth, stability and complexity of their culturally learnt 
behaviour. This cultural supremacy is underpinned by social learning; the transmission 
of information from one or more individuals to another. Humans, however, are not 
unique in their ability to learn socially. From insects (Leadbeater & Chitttka, 2007) to 
man’s closest living relative, the chimpanzee (Whiten, Custance, Gomez, Teixidor & 
Bard, 1996), non-human animals (henceforth animals) show a range of social learning 
abilities. In order to understand our species’ culture we must understand the social 
learning mechanisms (Heyes, 1994; Whiten & Ham, 1992) and strategies (Laland, 
2004) that might influence cultural behaviour, its stability and its evolution (Mesoudi, 
Whiten, & Laland, 2006; Whiten, Hinde, Laland, & Stringer, 2011). Two ways of 
achieving this are: (a) compare the abilities of various other species, both closely and 
distantly related to us in evolutionary history. This comparative psychology may reveal 
behavioural similarities or dissimilarities and allow an investigation of the cognitive 
processes behind such behaviour and, potentially, its evolutionary origins. And (b) 
study the ontogeny of our species. Such developmental psychology allows an 
investigation into the acquisition of social learning mechanisms, strategies and the co-
developing cognitive skills which facilitate their use.  
The overarching aim of this thesis is to investigate social learning mechanisms 
and strategies. Specifically, the characteristics of a model (the individual emitting the 
information) and the prior experience of an observer (the individual acquiring the social 
information) were investigated in relation to the observer’s social learning strategies, 
mechanisms and behaviour changes with continued task demonstrations and 
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interactions. A developmental and comparative approach is taken, separately, by 
investigating these strategies and mechanisms in four- to six-year-old children and 
captive chimpanzees. The following sections define and expand upon the terminology 
used throughout this thesis as well as introducing the main theoretical concepts and 
experimental methods.  
 
Social Learning Mechanisms 
 Learning can occur either with or without social information. Without-social-
information (asocial) learning could be reliable because individuals personally sample 
their environment but it is time consuming and laborious. Social learning prevents these 
personal costs but the information provided may be unreliable or outdated (Laland, 
2004). Investigating established mechanisms of social information transmission aid our 
understanding of animals’ learning processes. Here, mechanisms refer to behavioural 
outcomes rather than specific cognitive processes (Heyes, 2012). The plethora of social 
learning mechanisms have been outlined by Whiten and Ham (1992), Whiten, Horner, 
Litchfield, and Marshall-Pescini (2004) and Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini and 
Hopper (2009, Figure 1). As can be seen in Figure 1, there are many potential 
mechanisms for information transfer and those presented in the figure are, by the 
original authors own admission, not exhaustive. There is also debate about the exact 
definitions of some mechanisms, such as imitation (Whiten et al., 2009). Indeed, as 
research continues, subtle differences within each mechanism (e.g. emulation) have 
been discovered so that this mechanism becomes an umbrella term for a number of 
different mechanisms (e.g. object movement re-enactment, goal emulation, result 
emulation; as highlighted by Hopper 2010). Therefore, it is important to outline and 
define the mechanisms of interest throughout this thesis.  
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Figure 1. From Whiten et al. (2009, p.2148) with permission. See also Whiten et al. 
(2004) and Whiten & Ham (1992).  
 
In this thesis three social learning mechanisms are of interest; stimulus 
enhancement, goal emulation and imitation. These terms are operationalized as follows: 
(1) Stimulus Enhancement: an increase in the probability that the observer will interact 
with stimuli of the same physical type as those with which the demonstrator interacts, 
followed by asocial learning (Heyes, 1994). Typical evidence for this would include an 
individual touching an artefact following watching a model interacting with that artefact 
more than an individual who has not witnessed a social interaction with the object. 
Stimulus enhancement differs from local enhancement, whereby a learner’s attention is 
drawn to a location by another individual. (2) Goal Emulation: the observer learns from 
an individual that a goal can be achieved (Whiten & Ham, 1992). Typical evidence for 
this would be that an observer who witnesses another individual achieve a goal is 
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successful at completing the same goal but does not necessarily use the same method as 
the original model. (3) Imitation: an observer reproduces specific aspects of the intrinsic 
form of an act from the observation of a model (Whiten & Ham, 1992). Typical 
evidence for this would be that individuals are more likely to reproduce specific actions 
or methods in the same manner as they have witnessed. Copying of this fidelity can lead 
to the reproduction of inefficient or unnecessary actions, sometimes referred to as 
overimitation (Lyons, Young, Keil, 2007). Throughout this thesis use of the term 
‘overimitation’ will be avoided as it implies that the fidelity resulting in imitation of 
causally irrelevant actions is maladaptive, when in general this may not be the case. 
Instead, ‘high-fidelity’ imitation is used.  
It is important to note that mechanisms are not mutually exclusive within 
species. An animal species could use different mechanisms in different contexts. For 
example, Nagell, Olguin & Tomasello (1993) found that chimpanzees were more likely 
to obtain out-of-reach food with a tool after a social demonstration of that tool than with 
no information. The chimpanzees with a social demonstration did not imitate the precise 
two-action step of the model, suggesting an absence of behavioural imitation but a 
presence of goal emulation. In other circumstances chimpanzees may copy the exact 
actions employed by models during reward retrieval (Whiten, et al., 1996; Whiten, 
Horner & de Waal, 2005; Whiten et al., 2007). Chimpanzees, like other animals, might 
employ ‘a portfolio of alternative social-learning processes in flexibly adaptive ways, in 
conjunction with non-social learning’ (Whiten, et al., 2004, p. 36). Even within the 
same context a series of mechanisms could underpin the socially learned behaviour. For 
example a demonstration involving multiple components and steps might result in some 
aspects being imitated whilst others are emulated.  
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Social Learning Strategies 
Laland (2004) argued that social learning should not be considered inherently 
adaptive, but as a source of information that may or may not be used, dependent upon 
context. Accordingly, theoretical models of cultural evolution predict the evolution of 
flexible strategies (or transmission biases) enabling avoidance of unreliable or 
redundant information, and influencing the circumstances under which individuals copy 
others and from whom they learn (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Implementation of these 
strategies may not only dictate whether social information is copied or not but which, of 
a variety of social demonstrations witnessed, might be most likely to be copied 
(Mesoudi, 2008; 2011; Mesoudi & O’Brien 2008). The use of such cues in guiding 
behaviour is thought to increase fitness more than individual learning (Mesoudi & 
O'Brien, 2008) or unbiased social learning in which individuals acquire variants 
according to the frequency at which they are practiced (Rendell et al., 2011). 
Transmission biases refer to information, which has the potential to be socially 
learnt, being influenced by someone or something. Thus, a bias influences the 
likelihood of the social transmission of information. In the last decade there has been a 
surge of activity directed at identifying and understanding the variety of biases that 
might influence social learning (Kendal, Coolen, van Bergen, & Laland, 2005; Morgan, 
Rendell, Ehn, Hoppitt, & Laland, 2012; Rendell, et al., 2011; see Figure 2). There are 
biases that relate to the content of the social information, sometimes referred to as 
‘what’ biases (Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008; Mesoudi, Whiten & Dunbar, 2006), direct 
biases (Boyd & Richerson, 1985) or content biases (Henrich & McElreath, 2003). 
Alternatively, there are biases which relate to the context of the social information 
(context dependent biases; Henrich & McElreath, 2003), which can relate to the state 
(state based; Rendell, et al., 2011) of the observer, such that individuals may copy if 
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their personal information is outdated (as seen in fish; van Bergen, Coolen, & Laland, 
2004) or if they are dissatisfied or uncertain (as seen in fish; Kendal, Coolen, & Laland, 
2004; Kendal, Rendell, Pike, & Laland, 2009). Context dependent biases can also relate 
to the frequency of the behaviour whereby individuals glean information regarding the 
level of incidence of behaviours (frequency-dependent biases; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; 
Day, MacDonald, Brown, Laland, & Reader, 2001) such that individuals may copy the 
most frequently displayed behaviour (Toelch, Bruce, Meeus, & Reader, 2010). Finally, 
context can relate to the characteristics of the model, whereby certain models provide 
more reliable, and thus adaptive, information than others. These potential biases have 
been termed ‘who’ biases (Laland, 2004), indirect biases (Boyd & Richerson, 1985) and 
context dependent model-based biases (Henrich & McElreath, 2003). Much of the 
thesis revolves around investigating such biases in children and chimpanzees. 
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Figure 2. From Rendell et al. (2011, P.71) with permission.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
Model-based Biases 
Models have different characteristics that might influence the likelihood of 
copying the behaviour they demonstrate. These may include, but are not limited to, a 
model’s previous performance (Koenig, Clément & Harris, 2004), knowledge state 
(Jaswal & Malone, 2007), age (Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Rakoczy, Hamann, Warneken, & 
Tomasello, 2010), sex (Frazier, Gelman, Kaciroti, Russell, & Lumeng, 2011) and social 
status (Chudek, Heller, Birch, & Henrich, 2012). Furthermore, observers’ own 
characteristics may influence who is the ‘best’ model for them. For example, 
individuals might be biased towards learning from those from a similar, rather than 
different, cultural background because they are motivated to learn culturally appropriate 
behaviour (Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris, 2010). Such an interaction between observer 
and model characteristics emphasises the role of heuristics or transmission biases in 
enabling the most appropriate model, potentially providing the most useful and adaptive 
behaviour, to be copied.  
The main focus of this thesis is model-based biases. I begin by producing a 
comprehensive literature review (Chapter II) detailing the adaptive value of model-
based biases in children’s learning. This review also touches upon the literature in other 
animals such as chimpanzees. Following on from this, model-based biases in children 
and chimpanzees’ learning are investigated separately. As the thesis is in publication 
format, the theoretical underpinning for each specific paper is discussed in more detail 
in each chapter.  
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Prior Experience 
When learning about artefacts, individuals do not have just demonstrations of 
the same solution from a single model followed by an opportunity to interact with that 
artefact (as has been used in some social learning studies; Flynn & Whiten, 2008a; 
Horner & Whiten, 2005). Interspersing personal experience and varied demonstrations 
might have a significant impact upon children’s learning strategies and the social 
learning mechanisms they employ. For example individuals might copy all observed 
actions faithfully until they have a chance to interact with the task themselves and 
discover which actions are causally necessary and unnecessary, a ‘copy now, refine 
later’ strategy (Whiten et al., 2005). Here, a first interaction might involve high-fidelity 
imitation of actions but a second interaction might omit irrelevant actions. Alternatively, 
a first interaction may involve goal emulation but with continued demonstrations 
individuals might increase their copying fidelity of the model. Both these outcomes 
might tell us something very important about the way in which individuals socially 
learn and, therefore, it important to give individuals multiple demonstrations and 
chances to interact with a task.  
Over time, individuals might also witness alternative methods of achieving a 
goal. For example, a model could demonstrate one method, the observer then interacts 
with the task and then the same or different model could demonstrate an alternative 
method. When faced with divergent information (e.g. Kendal et al., 2004) it would be 
adaptive to select and reproduce the information most suited for one’s needs or the 
current context. However, there may be occasions when all the methods one experiences 
(personally or socially) are equally viable. When this occurs, the sequence of the 
information’s acquisition could influence which solution is selected. Individuals may be 
biased to the first method they witness due to a primacy (Murdock, 1962) bias or 
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because once they have a reliable solution, acquiring other information is unnecessary 
or inhibited (Hopper, Flynn, Wood & Whiten, 2010). Alternatively, individuals could 
be biased towards the most recent information because of a recency (Murdock, 1962) 
bias or because it is the most reliable information pertaining to a potentially changing 
environment (e.g. Van Bergen et al., 2004).  
Alternatively, individuals could witness alternative interactions from different 
models. If both solutions look viable individuals’ choices of whom and what they 
imitate could be guided by the model’s characteristics. There may also be an interaction 
between the sources of the information (personal versus socially demonstrated by 
model/s) and the content of information influencing solution choice but also the 
mechanism employed in copying. For example, infant imitation of parents is more 
likely to consist of motor skills (e.g. tool use) whereas affective behaviours are imitated 
from siblings and peers (Kuczynski, Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, 1987). Also, four- to 
five-year-old children imitate adults more than children and same age peers when an 
action is novel, but copy a peer over an older child and adult when the action is not 
novel (Zmyj, Daum, Prinz, Nielsen, & Aschersleben, 2011). In the first context, the 
function may be to learn a new skill whereas in the second context the action is familiar. 
Each context may affect the implementation of a model-based bias.  
Finally, an individual could have an opportunity to interact with a task before 
they witness social information pertaining to it. Here, individuals may be biased 
towards the method they personally acquired because they have experience of its 
reliability (e.g. a strategy of ‘copy only when uncertain’ as seen in a variety of animals: 
Kendal et al. 2005). Alternatively a bias towards social information may supersede prior 
personal information.  
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All these scenarios reflect realistic ways in which information about artefacts is 
learned. Therefore, it is important to investigate the impact of multiple model 
demonstrations and observer interactions, as well as repeated interaction with artefacts, 
on children’s social learning strategies and mechanisms. It is this level of ecological 
validity that is aimed for in the empirical chapters of this thesis. 
 
Overview of Experimental Methods 
Participants 
Human culture accumulates “refinements over time, thereby producing both 
technology and other cultural achievements of astonishing complexity and diversity 
unprecedented in the rest of nature” (Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012, 
p.1114). Understanding our uniquely cumulative culture requires a comparative 
approach. For example, Tennie, Call & Tomasello (2009) argue that chimpanzees and 
humans have different cognitive and learning mechanisms resulting in chimpanzee 
populations failing to show cumulative culture. Instead, chimpanzee cultures reflect 
traditions involving behaviour patterns that are within the species’ existing cognitive 
repertoire. This difference, they argue, is caused by species’ differences in attention to 
demonstrations and uniquely human cooperation. Building on this, Whiten & Erdal 
(2012) claim that cooperation, along with mindreading (Theory of Mind), language and 
egalitarianism creates a species-unique socio-cognitive niche, as supported by recent 
empirical work (Dean et al., 2012). To investigate these claims it is useful to consider 
human development and comparative evidence. The empirical work in this thesis 
focusses on two populations, human children and adult chimpanzees. These two 
populations will not be directly compared in this thesis. Instead, study of each 
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population tells us about their specific skills and informs our understanding of human 
culture. 
 
Children 
 To investigate human social learning and accompanying socio-cognitive skills it 
is useful to look at children’s development (Herrmann, Call, Hernández-Lloreda, Hare 
& Tomasello, 2008). The majority of this thesis focusses on children’s social learning 
mechanisms and strategies including a detailed review (Chapter II) of the adaptive value 
of model-based biases and the requisite cognitive skills associated with such biases. As 
such, a detailed description of children’s social learning will not be given here. In 
essence, children are cultural magnets (Flynn, 2008) and their social learning abilities 
are a window onto human cultural supremacy; children are able to imitate the actions of 
a model upon a novel artefact from infancy (Meltzoff, 1985), copy a complex set of 
nine actions upon a task by three years (Flynn & Whiten, 2008b) and generally acquire 
an innumerable amount of artefact, language and culturally-appropriate customs and 
norms. The aim of the thesis is to explore this social learning in more depth. All 
children tested were between four and six years of age, allowing for comparison with a 
large body of work investigating social learning strategy and mechanisms conducted 
with children (e.g. Flynn & Whiten 2008a, 2008b; Horner & Whiten, 2005; Koenig & 
Harris, 2005; McGuigan, et al., 2007, 2011). Furthermore children of this age were 
selected as they have an understanding of age and knowledge state (Edwards, 1984; 
Wellman et al., 2001) and they will have been in an educational environment with 
known peers for a stable amount of time.  
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Chimpanzees 
Chimpanzees are humanity’s closest living relative (Prüfer, et al., 2012). Popular 
literature (de Waal, 2007) and academic study (Tomasello, Call & Hare, 2003) have 
effectively argued that chimpanzees share many of our cognitive and socio-cognitive 
skills. This includes a portfolio of social-learning mechanisms (Whiten, et al., 2004). 
For example, like human neonates (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), chimpanzees are able to 
imitate human demonstrated facial gestures (Bard, 2007) and young chimpanzees are 
capable of imitating arbitrary actions performed by a known caregiver (Custance, 
Whiten & Bard, 1995). Adult chimpanzees are also able to socially learn a number of 
complex tool-use behaviours (Whiten et al., 2007). Indeed, in certain contexts 
chimpanzee’s social learning mechanisms can appear more efficient than humans 
(Horner & Whiten, 2005). In addition, as with children (Gergely, Bekkering & Király, 
2002), chimpanzees exhibit ‘rational imitation’ (Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call and 
Tomasello, 2007) whereby when the models use unusual body parts to switch on a 
display chimpanzees are more likely to copy the unusual action when the model’s hands 
are free as opposed to constrained.  
This ability to socially learn is not unique to captive individuals; chimpanzees in 
the wild demonstrate clear behavioural patterns unique to chimpanzees within their 
geographical location (Whiten et al., 1999) ultimately developing group differences. For 
example, one method of ant-dipping is customary at Gombe but not in any other site 
while a second distinct method is customary in Bossou and the Tai Forest but absent 
elsewhere. These differences appear to be independent of ecological and genetic 
differences although see Laland & Janik (2006) for a discussion of why claims of 
animal cultures remain controversial.  
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What chimpanzees learn when observing others, i.e. the mechanisms of the 
transmission of social information, is still a matter of some debate (Whiten et al., 2009). 
Also, the extent to which chimpanzees use heuristics to guide when, and from whom, 
they socially learn (Laland, 2004) as other animals do (Kendal et al. 2005) has, to date, 
been little investigated. To understand differences in human and chimpanzee social 
learning we need to further explore these mechanisms and strategies. The aim of the 
chimpanzee study in this thesis (chapter VI) was to implement an experimental design 
which mirrored captive chimpanzees’ naturalistic settings to test learning mechanisms 
and model-based biases. Previous work has demonstrated that chimpanzees 
preferentially copy the choices of older, higher ranking and previously proficient 
models (Horner, Proctor, Bonnie, Whiten, & de Waal, 2010) although it is not known 
whether it was the age, dominance and/or past proficiency that influenced the 
chimpanzees’choices. Here, the effect on chimpanzees’ behaviour of a model-based bias 
pertaining to known conspecifics’ past proficiency was investigated. In chapter V the 
same question is investigated in children but using a modified study design which 
mirrored their school setting. 
Furthermore, in adopting the study design outlined earlier, of multiple 
interactions with task, the thesis addresses a theoretical conflict which is particularly 
pertinent to the chimpanzee culture literature. The issue pertains to whether 
chimpanzees remain conservative to an initially discovered method of achieivng a goal 
(Hopper, Schapiro, Lambeth & Brosnan, 2011; Hrubesch, Preuschoft, & van Schaik, 
2009; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008) or are able to flexibly investigate alternative 
solutions despite a prior successful solution (Dean et al. 2012). Although not quite the 
same context, wild chimpanzees’ use of a sequential ‘tool-kit’ to obtain honey (Sanz & 
Morgan, 2007; Yamamoto, Humle & Tanaka, 2012) potentially indicates such 
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flexibility. The study with chimpanzees presented here extends previous research by 
introducing two task solutions simultaneously. This means that potentially the 
chimpanzees can make choices of which solution to attempt first and whether they 
incorporate both solutions into their repertoire.  
 
Tasks 
Comparing behaviour (such as reward retrieval) of individuals with social 
information with those who have no social information reveals the presence of social 
learning. However, such a comparison cannot necessarily identify which mechanisms 
might be underpinning the social learning. For example, the model may have merely 
drawn the observer’s attention to the artefact (stimulus enhancement) and subsequent 
actions were asocially learnt. To overcome this Whiten et al. (1996) adopted a two-
action task design first implemented by Dawson & Foss (1965). Whiten et al. (1996) 
created a food processing task as this was deemed the most likely domain in which 
behaviour would be socially transmitted naturally. Whiten et al. (1996) called these 
kinds of tasks ‘artificial fruits’. The value of these tasks is exemplified by a number of 
studies, which have used a Glass Ceiling Box (GCB) artificial fruits task. This task 
involves a transparent or opaque box with a hole at the front that can be revealed by 
sliding or lifting a door. The goal is to retrieve a reward from a tube located behind the 
door by inserting a stick tool into the tube. The demonstrated actions directed to the 
door are causally necessary to retrieve the reward. However, the GCB has a further 
opening in the roof, covered by a two-bolt defence that can be removed by poking or 
dragging them from the opening with the stick tool. This hole leads to an empty 
compartment with a ‘glass ceiling’ preventing physical access to the reward, so actions 
directed to the bolts or the upper compartment are observably (when the box is 
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transparent) or unobservably (when the box is opaque) causally irrelevant to retrieving 
the reward.  
By changing the context (i.e., the availability of causal information) social 
learning mechanisms can be investigated (Horner & Whiten, 2005; McGuigan, et al., 
2007). For example, when chimpanzees observed a human demonstrate the irrelevant 
ceiling actions and relevant door action in the opaque condition, they reproduced both 
the relevant and irrelevant actions, thus showing high-fidelity imitation of all the actions 
witnessed. However, with the transparent GCB chimpanzees ignored the irrelevant 
actions instead and imitated only the relevant actions (Horner & Whiten, 2005). The 
GCB was also presented across species. Horner and Whiten (2005) found that whilst 
three- to four-year old children showed a similar pattern of behaviour to the 
chimpanzees in the opaque condition, when the box was transparent children continued 
to imitate the irrelevant ceiling actions. Lastly, developmental changes in social learning 
mechanism use in a single species have also been tracked. McGuigan et al. (2007) found 
that both three- and five-year-old children imitated the irrelevant actions regardless of 
the availability of causal information following a live demonstration. However, when 
the information available was degraded in a video demonstration, the 3-year-olds did 
not employ high-fidelity imitation and omitted irrelevant actions but the 5-year-olds 
continued to employ a high-fidelity imitative approach, copying irrelevant and relevant 
actions. This propensity to imitate clearly irrelevant actions continues into adulthood 
(Flynn & Smith, 2012; McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011). Whilst these 
experiments focus on a single task they assist in our understanding of what mechanisms 
might underpin the spread of behavioural traditions. For example, the difference 
between children and chimpanzees might indicate that chimpanzees attend 
preferentially to goals and results, and children attend, to a greater extent, to the actions 
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being performed by the model. This may result in children learning functionally 
irrelevant but potentially culturally relevant behaviours (Horner & Whiten, 2005; 
Tomasello et al., 1993).  
For children, artificial fruits that contained a reward (sticker) held in place by a 
series of defences were used. Using a task with multiple possible solutions allowed a 
number of distinctions to be identified: (a) the propensity to discover each of these 
solutions during personal exploration, (b) the level of replication of a demonstrated 
solution compared to the level of production of an alternative solution, (c) fidelity or 
exploration of solution use once an alternative solution was demonstrated and (d) the 
replication of irrelevant actions under varying contexts. For chimpanzees, a task 
involving an inaccessible reward (food that was out of reach) with two physically and 
functionally unique tools was created. This also enabled an investigation of: (a) the 
propensity to discover each of these solutions during personal exploration, (b) the level 
of replication of a demonstrated solution compared to the level of replication and/or 
innovation of an alternative solution.  
 
Experimental Design  
Experimental work on social learning in children has almost exclusively used a 
dyadic design, in which a single naïve (no prior experience with the task) child 
participant watches another individual (normally an unfamiliar adult) perform a 
behaviour directed at the task and then is given the opportunity to interact with the task 
apparatus, to discover whether he or she will perform the behaviour, or variants of the 
behaviour, witnessed. These dyadic studies are extremely informative because the 
experimenter has complete control of the social demonstration that the child receives, 
with regard to the number of demonstrations as well as who demonstrates and what 
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(method and inclusion of irrelevant actions) they demonstrate. For this reason, the 
experiments with children presented in this thesis use this dyadic design but with a 
number of significant considerations and modifications. First, the identity of the model 
is considered with the model being either as neutral as possible (a hand puppet) or a 
model with a specific characteristic and made these characteristics the focus of the 
study. Second, in certain conditions children were able to explore the task before 
receiving social information, offering a more naturalistic scenario of learning. Third, 
under certain conditions children were provided with alternative social information from 
either one or more models. Fourth, children were given up to seven interactions with the 
task allowing an investigation of continuation of fidelity. These modifications meant 
model-based biases and behavioural change could be investigated while maintaining 
maximum control of the demonstrations.  
An alternative to the typical dyadic design is the use of diffusion experiments. It 
is argued that diffusion experiments allow for greater external validity because they 
allow for the investigation of how behavioural variations spread and how faithfully they 
do so (Whiten & Mesoudi, 2008) in the natural context in which social transmission 
occurs - the group. One particular diffusion design, open diffusion, involves introducing 
or ‘seeding’ a task-behaviour into a naïve group using demonstration by a trained or 
naturally proficient model (Day, Coe, Kendal & Laland, 2003; Flynn & Whiten, 2010; 
Whiten & Mesoudi, 2008). With chimpanzees, open diffusion offers an additional 
benefit as, other than during the training of the model, individuals are not separated 
from group mates, thus reducing any potential stress involved in the study. By using 
multiple groups and counterbalancing methods, open-diffusion designs can be used to 
look at social learning mechanisms (Whiten & Mesoudi, 2008) and, potentially, 
strategies. Moreover, multiple methods have been developed recently to enable the 
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identification of social learning mechanisms and strategies in such naturalistic contexts 
(Kendal, Galef, & Van Schaik, 2010). Open-diffusion designs provide less experimental 
control, since participants choose when, or indeed whether, to attempt the task and the 
experimenter cannot control the content of each demonstration (and who provides it) or 
task interaction to the same degree as dyadic experiments. The resulting transmission of 
behaviour is thus potentially much messier (Flynn & Whiten, 2010). However, as open-
diffusion represents a more ecologically valid context in which to explore social 
learning and cultural transmission a modified open-diffusion design with the 
chimpanzees was used.  
 
Aim and Structure of this Thesis 
 The purpose of this thesis is to investigate model-based biases and behavioural 
change regarding the use of differing social learning mechanisms and strategies in 
children and chimpanzees. Chapter II reviews literature surrounding model-based biases 
in children’s copying behaviour (including preference adoption), arguing that model-
based biases are adaptive and that different biases require different cognitive and social-
cognitive skills. Chapter III introduces an empirical study of children, investigating 
transmission biases relating to two model characteristics. Specifically, the age and 
stated knowledge state of a model was manipulated to investigate the fidelity of 
children’s copying. Children were more likely to copy all of the actions presented by an 
adult model than a child model. This chapter also revealed that continued demonstration 
and interaction did affect imitation of irrelevant actions relative to model identity such 
that those who witnessed a knowledgeable model increased the number of irrelevant 
actions they performed more than those who witnessed an ignorant model. This 
behaviour change is explicitly tested in Chapter IV, an empirical study investigating 
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children’s solution choice and social learning mechanisms following differing prior 
experiences and multiple social demonstrations. Children who acquired a solution either 
socially or asocially and then presented with an alternative solution that included 
irrelevant actions did not remain polarised to their initial solution. Rather, these children 
attempted the newly presented solution and then incorporated both solutions into their 
repertoire. Furthermore, children who acquired a solution through personally acquired 
information omitted subsequently demonstrated irrelevant actions to a greater extent 
than did children with prior social information.  
The final two empirical studies investigate the interaction between a model-
based bias of past-proficiency and multiple demonstrations and personal task 
interactions. Past-proficiency relates to a success model-based bias as outlined in Figure 
2 (Rendell et al., 2011). A success model-based bias can refer to instances in which 
learning may be biased towards copying (a) if the payoff is better, (b) in proportion to 
the payoff or (c) the most successful individual. The first two instances refer specifically 
to the outcome of the behaviour whilst the third relates more to the characteristics of the 
model. However, it is unclear whether these instances are occurring in the present, (as 
the model is demonstrating the information which may be transmitted), or in the past 
(the success was demonstrated in the past and that some form of ‘success reputation’ is 
biasing subsequent information transmission). Furthermore, it is not clear whether 
success relates to domain specific model success relating to the specific information 
which is to be transferred or whether it is domain general success, i.e. that the model 
generally has more success in his/her environment, which may also be related to 
dominance and prestige (Henrich & McElreath, 2003). Therefore, we use the term past-
proficiecny to refer to a model’s domain-specific ability shown in the past. As such it 
focusses on the potential for a model to have a reputation for being skilled within the 
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domain in which the model is currently demonstrating. Specifically, children (Chapter 
V) and chimpanzees (Chapter VI) were presented with demonstrations from known 
classmates/conspecifics, of differing proficiency ‘reputations’, regarding the use of one 
or other manipulandi/tool to retrieve a reward. These two studies were tailored to each 
species and their corresponding natural context, rather than attempting a direct 
comparison. The children were motivated to incorporate multiple solutions into their 
repertoire and this appeared to supersede a proficiency-reputation model-based 
transmission bias. However, when one model matched a child’s solution and one model 
offered an alternative solution children were biased towards selecting the solution 
choice of the model with the highest proficiency-reputation. Likewise, the majority of 
chimpanzees were able to use both tools and some chimpanzees asocially learnt new 
methods of reward retrieval. However, the first tool touched by chimpanzees from the 
model-groups indicates a model-based transmission bias as individuals were 
significantly more likely to match the tool demonstrated by the model with the higher 
past proficiency than the lower past proficiency. The thesis concludes (Chapter VII) by 
discussing transmission biases in relation to children and chimpanzees in the broader 
context of learning and cultural evolution.  
 
Format of Chapters 
 The chapters presented here are in publication manuscript format. Before each 
chapter there will be a brief cover sheet, indicating the publication status of each paper. 
References contained in each chapter will be presented at the end of the corresponding 
chapter. Due to the ‘thesis by publication’ format there will be no General Methods 
chapter, the relevant background to the methods involved in the thesis having been 
covered in this chapter.
Chapter I Introduction 
21 
 
References 
Bard, K. A. (2007). Neonatal imitation in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) tested with two 
paradigms. Animal Cognition, 10(2), 233-242.  
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. (1985). Culture and the evolutionary process. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  
Buttelmann, D., Carpenter, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Enculturated chimpanzees 
imitate rationally. Developmental Science, 10(4), F31-F38. 
Chudek, M., Heller, S., Birch, S., & Henrich, J. (2012). Prestige-biased cultural learning: 
bystander's differential attention to potential models influences children's learning. 
Evolution and Human Behavior, 33(1), 46-56. 
Custance, D. M., Whiten, A., & Bard, K. A. (1995). Can young chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) 
imitate arbitrary actions? Hayes & Hayes (1952) revisited. Behaviour, 837-859.  
Dawson, B. V., & Foss, B. M. (1965). Observational learning in budgerigars. Animal 
Behaviour, 13, 470-474. 
Day, R. L., Coe, R. L., Kendal, J. R., & Laland, K. N. (2003). Neophilia, innovation and social 
learning: A study of intergeneric differences in Callitrichid monkeys. Animal Behaviour 
65, 559-571. 
Day, R. L., MacDonald, T., Brown, C., Laland, K. N., & Reader, S. M. (2001). Interactions 
between shoal size and conformity in guppy social foraging. Animal Behaviour, 62(5), 
917-925. 
De Waal, F. (2007). Chimpanzee politics: Power and sex among apes. Johns Hopkins, 
University Press. 
Dean, L. G., Kendal, R. L., Schapiro, S. J., Thierrey, B., & Laland, K. N. (2012). Identification 
of the social-cognitive capabilities underlying human cumulative culture. Science, 
335(6072), 1114-1118. 
Edwards, C. P. (1984). The age group labels and categories of preschool children. Child 
Development, 440-452. 
Chapter I Introduction 
22 
 
Flynn, E. (2008). Investigating children as cultural magnets: do young children transmit 
redundant information along diffusion chains? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B: Biological Sciences, 363(1509), 3541. 
Flynn, E., & Smith, K. (2012). Investigating the mechanisms of cultural acquisition: How 
pervasive is overimitation in adults? Social Psychology, 43(4), 185. 
Flynn, E., & Whiten, A. (2008a). Cultural transmission of tool use in young children: A 
diffusion chain study. Social Development, 17(3), 699-718. 
Flynn, E., & Whiten, A. (2008b). Imitation of hierarchical structure versus component details of 
complex actions by 3-and 5-year-olds. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 
101(4), 228-240. 
Flynn, E., & Whiten, A. (2010). Studying children’s social learning experimentally “in the 
wild”. Learning & Behavior, 38(3), 284-296. 
Frazier, B. N., Gelman, S. A., Kaciroti, N., Russell, J. W., & Lumeng, J. C. (2011). I’ll have 
what she’s having: the impact of model characteristics on children’s food choices. 
Developmental Science, 15(1), 87-98. 
Gergely, G., Bekkering, H., & Király, I. (2002). Rational imitation in preverbal infants. Nature, 
415(6873), 755. 
Henrich, J., & McElreath, R. (2003). The evolution of cultural evolution. Evolutionary 
Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews, 12(3), 123-135. 
Herrmann, E., Call, J., Hernández-Lloreda, M. V., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Humans 
have evolved specialized skills of social cognition: The cultural intelligence hypothesis. 
Science, 317(5843), 1360-1366. 
Heyes, C. M. (1994). Social learning in animals: categories and mechanisms. Biological 
Reviews, 69(2), 207-231. 
Heyes, C. M. (2012). What's social about social learning? Journal of Comparative Psychology, 
126(2), 193-202. 
Hopper, L. M. (2010). ‘Ghost’experiments and the dissection of social learning in humans and 
animals. Biological Reviews, 85(4), 685-701. 
Chapter I Introduction 
23 
 
Hopper, L. M., Flynn, E., Wood, L. A. N., & Whiten, A. (2010). Observational learning of tool 
use in children: Investigating cultural spread through diffusion chains and learning 
mechanisms through ghost displays. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 106, 
82-97. 
Hopper, L. M., Schapiro, S. J., Lambeth, S. P., & Brosnan, S. F. (2011). Chimpanzees’ socially 
maintained food preferences indicate both conservatism and conformity. Animal 
Behaviour, 81(6), 1195-1202. 
Horner, V., Proctor, D., Bonnie, K. E., Whiten, A., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2010). Prestige affects 
cultural learning in chimpanzees. PLoS ONE, 5(5), e10625. 
Horner, V., & Whiten, A. (2005). Causal knowledge and imitation/emulation switching in 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens). Animal Cognition, 8(3), 
164-181. 
Horner, V., Whiten, A., Flynn, E., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2006). Faithful replication of foraging 
techniques along cultural transmission chains by chimpanzees and children. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103(37), 13878-13883. 
Hrubesch, C., Preuschoft, S., & van Schaik, C. (2009). Skill mastery inhibits adoption of 
observed alternative solutions among chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Animal 
Cognition, 12(2), 209-216. 
Jaswal, V. K., & Malone, L. S. (2007). Turning believers into skeptics: 3-year-olds' sensitivity 
to cues to speaker credibility. Journal of Cognition and Development, 8(3), 263 - 283. 
Jaswal, V. K., & Neely, L. A. (2006). Adults don't always know best. Psychological Science, 
17(9), 757-758. 
Kendal, J. R., Rendell, L., Pike, T. W., & Laland, K. N. (2009). Nine-spined sticklebacks 
deploy a hill-climbing social learning strategy. Behavioral Ecology, 20(2), 238-244. 
Kendal, R. L., Coolen, I., & Laland, K. N. (2004). The role of conformity in foraging when 
personal and social information conflict. Behavioral Ecology, 15(2), 269-277. 
Kendal, R. L., Coolen, I., van Bergen, Y., & Laland, K. N. (2005). Trade‐offs in the adaptive 
use of social and asocial learning. Advances in the Study of Behavior, 35, 333-379. 
Chapter I Introduction 
24 
 
Kendal, R. L., Galef, B. G., & Van Schaik, C. P. (2010). Social learning research outside the 
laboratory: How and why?. Learning & Behavior, 38(3), 187-194. 
Kinzler, K. D., Corriveau, K. H., & Harris, P. L. (2010). Children’s selective trust in native-
accented speakers. Developmental Science, 14(1), 106-111. 
Koenig, M. A., Clément, F., & Harris, P. L. (2004). Trust in testimony: Children's use of true 
and false statements. Psychological Science, 15(10), 694-698. 
Koenig, M. A., & Harris, P. L. (2005). Preschoolers mistrust ignorant and inaccurate speakers. 
Child Development, 76, 1261-1277.  
Kuczynski, L., Zahn-Waxler, C., & Radke-Yarrow, M. (1987). Development and content of 
imitation in the second and third years of life: A socialization perspective. 
Developmental Psychology, 23(2), 276-282. 
Laland, K. N. (2004). Social learning strategies. Learning & Behavior, 32(1), 4-14. 
Laland, K. N., & Janik, V. M. (2006). The animal cultures debate. Trends in Ecology & 
Evolution, 21(10), 542-547. 
 Leadbeater, E., & Chittka, L. (2007). Social learning in insects—from miniature brains to 
consensus building. Current Biology, 17(16), 703-713. 
Lyons, D. E., Young, A. G., & Keil, F. C. (2007). The hidden structure of overimitation. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(50), 19751-19756. 
Marshall-Pescini, S., & Whiten, A. (2008). Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and the question of 
cumulative culture: an experimental approach. Animal Cognition, 11(3), 449-456. 
McGuigan, N., Makinson, J., & Whiten, A. (2011). From over‐imitation to super‐copying: 
Adults imitate causally irrelevant aspects of tool use with higher fidelity than young 
children. British Journal of Psychology, 102(1), 1-18. 
McGuigan, N., Whiten, A., Flynn, E., & Horner, V. (2007). Imitation of causally opaque versus 
causally transparent tool use by 3-and 5-year-old children. Cognitive Development, 
22(3), 353-364. 
Meltzoff, A. N., & Moore, M. K. (1977). Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human 
neonates. Science, 198(4312), 75-78. 
Chapter I Introduction 
25 
 
Meltzoff, A. N. (1985). Immediate and deferred imitation in fourteen-and twenty-four-month-
old infants. Child Development, 62-72. 
Mesoudi, A. (2008). An experimental simulation of the “copy-successful-individuals” cultural 
learning strategy: adaptive landscapes, producer–scrounger dynamics, and 
informational access costs. Evolution and Human Behavior, 29(5), 350-363. 
Mesoudi, A. (2011). An experimental comparison of human social learning strategies: payoff-
biased social learning is adaptive but underused. Evolution and Human Behavior, 32(5), 
334-342. 
Mesoudi, A., & O'Brien, M. J. (2008). The cultural transmission of Great Basin projectile-point 
technology I: an experimental simulation. American Antiquity, 3-28. 
Mesoudi, A., Whiten, A., & Dunbar, R. (2006). A bias for social information in human cultural 
transmission. British Journal of Psychology, 97(3), 405-423. 
Mesoudi, A., Whiten A., & Laland, K. N. (2006). Towards a unified science of cultural 
evolution. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 29(4), 329-346. 
Morgan, T. J. H., Rendell, L. E., Ehn, M., Hoppitt, W., & Laland, K. N. (2012). The 
evolutionary basis of human social learning. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: 
Biological Sciences, 279(1729), 653-662. 
Murdock, B., B. (1962). The serial postion effect of free recall. Journal of Experimanet 
Psychology, 64(5), 482-488. 
Nagell, K., Olguin, R. S., & Tomasello, M. (1993). Processes of social learning in the tool use 
of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens). Journal of 
Comparative Psychology, 107(2), 174. 
Prüfer, K., Munch, K., Hellmann, I., Akagi, K., Miller, J. R., Walenz, B., ... & Pääbo, S. (2012). 
The bonobo genome compared with the chimpanzee and human genomes. Nature. 
Rakoczy, H., Hamann, K., Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2010). Bigger knows better: Young 
children selectively learn rule games from adults rather than from peers. British Journal 
of Developmental Psychology, 28(4), 785-798. 
Chapter I Introduction 
26 
 
Rendell, L., Fogarty, L., Hoppitt, W. J., Morgan, T. J., Webster, M. M., & Laland, K. N. (2011). 
Cognitive culture: theoretical and empirical insights into social learning strategies. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(2), 68-76. 
Sanz, C. M., & Morgan, D. B. (2007). Chimpanzee tool technology in the Goualougo Triangle, 
Republic of Congo. Journal of Human Evolution, 52(4), 420-433. 
Tennie, C., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Ratcheting up the ratchet: on the evolution of 
cumulative culture. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, 364(1528), 2405-2415. 
Toelch, U., Bruce, M. J., Meeus, M. T., & Reader, S. M. (2010). Humans copy rapidly 
increasing choices in a multiarmed bandit problem. Evolution and Human Behavior, 
31(5), 326-333. 
Tomasello, M., Call, J., & Hare, B. (2003). Chimpanzees understand psychological states–the 
question is which ones and to what extent. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(4), 153-156. 
Van Bergen, Y., Coolen, I., & Laland, K. N. (2004). Nine-spined sticklebacks exploit the most 
reliable source when public and private information conflict. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society of London, Series B: Biological Sciences, 271(1542), 957-962. 
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2003). Meta‐analysis of theory‐of‐mind 
development: the truth about false belief. Child development, 72(3), 655-684. 
Whiten, A., Custance, D. M., Gomez, J. C., Teixidor, P., & Bard, K. A. (1996). Imitative 
learning of artificial fruit processing in children (Homo sapiens) and chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 110(1), 3. 
Whiten, A., & Erdal, D. (2012). The human socio-cognitive niche and its evolutionary origins. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 367(1599), 
2119-2129. 
Whiten, A., & Flynn, E. (2010). The transmission and evolution of experimental microcultures 
in groups of young children. Developmental Psychology, 46(6), 1694-1709. 
Whiten, A., Goodall, J., McGrew, W. C., Nishida, T., Reynolds, V., Sugiyama, Y., & Boesch, 
C. (1999). Cultures in chimpanzees. Nature, 399(6737), 682-685. 
Chapter I Introduction 
27 
 
Whiten A., & Ham, R. (1992). On the nature and evolution of imitation in the animal kingdom: 
reappraisal of a century of research. Advances in the Study of Behavior, 21, 239-283. 
Whiten A., Hinde, R. A., Laland, K. N., & Stringer, C. B. (2011). Culture evolves. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 366(1567), 
938-948. 
Whiten, A., Horner, V., & De Waal, F. B. (2005). Conformity to cultural norms of tool use in 
chimpanzees. Nature, 437(7059), 737-740. 
Whiten, A., Horner, V., & Marshall-Pescini, S. (2005). Selective imitation in child and 
chimpanzee: A window on the construal of others’ actions. In S. Hurley &N. Chater 
(Eds.), Perspectives on imitation: From neuroscience to social science (pp. 263–283). 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Whiten, A., Spiteri, A., Horner, V., Bonnie, K. E., Lambeth, S. P., Schapiro, S. J., & de Waal, F. 
(2007). Transmission of multiple traditions within and between chimpanzee groups. 
Current Biology, 17(12), 1038-1043. 
Whiten, A., Horner, V., Litchfield, C. A. & Marshall-Pescini, S. (2004). How do apes ape? 
Learning & Behaviour, 32, 36–52. 
Whiten A., & Mesoudi, A. (2008). Establishing an experimental science of culture: animal 
social diffusion experiments. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: 
Biological Sciences, 363(1509), 3477-3488. 
Whiten, A., McGuigan, N., Marshall-Pescini, S., & Hopper, L. M. (2009). Emulation, imitation, 
over-imitation and the scope of culture for child and chimpanzee. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 364(1528), 2417-2428. 
Yamamoto, S., Humle, T., & Tanaka, M. (2012). Chimpanzees’ flexible targeted helping based 
on an understanding of conspecifics’ goals. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 109(9), 3588-3592. 
Zmyj, N., Daum, M. M., Prinz, W., Nielsen, M., & Aschersleben, G. (2011). Fourteen-month-
olds' imitation of differently aged models. Infant and Child 21(3), 250-266.
Chapter II Who do children copy? 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter II  
Who do children copy?  
Model-based biases in social learning 
 
This chapter focusses on reviewing evidence for the adaptive value of model-based 
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Abstract 
This review investigates the presence of young children’s model-based cultural 
transmission biases in social learning, arguing that such biases are adaptive and 
flexible. Section 1 offers five propositions regarding the presence and direction of 
model-based transmission biases in young children, claiming that such biases are 
adaptive. Section 2 discusses the cognitive abilities required for differing model-
based biases and tracks their development in early childhood. Section 3 suggests 
some future areas of research including considering the social aspect of model-based 
biases and understanding their use within a comparative perspective.  
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Introduction 
Social learning is ubiquitous in humans, and fundamental to children’s 
development, but alone cannot explain the unique stability and diversity of human 
culture. Research into cultural evolution has escalated in recent years (Boyd, 
Richerson, & Henrich, 2011; Whiten, Hinde, Laland, & Stringer, 2011), increasing 
our understanding of the circumstances that facilitate social learning. Theoretical 
models of cultural evolution predict the evolution of flexible strategies enabling 
avoidance of unreliable or redundant information, and influencing the circumstances 
under which individuals copy others and from whom they learn (Boyd & Richerson, 
1985). Thus, social learning is not seen as inherently adaptive and must be used 
selectively in the context of the environmental and model-based cues (characteristics 
of a demonstrator exhibiting a behaviour pattern) available to the observer. The use 
of such cues in guiding behaviour is known as ‘cultural transmission biases’ (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985, also termed social learning strategies; Laland, 2004). Transmission 
biases refer to information, which has the potential to be socially learnt, being 
influenced by someone or something. Thus, a bias influences the likelihood of the 
social transmission of information. These are thought to increase fitness more than 
individual learning (Mesoudi & O'Brien, 2008) or unbiased social learning in which 
individuals acquire variants according to the frequency at which they are practiced 
(Rendell et al., 2011). This review discusses how the characteristics of models bias 
the likelihood that an observing child copies a model. Whilst focusing on instances 
of copying a model, we acknowledge that children are able to learn behaviour 
without necessarily reproducing every aspect of a demonstration (Bekkering, 
Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Flynn & Whiten, 2008; Williamson, Meltzoff, & 
Markman, 2008) and that copying a model may serve a function beyond simply 
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learning behaviours (Over & Carpenter, 2011). In Section 1, we argue that model-
based biases enable children to gain the most useful information pertaining to their 
environment; hence a model-based bias is an adaptive cognitive tool that offers an 
evolutionary advantage. Throughout this review, adaptive means that the model-
based bias contributes to an individual’s survival by providing them with more useful 
behaviours within their environment than if such a model-based bias did not exist. In 
Section 2 we describe the developmental shift in the implementation of model-based 
biases, demonstrating increasingly flexible implementation. We conclude in Section 
3 by discussing future considerations and directions.  
 
Model-based Biases 
As children develop they constantly witness alternative methods of achieving 
a goal. This has been mirrored in experiments where children witness divergent 
information from different models relating to tool-use (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, in 
prep), and labels for elements in the environment (Koenig, Clément, & Harris, 2004). 
When faced with divergent information it would be adaptive to select and reproduce 
the information that achieves the outcome most suited for one’s needs, but this can 
be complex. Models have different characteristics that influence our choice, 
including their previous performance, knowledge state, age, sex and social status. 
Furthermore, observers’ own characteristics may influence who is the ‘best’ model 
for them. The potential list of relevant characteristics is endless and a naïve 
individual needs to evaluate these so that the behaviour of the most appropriate 
model, potentially providing the most useful and adaptive behaviour, is adopted.  
It should be noted that, as mentioned above, social learning is not seen as 
universally adaptive. For example, social information might pertain to an outdated 
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environment. Social learning strategies are thought to increase the adaptive value of 
social learning. However, there may be instances whereby a model-based social 
learning strategy may not be inherently adaptive. For example, a bias towards 
copying a model that is successful in one domain might lead to other, non-adaptive 
behaviours, also being copied from this model. This "piggybacking" (Mesoudi & 
O’Brien, 2008, p 23) of non-adaptive behaviour from a particular model could lead 
to maladaptive behaviour. Whilst interesting, this review only focuses on cases 
where we expect a bias to result in adaptive social learning.  
The adaptive value of model-based biases has been investigated in other 
fields, such as evolutionary biology, anthropology and non-developmental domains 
of psychology. Model-based biases have been described as ‘who’ biases (Laland, 
2004), indirect biases (Boyd & Richerson, 1985) and context dependent model-based 
biases (Henrich & McElreath, 2003). Within developmental psychology it has long 
been established that it is important to understand whom children learn from, and 
that children’s learning entails ‘an active construct of the model by the individual’ 
(Užgiris, 1981, p. 2). This review incorporates both evolutionary and developmental 
perspectives to argue that model-based biases are present, are adaptive, and are 
utilised more flexibly with ontogeny.  
 
Section 1: The Adaptive Value of Model-based Biases 
In this section we make five propositions regarding the adaptive value of model-
based biases. To begin, we examine children’s biases towards models whose 
behaviour indicates their desire to transfer information, namely children’s 
receptiveness to pedagogical cueing. Second, we consider children’s ability to 
evaluate and copy the most proficient individual before moving on to discussing 
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characteristics that identify models as belonging to groups with certain reputations 
that children may use to guide their learning. Fourth, we argue that the more similar a 
model is to a child, the more suitable s/he might be as a model, before finishing by 
discussing children’s biases towards models that are prestigious.  
 
Proposition 1: Children are Biased towards those who Intend to Teach 
Csibra and Gergely (2009) argue that children have an innate predisposition 
for receptiveness towards people’s ostensive signals indicating that the person is 
trying to communicate relevant information. These cues may include pointing, eye 
contact, and verbal directions. If a person is actively trying to communicate 
information then, generally, the person is communicating information about the 
environment that they believe will assist the observer. Being sensitive to a model’s 
ostensive cues is adaptive because it enables children’s attention to be drawn to 
important aspects of the environment. The sensitivity to ostensive cues is present 
from infancy, for example fourteen-month-olds search where they see someone point 
(Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005). This sensitivity influences which models 
individuals copy; children imitate a model more when s/he stoops to the child’s level, 
leans in, makes eye contact and talks engagingly (Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme, & 
Bushnell, 2007), gives verbal cues about the importance of actions (Southgate, 
Chevallier, & Csibra, 2009) or performs actions in a seemingly purposeful, rather 
than accidental manner (Carpenter, Akhta, & Tomasello, 1998; Gardiner, Greif, & 
Bjorklund, 2011). Indeed this receptiveness to pedagogical cueing is so strong it can 
limit exploratory play and discovery (Bonawitz, Shafto, Gweon, Goodman, Spelke, 
& Schulz, 2011). Thus children are receptive to pedagogical cueing and are biased 
towards copying models who attempt to share information about the environment.  
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Proposition 2: Children are Biased toward Copying the most Proficient Models 
A model’s success in a particular context indicates his or her ability to deal 
with that environment, therefore a successful model’s behaviour is the most adaptive 
behaviour to adopt. There is evidence that infants are able to discriminate between 
models who act competently or incompetently (Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & 
Daum, 2010) and seven-year-old children preferentially copy children rated by an 
experimenter as being competent rather than less competent (Brody & Stoneman, 
1985). Likewise, the ‘Trust’ paradigm (Harris, 2007; Koenig & Harris, 2005a), 
whereby children are introduced to one reliable model (e.g., labels a ball, “ball”) and 
one unreliable model (e.g., labels a ball, “shoe”), has demonstrated that, from infancy 
to six-years-old, children consistently copy reliable models over unreliable labellers 
for learning words (Koenig et al., 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005b; Vázquez, Delisle, 
& Saylor, 2012) and artefact use (Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; Zmyj et al., 
2010). The labelling of artefacts from models who self-declare they know what is 
right (declaring, “this is a spoon”) are more likely to be copied than models who are 
uncertain (“I think this is a fork”; Jaswal & Malone, 2007). Thus, children are able to 
discern the proficient model and are biased towards the information this model 
provides.  
   
Proposition 3: Children are Biased toward Copying Models Belonging to a 
Group which has a Reputation for being Proficient 
Employing model-based biases regarding an individual’s proficiency is costly 
in terms of time and cognitive processing, as it requires an assessment of the 
behavioural history of a model. Instead, it is more efficient for an individual to be 
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biased towards characteristics of models that are easily identifiable, often indicating 
an individual’s membership to a group. This group may have a different reputation 
for proficiency from another group leading to model-based biases. For example, a 
salient characteristic indicating group membership is age. A ‘copy older over 
younger models’ strategy seems adaptive because older individuals have had more 
experience with the environment and, by their continued existence, have made 
successful choices within the environment. Such age biases exist. Fifteen-month-olds 
are more likely to copy videotaped target acts when presented by an adult versus a 
two-year-old child (Seehagen & Herbert, 2011). Younger (one- to two-year-olds) 
siblings imitate the spontaneous social behaviours of their older (three- to five-year-
old) siblings far more than the other way around regardless of age gap or sex 
differences (Abramovitch, Corter, & Pepler, 1980; Pepler, Abramovitch, & Corter, 
1981). Three- and four-year-olds preferentially copy information provided by an 
adult over a child for novel word learning (Jaswal & Neely, 2006) and game rule 
learning (Rakoczy, Hamann, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2010), and seven- and eight-
year-olds imitate the food choices of older rather than younger children (Brody & 
Stoneman, 1981). This bias towards learning from older individuals is also seen in 
the reproduction of causally irrelevant actions by children; when models use 
causally-inefficient tools, adults are more likely to be copied than children (Elekes & 
Kiraly, 2012), two- and three-year olds do not copy the irrelevant actions 
demonstrated by a peer to the same extent as when demonstrated by adult models 
(Flynn, 2008; Horner & Whiten, 2005), and three- and five-year-olds copy relevant 
actions of both child and adult models but only faithfully reproduce the irrelevant 
actions of adults (McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 
2012). Potentially, children assume that increased age indicates increased proficiency 
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and use this bias to guide their learning (although see Section 2 for instances where 
this does not happen).  
 
Proposition 4: Children are Biased toward Copying Models that Resemble 
Themselves 
Individual differences result in individualised needs within an environment. 
These differences can influence children’s proclivity to gain information from a 
model that is most similar to them, an ‘observer-specific model-based bias’. This 
observer-specific bias may happen at a genetic, physiological or cultural level. For 
example, four- and five-year-olds generally accepted their mother’s claims over 
those of a stranger (Corriveau et al., 2009) indicating that children may select 
information from those more genetically related to them. Familiarity is a confound to 
this interpretation, yet familiarity itself can be a marker of in-group membership and 
infants imitate more actions of a familiar, compared to an unfamiliar, model 
(Learmonth, Lamberth, & Rovee-Collier, 2005). Likewise, three- to five-year-old 
children, given conflicting artefact labels and functions from a known or unknown 
teacher, preferentially copy the known teacher (Corriveau & Harris, 2009b). Children 
also copy the choices of familiar models when choosing personal preferences or 
labelling artefacts (Shutts, Kinzler, McKee, & Spelke, 2009) and in tool use tasks 
(Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, in press; Seehagen & Herbert, 2011). This 
preference for copying familiar models is adaptive because the child and the model 
have definite overlaps in their environment whereas the history of the stranger is 
unknown and, therefore, the information they provide may not be relevant for the 
child’s particular environment.  
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Another salient physiological group difference is sex and whilst sex is not 
necessarily correlated to ability within our environment, children may be influenced 
by cultural sex-role norms. Indeed, eighteen-month-old children discriminate 
between stereotypical male and female artefacts (Serbin, Poulin-Dubois, Colburne, 
Sen, & Eichstedt, 2001). Likewise, three-year-olds copy the preferences of same-sex 
(over different-sex) child models for personal preferences of novel food, clothes, toys 
and games (Frazier, Gelman, Kaciroti, Russell, & Lumeng, 2011; Shutts, Banaji, & 
Spelke, 2010). This adoption of sex-specific behaviour may provide children with 
relevant information pertaining to their physiological needs or it may enable them to 
learn behaviours expected of their sex by their cultural group.  
Learning other appropriate behaviours for one’s cultural group seems 
fundamental to a child’s development and there is evidence for a bias towards 
copying those belonging to the same cultural group. Twelve-month-old infants show 
a personal preference for foods endorsed by a speaker of their native language versus 
a model speaking a foreign language (Shutts et al., 2009). Likewise, Kinzler and 
colleagues found that five- and six-month-old infants attended more to a model 
speaking natural English over a model speaking ‘reverse’ English (the audio was 
played backwards) or a foreign language, and infants are also biased towards 
selecting a toy endorsed by a model speaking their native language (Kinzler, 
Corriveau, & Harris 2007) or using a native accent (Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 
2011). Language is one of the most basic markers of cultural identity and, as seen 
with familiarity, a bias towards learning from models who share your culture may be 
adaptive because the cultural similarity indicates a shared environment, and, 
therefore, the behaviour of the most similar model may be the most relevant.  
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Proposition 5: Children are Biased towards Copying Models with High Status 
Status incorporates two forms of social power; dominance, defined as an 
ability to acquire and monopolise resources over others, often through threatened or 
actual antagonism, and prestige, defined as status through non-agonistic means 
achieved through excelling in valued domains. Henrich and Gil-White (2001) note 
the importance of differentiating these two forms of status, which have their ‘own 
distinct psychology, selected for by distinct evolutionary pressures’ (p. 166). Humans 
can exhibit status through non-agonistic means and attainment of high prestige may 
reflect an individual’s superior ability to deal with his/her physical or social 
environment. The behaviour of high-status individuals, whether the status was 
acquired through skill or force, may thus be adaptive. In turn, it would be adaptive to 
copy models of high status, although such an adaption may result in copying 
behavioural traits that do not relate to the attainment of higher status (Mesoudi & 
O’Brien, 2008), hence the term ‘indirect bias’ (Boyd & Richerson,1985). 
Teacher ratings of social status and dominance of children correlate with 
observable characteristics, such as the age of a child (Grusec & Lytton, 1988), 
his/her size, and the number of wins in agonistic encounters with other children over 
resources (Pellegrini et al., 2007). Flynn and Whiten (2012) investigated both 
dominance and prestige in pre-school children’s social learning. There was evidence 
of a status-based model-based observation bias in these children; in a naturalistic, 
open diffusion setting with a novel puzzle-box, older children were watched more 
than younger children, popular children were watched more than less popular 
children, and more dominant children were watched more than less dominant 
children. This observation bias indicates a potential copying bias of more prestigious 
individuals. As dominant children did not monopolise the task, it seems they were 
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watched out of choice. Further, children were more likely to watch task 
manipulations made by peers they stated that they ‘liked’ rather than peers they 
stated that they did ‘not like’.  
Whether a model is observed by others may, in itself, be a marker of prestige; 
four-year-old children use bystanders’ silent reactions to models such that a model 
who was ‘endorsed’ by bystanders through nods and smiles was copied more for 
labelling novel artefacts than a model whose behaviour was met with negative 
bystander reactions (Fusaro & Harris, 2008). This endorsement effect occurs even 
when the bystander attendance is neutral in comparison to an ignored model 
(Chudek, Heller, Birch, & Henrich, 2012). Children are receptive to the status of 
others and are biased towards learning from those who have higher status both in 
terms of dominance and prestige. It would be fruitful to explore the nature of the 
relation between model status and often associated characteristics, such as 
proficiency and age, to discover what factors contribute towards prestige. Likewise, 
to investigate whether biased copying from prestigious models is, in some 
circumstances, limited to behaviour which potentially contributes to the attainment of 
prestige, rather than being indiscriminate in this regard as theoretically assumed 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1985). 
 
Summary 
 We have outlined five propositions relating to the presence and adaptive 
value of model-based biases. The evidence presented demonstrates that children 
monitor the characteristics or behaviour of others and use this to guide their own 
behaviour. Such abilities drive children to copy others, hence socially learn, in a 
discriminating manner. This behaviour goes beyond simply copying, as it is biased 
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copying and it is this bias which makes copying adaptive. The skills required for the 
implementation of biases are varied. Some model characteristics, such as a model’s 
age and sex, are salient whilst others, such as proficiency and professed knowledge 
state, are more subtle. Evaluation of these more subtle cues requires the development 
of certain cognitive skills, such as an ability to track behaviour and understand the 
knowledge states of others. The next section presents some of the cognitive skills 
that improve the application of model-based biases and discusses their development 
in line with the findings from the social learning literature. 
 
Section 2: The Development of Cognitive Skills Enabling Model-based Biases 
This section reflects on some cognitive skills required in, infancy and early 
childhood which enable and assist in implementing model-based biases. The 
cognitive skills described here are relatively high-level and based on empirical 
papers detailing model-based biases. Therefore, lower-level cognitive processes such 
as working memory, categorisation or language development are not discussed, 
although future work addressing the influence of these processes on model-based 
biases seems pertinent. We argue that these cognitive skills enable children to 
flexibly employ model-based biases in response to environmental and behavioural 
cues. This flexibility is important because it allows children to move beyond the five 
propositions in Section 1 and continually source and copy the ‘best’ model.  
 
From Infancy 
Perspective taking. From infancy children respond differently depending on 
a model’s visual access to stimuli and, therefore, potentially what the model knows 
(Koenig & Echols, 2003; Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008). This 
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perspective taking may facilitate the earliest forms of a model-based bias of 
proficiency. For example, a model who saw where a toy was hidden should be more 
proficient at locating the toy than a model who was unable to see where it was 
hidden. Such a proficient model is only more proficient in the immediate situation, as 
opposed to having a reputation for being proficient. In certain contexts (such as 
locating objects) this type of ‘immediate proficiency’ is more important than a 
reputation for proficiency; indeed, five-year-old children will rely more heavily on a 
model’s visual access (‘immediate proficiency’) than prior accuracy (‘reputation 
proficiency’) when locating a hidden object (Brosseau-Liard & Birch, 2011). This 
reflects flexibility in model-based bias use and whilst this research was conducted 
with five-year-olds, a consideration of context is seen from infancy.  
 
Consideration of context. As seen above, the best model in one context may 
not be the best model in another context, and children appear to show flexibility in 
the model-based biases employed. Six-month-olds are more likely to copy an action 
demonstrated by their mother over a stranger (the experimenter) in the infants’ 
homes, but in a laboratory this pattern is reversed and they preferentially copy the 
experimenter (Seehagen & Herbert, 2012). These authors suggest that infants have 
expectations about the two models’ usefulness as teachers; they spend much time 
with their mothers who demonstrate pedagogical cues in the familiar environment. 
Conversely, an infant might have experienced unfamiliar people mostly in unfamiliar 
settings and, thus, have either formed the expectation that unfamiliar people are 
knowledgeable in unfamiliar environments or display associative learning of 
unfamiliar models in unfamiliar environments. Such appreciation of context is 
sophisticated and as these infants were only six-months-old it seems that adapting 
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model-based biases in different contexts is either automatic or learnt in the first few 
months of life and this flexibility may contribute to the biases adaptive value.  
Context also affects biases toward copying models belonging to a particular 
group, such as an age group. One- and two-year-olds generally imitate spontaneous 
behaviour exhibited by adults more than peers, but the context affects this 
replication, such that imitation of parents is more likely to consist of motor skills 
(e.g. tool use) whereas affective behaviours are imitated from siblings and peers 
(Kuczynski, Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, 1987). These two types of behaviour 
(motor skills and affective behaviours) represent different functions, and therefore 
could elicit different model-based biases. Indeed, four- to five-year-old children 
imitate adults more than children and same age peers when an action is novel, but 
copy a peer over an older child and adult when the action is not novel (Zmyj et al., 
2011). In the first context, the function may be to learn a new skill and, therefore, 
children should be biased towards copying the model who they believe to be more 
knowledgeable (an adult over the child; Fitneva, 2010 ) whereas in the second 
context, the action is familiar and, therefore, the predominant motivation may be to 
learn behaviour appropriate to the child’s own characteristics, i.e. learn what is 
appropriate for a child, and thus children copy the model who is most similar to 
them; another child. Indeed, when the context of the learning is play infants show 
higher fidelity copying of a three-year-old child versus an adult (Ryalls, Gul, & 
Ryalls, 2000) and peers over older children and adults (Zmyj, Aschersleben, Prinz, & 
Daum, 2012), and children also prefer clothes, toys, games and foods endorsed by 
children over those endorsed by adults (Shutts et al., 2010). Furthermore, in a 
diffusion chain paradigm, when an initial adult demonstrated functionally irrelevant 
actions, in a functionally oriented way, the first child copied these actions but 
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subsequent children parsed out the action of the child model they had witnessed 
(Flynn, 2008). Conversely, when an adult model demonstrated irrelevant actions in a 
playful way the behaviour spread; the children copied the child models (Nielsen, 
Cucchiaro, & Mohomedally, 2012). This implies children assess the context and 
copy individuals belonging to groups who will be most proficient in that context, so 
will most aid their learning, or adaptiveness to the environment. Alternatively and as 
touched upon in the introduction and discussed in Section 3, copying may not always 
be driven by a desire to learn but instead a desire to share a social experience 
(Užgiris, 1981), or become more integrated with a social group (Over & Carpenter, 
2012).  
Context also influences perceptions of the relative proficiency of one model 
(or group) over another model (or group). When three- to five-year-olds, presented 
with stick figure ‘adult’ or ‘child’ models, were asked who would provide more 
reliable answers to questions, children selected the adult when the questions were 
within the adult domain, such as the nutritional value of food, but when the subject 
area was toys children deferred to the child model (VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). 
An ability to consider the domain of the behaviour alongside the model 
characteristics is adaptive as it allows for contextual flexibility in behaviour. 
Moreover, children demonstrate flexibility in their choice, such that when children 
are informed that a toy is ‘the adult’s favourite toy’ they defer to the adult, rather 
than a child model, for subsequent information regarding that toy (VanderBorght & 
Jaswal, 2009). The additional flexibility of understanding that there may be 
exceptions to a domain appropriate model-based bias is cognitively sophisticated and 
adaptively biases the child towards the most proficient model in each specific 
instance.  
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Evaluating context may be the most important skill in ensuring that model-
based biases towards certain models and categories (e.g. adult versus child) may be 
used flexibly. The flexibility of biases ensure that whilst children have biases 
towards learning from individuals based on their group membership they understand 
that these groups have different skills involving varying degrees of functional and 
social relevance for the observing child. Therefore, this flexibility increases the 
adaptive value of model-based biases.  
 
Monitoring reactions to the model’s behaviour. Context also involves 
monitoring the effect of a model’s behaviour. This might be the physical effect of the 
action or, more subtly, it may relate to how others react to a model’s behaviour. 
Infants are sensitive to the reactions of others and avoid imitating an action when 
unknown adults react negatively to an adult model actions (Repacholi, 2009) or show 
irritation towards the model (Repacholi & Meltzoff, 2007). A similar pattern is found 
in three- and four-year-olds when the model is a same-aged peer (Frazier et al., 2011) 
and also with novel word copying in four-year-olds who copy the novel artefact 
labels of models for whom bystanders react with smiles, more than the labels given 
by models for whom bystanders react with frowns (Fusaro & Harris, 2008). This 
ability to take account of the reactions of others could facilitate two model-based 
biases proposed in Section 1: first, the reactions of others may indicate that the model 
has performed a behaviour that pleases or displeases others and, therefore, indicates 
some degree of third-party evaluated model proficiency (proposition 2), and second, 
the reactions of others may be directed towards the model themselves and this could 
indicate some level of prestige (proposition 5). Presenting third-party bystanders who 
disapproved of clearly correctly modelled behaviour will help differentiate between 
Chapter II Who do children copy? 
45 
 
these biases. Either way, the ability to monitor the reactions of others is a useful skill 
in the implementation of model-based biases.  
 
From early childhood 
Evaluate the model’s testimony. Evaluating model testimony is important 
for developing model-based biases pertaining to proposition 2 (children are biased 
toward copying the most proficient models) in the preceding section. Studies 
involving model testimony have shown that three-year-olds show mixed 
discrimination of proficient and less proficient models, with evidence of copying the 
behaviour of the reliable model (Birch et al., 2008; Corriveau & Harris, 2009a) but 
also a lack of discrimination of accurate over inaccurate informants (Koenig & 
Harris, 2005b). However, by four to six years, children consistently copy reliable 
models over unreliable labellers for learning words (Koenig et al., 2004; Koenig & 
Harris, 2005b; Vázquez et al., 2012) and artefact use (Birch et al., 2008). Six-year-
olds also copy reliable labellers over tangential labellers, who are not inaccurate but 
fail to answer the question, although four-year-olds fail to make such a distinction 
(Vázquez et al., 2012). Furthermore, three-year-olds have difficulty discriminating 
between models when the reliable informant is anything other than 100% accurate, 
whereas four-year-olds are able to make distinctions between a model who was right 
75% of the time versus a model who was right 25% of the time (Pasquini, Corriveau, 
Koenig, & Harris, 2007). Thus, with development comes an increasing ability to 
understand and evaluate a model’s testimony, and hence develop increasingly 
sophisticated flexibility in the use of model-based biases regarding a model’s 
proficiency. 
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Understanding knowledge states. Models can express different levels of 
confidence in their knowledge state by using terms such as ‘know’, ‘think’, ‘guess’ 
and ‘don’t know’ which present a scale of knowledge confidence. Children as young 
as three years are able to distinguish between a model verbally indicating uncertainty 
(“I think this is a spoon”) and one indicating certainty (“This is a spoon”) in a word 
learning paradigm (Jaswal & Malone, 2007), but struggle with subtleties of ‘know’, 
‘think’ and ‘guess’ (Moore, Bryant, & Furrow, 1989). By four years, children are 
able to distinguish between ‘know’ versus ‘think’ or ‘guess’ and this improves with 
age, but until eight years children have difficulty distinguishing between ‘think’ and 
‘guess’ (Moore et al., 1989).  
Children also adapt to the context of the responses; if a model’s hesitant 
response could be caused by indecision rather than uncertainty, four-year-olds are 
more likely to accept a model’s artefact label (Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001) so as 
children develop they become more skilled at evaluating the subtle differences in a 
model’s declared knowledge state. This understanding aids both children’s 
assessment of the potential proficiency of the model. For example, self-declared 
knowledge can assist in ascertaining the proficiency of the model. Model-based 
biases involving a model’s self-declared knowledge state occur from as young as 
three years of age, with increased word learning (Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001; 
Sabbagh, Wdowiak, & Ottaway, 2003) and irrelevant action reproduction (Wood et 
al., 2012) following demonstrations from models with declared knowledge versus 
declared ignorance.  
 
Assessing specialists and generalists. Humans have common shared 
knowledge; we all know the difference between cats and dogs. But we also have 
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specialist knowledge; doctors have expertise in anatomy while farmers have 
expertise with crops. It follows that if a model fails to show proficiency in shared 
general knowledge the perception of his/her proficiency should be more negatively 
affected than if the same model fails to show proficiency in an area of specialist 
knowledge. Young children are able to make this important distinction, as three- and 
four-year-olds do not copy a model who specialised in labelling dog species over a 
neutral model for novel artefact labelling, but a model who wrongly labelled dogs as 
cats was not chosen over a neutral model (Koenig & Jaswal, 2011). This skill 
improves with development (Koenig & Jaswal, 2011); whilst four-year-olds do not 
generalise beyond word knowledge having witnessed a reliable word labeller, five-
year-old children generalise that the reliable word labeller will also excel in broader 
facts (Brosseau-Liard & Birch, 2010). This assessment of specialists and generalists 
allows children to use more subtle group membership model-based biases rather than 
more salient distinctions (e.g. age) whilst ensuring that they realise the potential 
limitations of this group membership.  
 
Tracking prior personal experience and knowledge. Models do not always 
provide the best information available to a child. For model-based biases to be truly 
adaptive, children need to be able to not only compare one model with another, but 
should evaluate a model in comparison with their own knowledge and behaviour. 
This is evident in five-year-old children; when given no previous chance to interact 
with a task children will generally copy the irrelevant actions demonstrated by a 
model, but when they have successful prior interaction with a task, children will copy 
a new solution demonstrated by a model but parse out the causally irrelevant actions 
demonstrated by the model (Wood, Kendal & Flynn, 2013). Likewise, three-year-old 
Chapter II Who do children copy? 
48 
 
observers only use the false testimony of a model until their first failed attempt 
implementing this social information, and four- and five-year-olds improve upon this 
by only copying models up to the point at which the social information provided by 
the model conflicts with their personal information, the latter they then favour 
(Clément, Koenig, & Harris, 2004; Ma & Ganea, 2010).  
As expected, a child’s reliance on his/her personal information is affected by 
the interplay between the efficacy of his/her own behaviour and the efficacy of the 
model’s actions, such that children with a difficult prior experience are more likely to 
imitate an adult’s precise means of achieving something, compared to children with 
an easy prior experience (Williamson et al., 2008). When the choice of the model 
conflicts with the child’s knowledge of an optimum tool for task completion, 
children ignore a model’s choice unless the model explicitly states that her method is 
functionally appropriate or when the model’s choice is only slightly less efficient 
than the child’s preference (DiYanni & Kelemen, 2008). A developing confidence in 
one’s personal knowledge within a task thus ensures effective evaluation of a 
model’s behaviour, although over confidence in one’s personal information causes 
the rejection of potentially useful social information (Jaswal, McKercher, & 
VanderBorght, 2008). This relative assessment ability ensures that the model-based 
biases, whether they are towards models giving pedagogical cues, models with a 
reputation for proficiency or prestige, or models belonging to a group with a 
reputation for these characteristics, are not copied blindly. This ability to use prior 
information to critique behaviour ensures model-based biases represent adaptive 
heuristics.  
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Calibration of multiple pieces of information or cues. There are instances 
whereby children are presented with multiple pieces of information about a model 
and these may pertain to different biases as presented in Section 1. For example, a 
child may receive information from a proficient child or an incapable adult (Wood et 
al., 2012). When this occurs, children must calibrate biases regarding age and 
proficiency to guide their behaviour. For example, children favour older, over 
younger, children when making food choices, only until older models are shown to 
be less competent than younger models in an unrelated domain (Brody & Stoneman, 
1985), and three- and four-year-olds will choose to label a novel object in accordance 
with a child model, rejecting the adult’s label, if the adult’s previous behaviour was 
unreliable (Jaswal & Neely, 2006). So, here children calibrate a group-based bias of 
model age against, the potentially more informative, proficiency bias and were more 
biased towards individual proficiency.  
Such calibration also occurs with regard to familiarity and proficiency model-
based biases. When three- to five-year-old children were given conflicting artefact 
labels and functions from a known or unknown teacher they copied the known 
teacher when no further information was provided (Corriveau & Harris, 2009b). 
However, when the unfamiliar teacher was more accurate than the familiar teacher at 
labelling familiar objects, four- and five-year-old children moderated their trust of 
the models, whilst three-year-olds showed little change in behaviour. Thus, 
development between three and five years demonstrates an emerging ability to 
calibrate across multiple model-based biases. There are a number of explanations for 
this; first, three-year-old children may have a model-based bias towards familiar 
adults but have not developed a proficiency model-based bias. Such an explanation is 
unlikely as from infancy children seem able to judge proficiency (Zmyj et al., 2010; 
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see proposition 2). Second, three-year-old children may be more influenced by the 
familiarity bias than a proficiency bias, perhaps due to a lack of social interactions 
with those who are unfamiliar. Third, three-year-old children may struggle with such 
calibration, perhaps due to a poorer working memory. Such a proposal could be 
tested by assessing the calibration of older individuals when a cognitive load is put 
upon their working memory.  
There are other instances where children fail to calibrate; when two models 
grasp at opaque cups, three- to four-year-olds choose the cup grasped by the model 
who saw which cup held the reward (they choose the ‘seeing’ model), but when both 
models point at the different locations children did not favour the ‘seeing’ model, 
indicating that the pointing of the ‘unseeing’ model was confusing (Palmquist, 
Burns, & Jaswal, 2012). For children of this age, the model-based biases towards 
pedagogical cues (pointing) may be stronger than biases towards models that are 
proficient due to their visual access, the latter of which is more cognitively complex 
for the child’s understanding. Likewise, five-year-old children’s imitation of a model 
is more influenced by the model’s group membership (adult versus child) than the 
model’s knowledge state (model stating knowledge or ignorance about task 
completion) even though children of this age are able to correctly identify knowledge 
state (Wood et al., 2012). This indicates that a failure to correctly calibrate biases is 
not due to a lack of ability to implement one of the biases but due to the lack of 
experience a child has had with multiple biases or the cognitive load required within 
such calibration.  
Alternatively, young children may understand that a model’s self-declared 
knowledge state is not always an accurate gauge of the reliability or utility of the 
behaviour they exhibit. A sophisticated assessment of a model’s credibility must 
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involve calibration of self-declared knowledge and behavioural accuracy of the 
model. Adults are able to make such calibrations (Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman, & 
Hastie, 2007; Tenney, Spellman, & MacCoun, 2008) but, whilst four- and five-year-
olds are able to make accurate judgements regarding knowledge and accuracy 
independently, they are unable to discredit models that exhibit inconsistencies 
between knowledge and accuracy (Tenney, Small, Kondrad, Jaswal, & Spellman, 
2011). This, again, supports the notion that children can process single model-based 
biases but find the calibration of multiple biases challenging. This section has 
demonstrated that there is a cognitive cost associated with model-based biases. 
Different types of model-based biases, such as a bias towards pedagogical cues, may 
be automatic and these may dominate in younger children until they are able to 
understand other biases, such as proficiency, and calibrate across these biases 
effectively.  
 
Summary 
 We have highlighted some of the cognitive skills required for children to 
employ model-based biases. Many of these skills develop in the first five years of a 
child’s life and are a vital part of a child’s social cognition; for example, monitoring 
affect, perspective taking and language. Other cognitive skills enable children to 
move beyond employing model-based biases, to facilitating flexibility in their use; 
for example, understanding context, assessing specialists and generalists, tracking 
prior personal experience and calibrating multiple biases, abilities requiring other 
cognitive skills such as language and working memory. Additionally, children 
require experience, something that can only come with time. Flexibility in the use of 
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model-based biases is important as it allows children to move beyond simple biases 
to evaluating the context and the model’s behaviour.  
 
Section 3: Future Directions 
 We conclude this review by suggesting avenues of investigation of model-
based biases beyond our argument of their adaptiveness and exploration of their 
development. Specifically, we focus on the emerging argument that social learning 
and, potentially, model-based biases are not solely based on individuals acquiring the 
best environmental information. We thus discuss and acknowledge the importance of 
the social interaction between the observer and the model. Following this, we 
highlight the usefulness of a comparative perspective, demonstrating that model-
based biases in non-human animals show both convergences and divergences with 
that of children.  
 
Understanding the Social Side of Model-based Biases  
This review has deliberately focussed on the adaptive value of model-based 
biases, arguing that preferentially copying certain models will lead to learning the 
most adaptive behaviour for one’s environment. However, we accept that we have 
assumed that the behaviours learnt are primarily functional (e.g. tool use or culturally 
appropriate). However, to-be learnt behaviour may also be inherently social, and 
social interaction is an additional or alternative function of imitation (Grusec, & 
Abramovitch, 1982; Over & Carpenter, 2012; Užgiris, 1981). Therefore, an 
interesting future direction would be to focus on the interplay between social and 
functional motivations to copy within the context of model-based biases. As seen in 
the previous section, discussing context, children’s model-based biases change if the 
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to-be copied behaviour becomes more social (e.g. play) than functional (Zmyj et al., 
2011). Investigating model-based biases in the context of how the content of the 
modelled behaviour affects the use of model-based biases would shed more light on 
whether the same biases are employed differently when the domain of the to-be-
copied behaviour varies.  
Additionally, it would be interesting to explore model-based biases which 
focus on the social behaviour of models, building upon work showing that how 
socially engaging a model is can affect whether children copy her or him (Elekes & 
Kiraly, 2012; Nielsen, 2006; Nielsen, Simcock, & Jenkins, 2008). Nielsen (2006) and 
Nielsen & Blank (2011) argue that this is due to a social motivation to share an 
experience or create an affiliation and that certain social, or indeed anti-social 
behaviours, influence the copying of functional behaviours. Furthermore, witnessing 
scenarios involving third-person ostracism can increase imitation in children (Over & 
Carpenter, 2009). This last example, whilst not demonstrating a model-based bias, 
does suggest that the model-based biases in the previous examples may be a by-
product of an emotional reaction to a social situation rather than an evolutionary 
adaptation. Of course, such behaviour might be both an emotional reaction and 
adaptive, in that pro-social behaviour is thought to be an evolutionary adaptation 
(Dawkins, 1989). Thus children may be biased towards copying models that are pro-
social both in order to obtain pro-social traits and because pro-social behaviour offers 
a degree of prestige.  
  
Comparative Research 
The adaptive nature of model-based biases has been discussed in relation to 
non-human animals’ (henceforth animals) social learning (Laland, 2004). In the last 
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decade there has been a surge of activity directed at identifying and understanding 
the variety of biases that might influence social learning in animals (Kendal, Coolen, 
van Bergen, & Laland, 2005; Rendell et al., 2011). Work with animals demonstrates 
some interesting convergences with children. For example, in line with proposition 1 
both dogs (Range, Viranyi, & Huber, 2007) and chimpanzees (Buttelmann, 
Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2007), seem able to assess a model’s intentions, and in 
line with proposition 2, some animals demonstrate biases toward the most proficient 
models, preferring to copy (sticklebacks, Duffy, Pike, & Laland, 2009) or observe 
(capuchins, Ottoni, de Resende, & Izar, 2005) the successful. 
Regarding proposition 3, some animals are biased towards models belonging 
to a group that may have a reputation for being more proficient; stickleback fish copy 
the feeding location of older, larger fish as opposed to smaller, younger fish (Duffy 
et al., 2009). Mice are more influenced by the food choices of adult mice over 
younger mice (Choleris, Guo, Liu, Mainardi, & Valsecchi, 1997) and young female 
guppies copy the mate choice of older versus younger female guppies (Amlacher & 
Dugatkin, 2005). Wild chimpanzees show selective attention towards observing 
models of the same age or older, but not younger, than themselves (Biro et al., 2003), 
and captive chimpanzees’ learning of food retreival methods is influenced more by 
older versus younger individuals (Horner, Proctor, Bonnie, Whiten, & de Waal, 
2010) and by dominant or ‘expert’ individuals (Kendal et al., in prep).  
In line with proposition 4, some animals are biased towards models who are 
more genetically similar (rats; Saggerson & Honey, 2006) and more familiar (fish; 
Swaney, Kendal, Capon, Brown, & Laland, 2001) to themselves. With regard to 
proposition 5 some animals are biased towards individuals with high status; 
dominant individuals appear to elicit social learning more than subordinates in a 
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wide variety of species (e.g. chimpanzees, Bonnie, Horner, Whiten, & de Waal, 
2007, Horner et al., 2010; capuchins, Dindo, Thierry, & Whiten, 2008; hens, Nicol & 
Pope, 1994, 1999; and seals, Sanvito, Galimberti, & Miller, 2007). However, the 
degree to which this is analogous to a copying high-status individuals bias in children 
depends upon the degree to which high-status represents aggressive force (power) or 
deference (prestige) in human and non-human species. Work with animals also offers 
some interesting interpretations for these biases. For example in lemurs, dominant 
individuals were more likely to be copied, as they monopolised resources (Kendal et 
al., 2010) and thus provided the most demonstrations (although this is not the case 
with the preferential observation of dominants in chimpanzees; Kendal et al. in 
prep.). In children non-monopolization of resources has been seen (Flynn & Whiten, 
2012) yet the bias remained; the dominant children were watched out of choice. 
Another interesting interpretation from animal research is that increased social 
learning from a particular model may not always be due to model-based biases, but 
instead be due to an attentional by-product. Benskin, Mann and Lachlan (2002) and 
Katz and Lachlan (2003) suggest that female finches copy the feeding location of 
male rather than female conspecifics because females pay attention to males as 
potential mates, while females do not need to attend to one another. Conversely, 
male finches show no feeder preference because male finches pay equal attention to 
males (as potential rivals) and females (as potential mates). Likewise, male canaries 
are more innovative and better at personally learning a new feeding behaviour, but 
behaviours demonstrated by the females are more likely to be copied as the males are 
aggressive towards male observers (Cadieu, Fruchard, & Cadieu, 2010). Lastly, wild 
vervet monkeys learn to retreive more food from an artificial fruit task when the task 
is modelled successfully by a female rather than a male, possibly because of females’ 
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tolerance of observer presence (van de Waal, Renevey, Favre, & Bshary, 2010) or 
their likelihood, as the philopatric sex, of possessing relevant knowledge.  
This body of work on animals suggests that model-based biases are not 
unique to humans. However, what may be unique to humans is the flexibilty with 
which biases are used through children’s developing ability to be receptive to 
pedagogical cues (Call & Tomasello, 1999), perspective take (Brosseau-Liard & 
Birch, 2011), categorise and generalise proficiency (Koenig & Jaswal, 2011), assess 
context (Zmyj et al., 2011) and calibrate multiple model-based biases (Jaswal & 
Neely, 2006), not to mention our species’ understanding of complex language and 
higher-order mental state understanding (Jaswal & Malone, 2007). Alternatively, 
what could be unique to humans is that imitation serves a social as well as a 
functional motivation, as outlined above (Nielsen, 2009). Animals may have the 
ability to categorise and generalise proficiency, or calibrate multiple model-based 
biases, and these are avenues that need further investigation.  
 
Conclusions 
Children are prolific social learners, adopting the language, tool-use, 
knowledge and beliefs of those around them. We have highlighted that children do 
not source information indiscriminately, but rather use biases to guide their learning. 
What makes children’s social learning truly impressive is their ability to implement 
strategies of model-based biases. These biases are adaptive in that they enable 
children to source the ‘best’ trait variant without the cost of assessing every trait 
variant displayed within the environment. Whilst some biases seem automatic, 
children need a suite of cognitive skills to use other model-based biases. These 
cognitive abilities are not all necessary for the occurrence of model-based biases, but 
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they all assist in ensuring model-based biases are effective, because they enhance 
children’s appraisals of models and allow children to flexibly evaluate the context. 
Model-based biases and some of the accompanying cognitive skills required to learn 
and maintain these biases are not unique to humans. However, the combination of 
model-based biases and children’s development of species-unique socio-cognitive 
skills (Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012; Whiten & Erdal, 2012), 
such as language and understanding another’s mental states, means that children 
stand alone in their ability to source the right model for them, in the right context, 
and use this model’s behaviour to guide their own behaviour; resulting in a uniquely 
adaptive form of social learning.
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Abstract 
Many animals, including humans, acquire information through social learning. 
Although such information can be acquired easily, its potential unreliability means it 
should not be used indiscriminately. Cultural ‘transmission biases’ may allow 
individuals to weigh their reliance on social information according to a model’s 
characteristics. In one of the first studies to juxtapose two model-based biases, we 
investigated whether the age and knowledge state of a model affected the fidelity of 
children’s copying. Eighty-five 5-year-old children watched a video demonstration of 
either an adult or child, who had professed either knowledge or ignorance regarding a 
tool-use task, extract a reward from that task using both causally relevant and irrelevant 
actions. Relevant actions were imitated faithfully by children regardless of the model’s 
characteristics, but children who observed an adult reproduced more irrelevant actions 
than those who observed a child. The professed knowledge state of the model showed a 
weaker effect on imitation of irrelevant actions. Overall, children favoured the use of a 
‘copy adults’ bias over a ‘copy task-knowledgeable individual’ bias, even though the 
latter could potentially have provided more reliable information. The use of such social 
learning strategies has significant implications for understanding the phenomenon of 
imitation of irrelevant actions (overimitation), instances of maladaptive information 
cascades and for understanding cumulative culture.  
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Introduction 
The adaptive value of social learning is now evident in a vast range of animals, from 
humans to insects, increasing our understanding of cultural evolution and social 
intelligence (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Tennie et al., 2009; Whiten & van Schaik, 
2007). When acquiring information individuals face evolutionary trade-offs between the 
acquisition of costly but accurate personal information and the use of cheap but 
potentially less reliable social information (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Kendal et al., 
2005). Accordingly, the use of social information should be determined by an 
evaluation of the content of the information presented and the characteristics of the 
information provider, the model (e.g. Henrich & Gil-White, 2000; Rendell et al., 2011; 
van Bergen et al., 2004). Nevertheless, the transmission of information from one 
individual to another has resulted in the accumulation of errors or cascades of 
misinformation (Rieucau & Giraldeau, 2009; Tanaka et al., 2009). For example, humans 
copy non-functional attributes (Mesoudi & O’Brien, 2008), and maladaptive behaviors 
pass between individuals within groups (McGuigan & Graham, 2009; Whiten & Flynn, 
2010).  
Furthermore, humans copy actions that, at face value, appear to be causally 
irrelevant to their goal (Horner & Whiten, 2005). The propensity to copy these 
irrelevant actions appears in different cultures (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010), increases 
with age (McGuigan et al., 2007; Nielsen, 2006) into adulthood (McGuigan et al.,2011), 
and persists despite interventions such as reinforcement for the identification of 
irrelevant actions and direct instructions to only copy relevant actions (Lyons et al., 
2007, 2011). Such pervasiveness has led some to view copying irrelevant actions as, ‘an 
evolutionary adaption that is fundamental to the development and transmission of 
human culture’ (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010, p.729). For example, imitating apparently 
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causally irrelevant elements of tool use demonstrations may help children acquire 
means actions before they fully understand their causal role (Hernik & Csibra, 2009). If 
one does not know whether an action is causally necessary it may be adaptive to copy 
this action.  
Copying causally irrelevant actions could only be adaptive if individuals 
develop flexible strategies that dictate the circumstances under which they copy others. 
Theoretical models have explicitly considered heuristics that may be adopted in social 
learning, which have been termed ‘social learning strategies’ (Laland, 2004) and 
‘cultural transmission biases’ (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Rendell et al., 2011). 
According to Boyd and Richerson (1985), individuals may employ an indirect bias 
towards learning from a model with specific preferential characteristics. These indirect 
biases, or context-dependent (Henrich & McElreath, 2003) model-based biases, include 
characteristics such as the model’s age. Using such model-based biases allows 
populations to approach adaptive optima much faster than they otherwise would under 
individual learning or ‘guided variation’ (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). For example, 
Mesoudi and O’Brien (2008) found, by simulating the cultural transmission of 
prehistoric projectile-points, that the population-level pattern observed in Nevada’s 
archaeological record was consistent with a bias of wholesale copying of a successful 
hunter’s projectile-point design, including non-functional but selectively neutral aspects 
(such as color), rather than copying particular projectile-point attributes.  
In an argument analogous to that of Laland (2004) regarding the relative 
abundance of cognitively challenging versus simpler social learning strategies in the 
animal kingdom, we argue that within a species there may be differences in the 
propensity to use certain model-based biases. Specifically, children may find a ‘copy 
adult over child’ strategy relatively easy to implement compared to a ‘copy task-
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knowledgeable individual’ strategy (Henrich & Broesch, 2011) for a number of reasons. 
First, an understanding of age develops earlier than an understanding of knowledge 
(Edwards, 1984; Wellman et al., 2001) and thus related biases may also develop earlier. 
Second, age may be a more salient characteristic and thus involve less cognitive 
processing. Third, children may understand that self-declared knowledge states may be 
less reliable than age. In the current study five-year-old children received 
demonstrations of observably relevant and irrelevant actions in relation to the goal of 
extracting a reward from an artificial fruit and we investigated whether the observing 
child’s subsequent behavior was influenced by the model’s age and/or knowledge state. 
Kirkpatrick and Dugatkin (1994) found the strategy of ‘copy older individuals’ 
to be a prominent heuristic. There is evidence that older models elicit more social 
learning than younger models in many species (e.g. seals, Sanvito et al., 2007; mice, 
Choleris et al., 1997; guppies, Amlacher & Dugatkin 2005, Dugatkin & Godin, 1993; 
chimpanzees, Biro et al., 2003, Horner et al., 2010). Likewise, human developmental 
research has considered model age as a determining factor in social learning for some 
time. Observational studies have shown that younger (1- to 2-year-old) siblings imitated 
their older (3- to 5-year-old) siblings far more than the other way around regardless of 
age gap or sex differences (Abramovitch et al., 1980; Pepler et al., 1981). When 
presented with two models of differing ages (two years younger, same age, or two years 
older) simultaneously, eight year olds imitate the food preference choice of older and 
same age peers over younger peers (Brody & Stoneham, 1981). Similarly, when the two 
models presented were a child and an adult, three- and four-year-olds preferentially 
used information provided by an adult over a child, for word learning (Jaswal & Neely, 
2006) and simple rule games, interpreting the adult’s behavior as normative (Rakoczy et 
al., 2010) 
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The effect of a model’s age on children’s social learning is modulated by the 
content of the to-be-copied behavior. Two-action, artificial fruits tasks have shown that 
14-month-old infants (Hanna & Meltzoff, 1993) and 3-, 4- and 5-year-old children, 
(Flynn & Whiten, 2008a; Hopper et al., 2008, 2010) imitate relevant actions performed 
by a peer to the same extent as children in studies with adult models (McGuigan et al., 
2007). However, studies looking at the imitation of irrelevant actions show that 2- and 
3-year old children did not copy the irrelevant actions demonstrated by a peer to the 
same extent as irrelevant actions presented by an adult model (Flynn, 2008; Horner & 
Whiten, 2005). Subsequently, McGuigan et al. (2011) explicitly investigated the effect 
of a model’s age on the copying of irrelevant actions. Observers of various ages (3- and 
5-year-olds and adults) copied significantly more irrelevant actions when they were 
modelled by an adult as opposed to a 5-year-old child. It remains unclear whether this 
disposition indicates a bias of ‘copy adults’ or the more cognitively complex bias of 
viewing a child model as ‘less rational and knowledgeable’ than an adult model (Flynn 
2008, p. 3549). 
The effect of a model’s knowledge state on children’s social learning strategies 
is less clear. By five years of age children have a concept of a model’s expertise 
(Azmitia, 1988; Birch et al., 2008, 2010; Moore et al., 1989), knowledge (Koenig & 
Harris, 2005; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001; Wellman et al., 2001), intention to teach (Ziv 
et al., 2008) and infer a model’s knowledge state based on his/her age (Taylor et al., 
1991). One might expect observers to rely more heavily on an individual’s 
demonstration when that individual has professed knowledge in the specific task 
domain (Henrich & Broesch, 2011). Furthermore, although there has been theoretical 
speculation of the existence of a hierarchy of transmission biases (McElreath et al., 
2008), the interaction between biases remains unclear. We are only aware of one study 
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investigating the interaction of copying biases of children of a model’s age and 
competence. In this study the competence information, exhibited in an unrelated task, 
outweighed age information such that children (aged 7- to 8-years-old), in order of 
preference, copied: a high-competence peer, a high-competence younger model, a low-
competence peer and low-competence younger model (Brody & Stoneman, 1985). To 
test a task-directed context bias, however, one must manipulate the model’s professed 
knowledge state of the specific task. 
The current study explicitly investigated the effect of two model-based biases on 
children’s copying fidelity. We contrasted the model’s age (adult versus peer model) 
with a bias that might require greater assessment, the model’s task-directed knowledge 
state (task-knowledgeable versus task-ignorant model). The completion of a two-action 
tool-use task (Dawson & Foss, 1965), which included causally relevant and irrelevant 
components, was demonstrated by one of four models differing with respect to these 
biases. We predicted that: (1) an observer who witnessed a model successfully extract a 
reward from a task would imitate the relevant actions demonstrated using the same 
means to extract the reward regardless of the model’s characteristics. (2) In line with 
McGuigan et al. (2011), children who witnessed an adult model would exhibit higher 
levels of imitation of causally irrelevant actions than those who witnessed a child 
model. (3) Children faced with a task-knowledgeable model would show higher levels 
of imitation of causally irrelevant actions than those presented with a task-ignorant 
model. Finally, (4) in line with Brody & Stoneman (1985), there would be a hierarchy 
of transmission biases with a task-knowledgeable adult facilitating the highest level of 
imitation of irrelevant actions, and a task-ignorant child producing the lowest levels of 
imitation of irrelevant actions, with potential differences between the two other models 
allowing the hierarchy of biases to be examined further. 
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 Method 
Participants 
Ninety-six 5-year-old children (45 males, M = 65 months, SD = 3.5 months) 
from schools in County Durham participated. There were no significant differences for 
sex, [χ2 (8, N = 96) = 2.29, p = .97] or age (F8, 87 = 0.81, p = .60) across the experimental 
conditions and the no model control. 
 
Materials 
A two-action task, the transparent version of the ‘Glass Ceiling Box’ (GCB; see 
Figure 1, Flynn, 2008; Horner & Whiten, 2005; McGuigan & Graham, 2009; McGuigan 
et al., 2007; 2011) was used. The GCB is a transparent box with an opening at the front 
that can be revealed by sliding or lifting a door. The goal is to retrieve a Velcro-backed 
sticker reward from a tube located behind the door, by inserting a stick tool (a 22cm rod 
with Velcro on the end) into the tube. The demonstrated actions directed to the door at 
the front of the GCB are causally necessary to retrieve the reward. The GCB has a 
further opening in the roof, covered by a two-bolt defence that can be removed by 
poking or dragging them from the opening with the stick tool. This hole leads to an 
empty compartment with a ‘glass ceiling’ preventing physical access to the reward, so 
actions directed to the bolts or the upper compartment are observably causally irrelevant 
to retrieving the reward.  
Chapter III Model age and knowledge state 
77 
 
 
Figure 1. The Glass Ceiling Box (GCB) showing a model performing one of the 
irrelevant actions. Photo from Flynn (2008). 
 
Design 
A between-groups design was used, with children randomly allocated to one of 
four conditions pertaining to the model’s characteristics (adult professing knowledge, 
adult professing ignorance, 5-year-old professing knowledge and 5-year-old professing 
ignorance, N = 85) or a no model control (N = 11). The control group was relatively 
small as the GCB has been administered in several experiments (Flynn, 2008; Horner & 
Whiten, 2005; McGuigan et al., 2007, 2011) with controls showing similar levels of 
interaction and success as shown in the current experiment. Both models were female 
and unknown to the participants. After observing a video of the model’s initial entrance 
and profession of knowledge or ignorance about task completion, participants watched 
one of two video demonstrations of the reward being extracted from the GCB. These 
clips were identical, regardless of the model’s age, and counterbalanced across 
Bolt defence which 
lead to the glass ceiling 
Door defence which 
lead to a reward 
located inside a tube 
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conditions; the only difference was the depiction of different methods (method 1, poke-
bolts-then-slide-door, and method 2, drag-bolts-then-lift-door). As participants had 
more than one response trial, there was a within-groups variable of trial number (T1 and 
T2). In the no-model control condition children were presented with the GCB without 
witnessing any demonstration.  
 
Procedure 
Children were tested individually in a quiet place in their school. Each child sat 
at a table in front of a laptop computer with the GCB on an adjoining table. The child 
was told, “Today I have brought in this toy. This is a video of me showing the toy to 
Emma. Watch closely and listen carefully.” The child then watched an introduction to 
one of the video demonstrations in which the model walked into a room, looked at the 
GCB and turned to the camera professing either knowledge, “I know this game, I’ve 
played with it lots of times, I know exactly how to do this” or ignorance, “This is a new 
game, I have never seen it before, I don’t know how to do it.” Children watched this 
introduction twice and after each viewing were asked, “Had Emma seen the game 
before? Did she know how to do it?” By the second viewing all participants answered 
correctly.  
Then the child was told, “We asked Emma to play with the box and recorded 
what happened.” Children watched one of two video demonstrations of either the 
method 1 or method 2 sequences of actions being carried out on the GCB. Unlike 
McGuigan et al. (2011), these video clips showed only the hands and arms of a petite 
adult. Thus any difference in participant’s behavior was due to model characteristics 
alone and not the physical differences in the demonstration (e.g. motor coordination) or 
ostensive cues. Twenty adults, blind to the study, watched the video clips and were 
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asked who performed the actions. All labelled the demonstrations as desired, with those 
seeing a child at the beginning labelling the demonstration as having been performed by 
a child and those who witnessed an adult at the beginning attributing the actions to an 
adult. 
The sequence of actions was as follows: the tool was used to remove two bolts 
on top of the GCB either by poking or dragging, the tool was inserted into the top hole 
and the glass ceiling tapped three times (totalling five irrelevant actions), a door at the 
front of the GCB was moved by either sliding or lifting it, the tool was inserted and a 
sticker removed. Children watched the video demonstration of the sequence of actions 
twice and were then told, “I would like you to play with the toy. There is no right or 
wrong way. I just want to see you play.” The child was allowed to interact with the 
GCB (T1) until (s)he retrieved the reward successfully or three minutes had elapsed. If 
required, children were given a prompt, “You can play with it as much as you like.” 
Each child was then shown the demonstration clip a third time and allowed a further 
attempt (T2).  
In the no-model condition each child was told, “Lots of children have played 
with this toy today and now I would like you to play with it.” They received three 
minutes with the GCB and were given the same prompt as the experimental group. All 
children were rewarded with a sticker for their participation, regardless of their success. 
 
Analysis 
Each participant’s performance was scored on four variables, i) successful 
removal of the sticker, ii) method used to open the door iii) method used to remove the 
bolts and, iv) how many irrelevant actions were copied. The experimenter coded all 
children’s behavior whilst two independent observers, blind to the children’s allocated 
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condition, coded 26% of the sample. All Cronbach’s Alpha scores were 0.95 or above, 
showing an excellent level of rater-reliability.  
 
Results 
All of the dependent variables (i to iv above) were compared between conditions 
(type of model) and within participants (T1 versus T2). Children who observed a 
demonstration were significantly more successful at retrieving the reward at T1 (success 
rate = 68%, p < .01 Fishers Exact Test, one tailed) than children in the control condition 
(18%), with a significant increase in success from T1 to T2 (McNemar Z1, 85 = -3.21, p < 
.01).  
 
Copying of Causally Relevant Actions 
No child in the no-model control condition lifted the door, while ten slid it. The 
number of children in the experimental conditions who copied the door-opening method 
they witnessed was significantly greater than chance with 71% copying the method at 
T1 [χ2 (1, N = 68) = 11.53, p < .001] and 72% at T2 [χ2 (1, N = 74) = 13.84, p < .001]. 
Our first hypothesis was that model characteristics would not affect the copying of 
causally relevant actions. To test this we ran a multi-level logistic regression of relevant 
actions across T1 and T2 with corrected standard errors to account for the dependence 
between a child’s T1 and T2 behavior. Model age, model knowledge state and 
demonstration witnessed (slide or lift) were entered as predictors and copying of action 
witnessed was the dependent variable. Age and knowledge state were not significant 
predictors of the imitation of the relevant actions. The demonstration witnessed (lift or 
slide) was a significant predictor (see Table 1), children copied the door-slide method 
more than the door-lift method (97% slide, 46% lift).  
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Table 1. The effects of a model’s age and knowledge state and demonstration witnessed 
on relevant actions copied. Logistic regression with standard errors 
Parameters Estimate (SE) 
Intercept  1.74         (0.47) *** 
Model Age
a 
0.35         (0.44) 
ns 
Model Knowledge State
b 
0.46         (0.44) 
ns 
Demonstration
c 
1.76         (0.44) *** 
a 
Dichotomous variable 0=child 1=adult; 
b
 Dichotmous variable 0= ignorant 
1=knowledgeable; 
c
 Dichotomous variable 0=lift 1=slide; 
ns 
 p > .05, *** p < .001 (two 
tailed). 
 
Copying of Causally Irrelevant Actions 
Only two children in the control condition produced an action directed to the 
(causally irrelevant) bolts, both poking them, and no child tapped the tool into the upper 
compartment. Baseline behavior comparisons were made between the children in the 
control group and the experimental children at T1 only, as by T2 the children had 
experience with the GCB. Children who observed a demonstration performed 
significantly more irrelevant actions at T1 (M = 1.55, SD = 1.74, t34 = -4.72, p < .001.) 
than control children (M = 0.27, SD = 0.65). In the experimental conditions, the number 
of children who copied the bolt removal method they witnessed was significantly 
greater than chance at T1 [χ2 (1, N = 48) = 16.33, p < .001] and T2 [χ2 (1, N = 60) = 
23.67, p < .001]. As the bolt method witnessed did not affect the total number of 
irrelevant actions performed at T1 (t83 = -1.54, p = .13) or T2 (t83 = -1.61, p = .11), the 
data were collapsed across methods.  
It was hypothesised that children would imitate more irrelevant actions when 
they were presented by an adult as opposed to a child and when presented by a self-
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reported knowledgeable model as opposed to an ignorant model. To test this we 
conducted a Poisson regression analysis of irrelevant actions, using joint modelling with 
robust standard errors to account for the dependence between a child’s T1 and T2 
behavior, with model age, model knowledge state, participant age and participant sex 
entered as predictors. Participant age and sex were not significant predictors. As 
expected, model age was a significant predictor (adult model, M = 2.26, SD = 1.81, 
child model M = 1.51, SD = 1.80, p < .05), but, contrary to expectation, knowledge state 
was not (see Table 2 and Figure 2). Thus, whilst children who witnessed an ignorant 
model produced fewer (M = 1.71, SD = 1.78) irrelevant actions than children who 
witnessed a knowledgeable model (M = 2.05, SD = 1.89, p = .18), this difference was 
not significant.  
 
Table 2. Effects of a model’s age and knowledge state and participant demographics on 
the number of irrelevant actions performed. Poisson regression using joint modelling 
with robust standard errors 
Parameters Estimate    (SE) 
Intercept    0.55         (1.75) 
ns
 
Trial 2 – Trial 1   0.35         (0.01) *** 
Model Age
a 
  0.41         (0.18) * 
Model Knowledge State
b 
  0.24         (0.18)
 ns
 
Participant’s Sexc   0.24         (0.18) ns 
Participant’s Age  -0.01         (0.03) ns 
a 
Dichotomous variable 0=child 1=adult; 
b
 Dichotmous variable 0= ignorant 
1=knowledgeable ; 
c
 Dichotomous variable 0=male 1=female; 
d
 Continous variable 
age (months); 
ns 
 p > .05, * p < .05 (two tailed), *** p < .001 (two tailed). 
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Pairwise comparisons of the four conditions (knowledgeable adult, 
knowledgeable child, ignorant adult, ignorant child) showed that, whilst children 
presented with the child-ignorant model performed significantly fewer irrelevant actions 
compared to children presented with the adult-knowledgeable model (t78 = 2.66, p < 
.01), no other differences were significant (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Mean number of irrelevant actions (out of 10) performed depending 
on model identity over the two trials.  
Note. IC: ignorant child, KC: knowledgeable child, IA: ignorant adult, KA: 
knowledgeable adult. Asterisks indicate a difference in means more than expected 
between groups (*p < .05). Asterisk within a bar indicates a significant increase in 
irrelevant actions from T1 to T2 (*p < .05). 
 
Post-hoc Analysis 
Overall, children produced significantly more irrelevant actions at T2 (M = 2.21 
SD = 1.89) than T1 (M = 1.55, SD = 1.74; t84 = -3.71, p < .001). This increase was 
significant for those who observed a knowledgeable adult (paired t-test: t19 = -2.53, p < 
* 
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.05, Cohen’s d = 0.56), and a knowledgeable child (t22 = -2.08, p < .05, d = 0.40) but 
not for those who observed an ignorant adult (t21 = -1.87, p = .08, d = 0.28), or an 
ignorant child (t19 = -0.98, p = .34, d = 0.28, see Figure 2), although the power for the 
latter two tests was low.  
 
Discussion 
The current study extends research into cultural transmission by explicitly 
examining the role of, and relation between, two different model-based context 
dependent transmission biases: age and professed task-knowledge state. The results 
confirmed two of our initial predictions, (1) that children would imitate relevant actions 
regardless of a model’s age and knowledge state, and (2) that children would imitate 
more causally irrelevant actions produced by an adult than a peer. Our third and fourth 
predictions, (3) that children would use a task-directed bias to imitate irrelevant actions 
produced by a task-knowledgeable, but not task-ignorant, model and (4) that there 
would be a hierarchy of transmission biases, received comparatively weaker support. 
 As predicted, and in line with previous findings (Flynn, 2008; Flynn & Whiten 
2008a, 2008b; Hopper, et al., 2008, 2010), the model’s characteristics did not affect the 
high levels of imitation of the relevant actions. Such faithful imitation of relevant 
actions appears to be canalisation, where the various possibilities for manipulating a 
task are reduced after a social demonstration (Flynn & Whiten, 2008a; Hopper et al., 
2010; Horner, et al., 2006). This is clearly illustrated by the 46% of children who 
observed the door of the GCB being lifted and produced a lift action despite the 
availability of a preferred more salient slide method.  
We posit that young children exhibit a social learning strategy (Laland, 2004) of 
‘faithfully copy adults’ because, whilst children copied relevant actions from both peers 
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and adults, they copied significantly more irrelevant actions when demonstrated by an 
adult versus a peer. The demonstrations were presented on video, and all children 
witnessed the same pair of hands manipulating the task, regardless of condition, so the 
bias we witness for children to copy an adult over a peer was not due to any ostensive 
cues present in the demonstration. Such a finding is in line with McGuigan et al. (2011), 
who found similar results with three- and five-year-old children. The irrelevant actions 
in the current study were not neutral (Mesoudi & O’Brien, 2008) but entailed a cost in 
terms of delaying reward acquisition. This demonstrates the potential power of such 
transmission biases to establish maladaptive information cascades, sometimes at the 
population level (Bikhchandani et al., 1998; Henrich & McElreath, 2003).  
A task-directed bias of ‘copy task-knowledgeable individuals’ did not override 
the tendency to copy adults, despite the fact that the children in the current study could 
correctly identify the model’s knowledge state. In contrast, when Brody & Stoneman, 
(1985) juxtaposed peer age and competence (on an unrelated task), a competence bias 
outweighed any age bias, such that younger peer/high-competence models were 
preferred over same-age peers/low competence ones. Whether this difference in results 
is due to the model’s ages (adult and child model versus younger and same age peer 
model), reputation (knowledge state versus reliability) or medium of competency (self-
declared in a video clip versus a description given by an adult experimenter) are unclear 
but is ripe for further exploration.  
Whilst the regression model of irrelevant actions indicated that knowledge state 
was not a significant predictor, pairwise comparisons (of the four model types) showed 
that a knowledgeable adult demonstration resulted in more irrelevant actions being 
produced than an ignorant child demonstration; no other groups differed significantly. 
Thus a model’s age was weighted over the professed task-knowledge, but task-
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knowledge was evaluated to some degree, lending some support to the idea that there is 
a hierarchy of transmission biases as reported by McElreath et al. (2008). Additionally, 
post hoc analysis revealed that children, who witnessed knowledgeable models, 
reproduced significantly more irrelevant actions at their second attempt than children 
witnessing ignorant models, who showed no change across their attempts. Taken 
together these results provide limited support for a knowledge-based strategy. 
Our findings provide, to our knowledge, the first evidence in any species 
(consistent with the analogous prediction of Laland, 2004) that, in decisions pertaining 
to the cultural transmission of information, easily adopted heuristics, such as age-based 
biases, may be more readily used than more cognitively challenging biases, such as 
those involving assessment of another’s knowledge state with regard to the task at hand. 
The question then is, whether an age bias is inherently more adaptive than a knowledge 
state bias or whether it is simply easier to evaluate? Whilst there is an argument that 
children may understand that self-declared knowledge states may be less reliable than 
age, we believe it is more likely that the preference for a ‘copy adult over child’ strategy 
involves less cognitive processing and is a by-product of its relative ease to implement. 
An understanding of age develops earlier than an understanding of knowledge 
(Edwards,1984; Wellman et al., 2001) and thus related biases may also develop earlier.  
This cognitively easier assessment of a model’s age may, however in itself, be 
adaptive because adults, by their increased experience with the world, are generally 
more proficient and knowledgeable models than children. Children infer a model’s 
knowledge state based on his/her age (Taylor et al., 1991), thus this correlation may 
lead to effective social learning strategies. However, when the correlation is 
contradicted, and there are instances of ignorant adults or knowledgeable children, 
children still rely on the age bias, resulting in the current study’s finding that children 
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are as likely to copy the irrelevant actions of an ignorant adult as a knowledgeable child. 
This occurred even though every child was able to correctly identify the knowledge 
state of the model. Thus, it would be informative to conduct future research into 
children’s developing ideas of the inter-relation between age and knowledge state.  
The relation between these biases also helps us to understand the phenomenon 
of copying causally irrelevant actions. The children’s selective reproduction of causally 
irrelevant actions suggests that this phenomenon may not be as pervasive as previously 
thought (Lyons et al., 2007; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010) in that the replication of 
irrelevant actions was modulated in response to a model’s characteristics. However, that 
is not to say that imitation of irrelevant actions can no longer be considered an 
evolutionary adaptation (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). The copying of causally 
irrelevant actions may reflect a cognitively complex process within a child, involving 
assumptions about the ‘irrelevance’ of particular actions. For example, it would be 
adaptive for children to evaluate which seemingly causally irrelevant actions may be 
relevant actions whose causal efficacy they are yet to understand (Hernik & Csibra, 
2009) versus those actions which are simply irrelevant. A wise assumption may be that 
adults are more likely to produce ‘irrelevant’ actions that actually have an opaque 
function of social or cultural relevance, whilst irrelevant actions of peer-aged children 
should be taken at face value. Therefore an overriding strategy of ‘adults should be 
imitated faithfully, children should be imitated unless their actions seem non-functional’ 
may be extremely adaptive, even though this heuristic may sometimes lead to the 
copying of irrelevant actions.  
High fidelity copying is a necessary factor underlying the unique capacity of 
humans for cumulative cultural transmission (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Faithful 
imitation is the bedrock of cultural ratcheting (Tennie et al., 2009) as it prevents any 
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loss of knowledge, allowing for potential improvement in subsequent 
individual development and/or generations. Faithful imitation of causally irrelevant 
actions, as exhibited in this study, may appear to conflict with our species' capacity for 
cumulative culture due to its potential to lead to cascades of misinformation. However, 
the current study has demonstrated that the selective nature of children’s social learning, 
in copying adults over children and potentially assessing the irrelevance of apparently 
causally irrelevant actions, explains why a more likely result is the advancement of 
complex, socially learned behaviours. 
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Chapter IV  
Copy me or copy you?  
The effect of prior experience on social learning 
 
The previous chapter (Chapter III) revealed that continued demonstration and 
interaction affected imitation of irrelevant actions relative to model identity such that 
those who witnessed a knowledgeable model increased the number of irrelevant actions 
they performed more than those who witnessed an ignorant model. This task behaviour 
change is explicitly tested in Chapter IV, an empirical study investigating children’s 
solution choice and social learning mechanisms following differing prior experiences 
and multiple social demonstrations. This chapter is published, as is, in Cognition, 
(2013), 127(2), 203-213. 
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Abstract 
The current study investigated children’s solution choice and imitation of causally-
irrelevant actions by using a controlled design to mirror naturalistic learning contexts in 
which children receive social information for tasks about which they have some degree 
of prior knowledge. Five-year-old children (N = 167) were presented with a reward 
retrieval task and either given a social demonstration of a solution or no information, 
thus potentially acquiring a solution through personal exploration. Fifty-three children 
who acquired a solution either socially or asocially were then presented with an 
alternative solution that included irrelevant actions. Rather than remaining polarised to 
their initial solution like non-human animals, these children attempted the newly 
presented solution, incorporating both solutions into their repertoire. Such an adaptive 
and flexible learning strategy could increase task knowledge, provide generalizable 
knowledge in our tool-abundant culture and facilitate cumulative culture. Furthermore, 
children who acquired a solution through personally acquired information omitted 
subsequently demonstrated irrelevant actions to a greater extent than did children with 
prior social information. However, as some children with successful personally acquired 
information did copy the demonstrated irrelevant actions, we suggest that copying 
irrelevant actions may be influenced by social and causal cognition, resulting in an 
effective strategy which may facilitate acquisition of cultural norms when used 
discerningly.  
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Introduction 
Children are prolific social learners and the extent of their faithful imitation of a 
model’s behaviour is matched by no other species including other great apes (Dean, 
Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012; Tennie, Greve, Gretcher, & Call, 2010; 
Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009). A wealth of previous research 
demonstrates that providing children with social information about a novel artefact can 
lead to the canalisation of behaviour, whereby children faithfully reproduce an observed 
behaviour without attempting possible alternatives (Flynn & Whiten, 2008a; Hopper, 
Flynn, Wood, & Whiten, 2010; Horner, Whiten, Flynn, & de Waal, 2006), sometimes 
leading to the copying of clearly causally irrelevant actions (Horner & Whiten, 2005; 
Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012). Children’s copying of irrelevant actions appears in 
different cultures (e.g. Kalahari Bushmen, Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010 and western 
society, Horner & Whiten, 2005), increases with age (McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & 
Horner, 2007; Nielsen, 2006) into adulthood (Flynn & Smith, 2012; McGuigan, 
Makinson, & Whiten, 2011), and persists despite many forms of intervention (Lyons, 
Young, & Keil, 2007; Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011).  
As children often receive social information regarding artefacts about which they have 
some degree of prior knowledge, the overarching aim of the current study was to 
understand how children’s imitation of socially demonstrated solutions and causally 
irrelevant actions are influenced by experiencing multiple solutions to a problem.  
When new social information contrasts with prior information children may 
draw upon ‘social learning strategies’, heuristics guiding their use of social information 
(Laland, 2004). Boyd and Richerson (1985) suggest that learning one solution can 
inhibit further exploration of a problem, with such conservatism common in non-human 
animals. Chimpanzees that discover one solution for food retrieval are unlikely to try a 
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more efficient solution and when one solution is precluded, those expert in the blocked 
solution do not adopt an alternative solution (Hrubesch, Preuschoft, & van Schaik, 
2009). Similarly, Hopper, Schapiro, Lambeth and Brosnan (2011) found conservatism 
to initial social information even when an alternative behaviour, which was similar in 
difficulty, produced a higher value reward. Conservatism to personally acquired 
information continues in the face of equally beneficial alternate social information in a 
number of species (starlings, Templeton & Giraldeau, 1996; guppies, Kendal, Coolen, 
& Laland, 2004; sticklebacks, van Bergen, Coolen, & Laland, 2004; see Kendal, 
Coolen, van Bergen, & Laland, 2005 for a review). This reluctance to weight social 
information over personally acquired information can be overcome with sufficiently 
persuasive social information (nutmeg manikins, Rieucau & Giraldeau, 2009), costs to 
using personal information (fish, Kendal et al., 2004; orangutans, Lehner, Burkart, & 
van Schaik, 2011), or when individuals are allowed continued attempts to retrieve a 
reward (capuchin monkeys, Dindo, Thierry, de Waal, & Whiten, 2010).  
We address children’s use of these strategies by investigating children’s 
behaviour after prior task experience and subsequent demonstrations of alternate task 
solutions which included causally irrelevant actions. Specifically, relating to differing 
solutions of an artificial-fruit task, we investigate: (1) how children weigh an initial 
socially demonstrated task solution with a subsequent socially demonstrated task 
solution, (2) whether personally acquired information affects children’s copying of 
subsequent socially demonstrated solutions, (3) solution choice over time and (4) the 
influence of prior experience on the often prevalent reproduction of irrelevant actions. 
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Demonstrations of Alternative Solutions 
Our first research question investigated how children weigh an initial socially 
demonstrated task solution with a subsequent socially demonstrated task solution. 
Traditionally, social learning studies have presented social information in the form of 
one or multiple demonstrations of the same solution, resulting in children faithfully 
copying the demonstrated solution in subsequent trials (Flynn & Whiten, 2008a, 2008b; 
Hopper et al., 2010; Horner et al., 2006). For example, Flynn and Whiten (2008a) found 
that only one child out of 80 attempted a solution that was different to the one 
witnessed. Similarly, in infancy use of a familiar tool is inflexible relative to a novel 
tool (Barrett, Davis, & Needham, 2007). Further, in studies of normativity children 
protest when an individual subsequently performs a behaviour that the child associates 
with a different, previously socially learnt behaviour (Rakoczy, Warneken, & 
Tomasello, 2008), suggesting that once a model demonstrates a solution children are 
quick to establish how something ‘ought’ to be done and do not accept the more 
recently demonstrated behaviour.  
In contrast, Siegler and Opfer (2003) found that when working through 
mathematical problems children possess multiple numerical representations, such that a 
single child could utilise different methods to obtain the correct answer to similar 
problems. They suggested that children are motivated to acquire multiple strategies to 
solve a problem and that when similar problems are presented close in time children 
may use different solution strategies in their repertoire. In the current study, where some 
children were provided with social demonstrations of alternative solutions, we predicted 
that children would imitate the model’s first demonstration. We made no clear 
predictions about what children would do upon witnessing a second, alternative 
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solution. Such an investigation, however, is important as it reflects real-life learning and 
reveals the relative prevalence of solution canalisation and multiple strategy acquisition.  
 
Personally Acquired Information 
The relation between children’s acquisition of knowledge through their own 
experience (personal learning) and through their interactions with others (social 
learning) has been of interest since the beginning of the empirical study of 
developmental psychology (e.g. Piaget, reviewed by DeVries (1997)). Adults can 
demonstrate an inherent resistance to changing their opinion (Ehlrich & Levin, 2005) 
and although the number of, consensus among, and performance of demonstrators can 
result in adults disregarding their personal choice, participant confidence, success rate 
and non-public answers increase the probability of maintaining one’s own choice (Asch, 
1951, 1956; Morgan, Rendell, Ehn, Hoppitt, & Laland, 2012). Children with divergent 
personal information, regarding solutions to a reward extraction task, tend to converge 
upon a single solution in a social setting (Flynn & Whiten, 2010) suggesting children 
have some degree of social conventionality. If, however, social information is 
inaccurate (Clément, Koenig, & Harris, 2004), if the model is demonstrating an 
inefficient (Pinkham & Jaswal, 2011) or non-affordant method (DiYanni & Kelemen, 
2008), or if the model has an ‘unreliable’ reputation (Ma & Ganea, 2010), children are 
more likely to rely upon their personally acquired information. Equally, when children 
are presented with a difficult experience of retrieving a reward, they copy an alternative 
technique (Williamson, Meltzoff, & Markman, 2008; Williamson & Meltzoff, 2011). 
Likewise, when a child’s personally-acquired easy solution to a task becomes 
ineffective s/he defers to a model’s task actions (Williamson et al., 2008). In the current 
study the difficulty or effectiveness of the solution was not manipulated. Therefore, the 
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current study makes a significant contribution to previous research by addressing 
children’s relative weighting of prior, personally-acquired information against 
subsequent socially-acquired information when both provide solutions of comparable 
efficiency and validity. Due to the novelty of our research question we made no specific 
predictions regarding children’s solution choice. 
 
Solution Choice over Time 
Traditionally, observational learning studies provide children with a single phase 
consisting of a demonstration of either a single (Lyons et al., 2007) or two or three 
(Flynn & Whiten, 2008b; Wood et al., 2012) demonstrations of the same solution, 
followed by a response phase. In the current study there were two phases of 
demonstrations (differing varieties) and responses consisting of two to seven trials. This 
allowed investigation of whether the number of solutions children experience and the 
source (personal/social) of those solutions affected their behaviour as their task 
experience increased. Whilst previous studies show canalisation to a demonstrated 
solution (as outlined above), there are rare instances of innovation and behavioural 
spread of such innovations (Whiten & Flynn, 2010) suggesting that as a child’s 
experience with a task grows and as other solutions are witnessed s/he may be 
motivated to explore alternative solutions.  
 
Irrelevant Action Imitation 
There are conflicting theories as to why children imitate irrelevant actions. 
Lyons et al. (2011) suggest that when naïve children receive social information their 
causal beliefs become distorted by the demonstration of irrelevant actions to the extent 
that they believe that such actions are causally necessary. Alternatively, children may 
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not encode these actions as functionally necessary to acquiring the reward. Instead, they 
are unsure of the purpose of the actions and copy them as a default strategy which is 
refined later (Whiten, Horner, & Marshall-Pescini, 2005), or they interpret the model’s 
actions as meaningful (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010), or normative (Kenward, Karlsson, 
& Persson, 2011; Kenward, 2012). Conversely, children may copy irrelevant actions to 
serve a social function of sharing an experience with a model (Užgiris, 1981) whereby 
children's social goals, identification with the model and with the social group in 
general, influences the copying of irrelevant actions (Over & Carpenter, 2012).  
The current study aimed to discern between these explanations by asking a 
number of critical questions. First, does the social demonstration of two alternative 
methods lead to the extraction of only the critical sequences of actions required to reach 
a desired goal (Buchsbaum, Gopnik, Griffiths, & Shafto, 2011; Byrne, 1999)? Second, 
would children incorporate irrelevant actions presented in a demonstration that used the 
same solution as the children had themselves previously discovered? With both these 
questions, if the children omit the irrelevant actions it would suggest that the imitation 
of irrelevant actions may be due to adapted casual reasoning or, more simply, employ a 
strategy of ‘copy now, refine later’ (Whiten et al., 2005). Alternatively, if children copy 
these irrelevant actions faithfully it would suggest a more normative or social 
explanation. Third, does personally acquired experience decrease the copying of 
irrelevant actions of a previously unseen solution? Williamson et al. (2008) and 
Williamson and Meltzoff (2011) found that children with personally acquired success 
do not adopt an alternative technique involving the use of an opaque, causally irrelevant 
action. By presenting both an alternative solution and irrelevant actions within that 
solution we investigated whether children would be faithful to their previous solution, 
or whether they would adopt the new solution, either only including the relevant 
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actions, or in its entirety. If children imitate the alternative strategy but do not imitate 
the irrelevant actions it would suggest that there is an absence of social or normative 
motivation towards copying the puppet’s irrelevant actions. Instead, their omission 
would suggest that children’s personally acquired information gives them a casual 
understanding of the task (Lyons et al., 2011), or already refines their understanding of 
the task (Whiten et al., 2005) suggesting a more causal explanation for irrelevant action 
reproduction.  
 
Summary 
This study investigated how 5-year-old children behave after experiencing 
multiple solutions to a problem. Children of this age were chosen to allow for a 
comparison with related empirical work investigating imitation of tool use (e.g. 
Buchsbaum et al., 2011; McGuigan et al., 2010; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010; Wood et 
al., 2012). Our study adopted a two-action artificial fruit paradigm (Dawson & Foss, 
1965; Whiten, Custance, Gomez, Teixidor, & Bard, 1996), the Sweep-Drawer Box 
(SDB, see Figure 1), a puzzle-box that contained a reward held in place by a series of 
defences. Critically, there were two separate solutions to the SDB, a drawer and a sweep 
mechanism that could be used to release the reward. Using a task with two possible 
solutions allowed a number of distinctions to be identified: (a) the propensity to 
discover each of these solutions during personal exploration, (b) the level of replication 
of a demonstrated solution compared to the level of production of an alternative 
solution, and (c) fidelity or exploration of solution use once an alternative solution was 
demonstrated. Irrelevant actions were incorporated into the demonstrations allowing 
investigation of whether personally acquired information, or multiple solution 
demonstrations, would reduce the copying of irrelevant actions. We made no specific 
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predictions regarding a child’s solution choice or irrelevant action reproduction 
following receipt of additional social information but such an investigation allowed us 
to examine such real-life contexts in a controlled manner. 
 (a)     (b)     (c)      (d) 
Figure 1. The Sweep-Drawer Box (panel a). Puppet using the sweep (panel b). Top view 
of SDB showing movement of sweep and drawer (panel c). Puppet using the drawer 
(panel d). 
 
Method 
Design 
 The experiment had two phases both consisting of task information and task 
interaction. Phase 1 manipulated the source of the child’s original task information such 
that children either had personal or social experience. Phase 2 manipulated the 
subsequent task information such that successful children either had agreeing or 
opposing solutions or no further information and unsuccessful children either had their 
first demonstration or no further information. This design facilitated the investigation of 
children’s behaviour after experiencing multiple solutions to a problem through the 
following assessments: (1) children’s behaviour following alternative (Phase 1 and 
Phase 2) socially-demonstrated task solutions; (2) children’s solution choice following 
personally acquired information (Phase 1) and subsequent social information (Phase 2); 
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(3) tracking solution choice over time (in multiple Phase 2 response trials); and (4) 
investigating the often prevalent reproduction of irrelevant actions following both 
phases. 
 
Participants 
One hundred and seventy children were recruited from eleven primary schools 
in County Durham, UK. Three participants were excluded from the study due to 
experimenter error leaving 167 (79 males, M = 65.7 months, SD = 3.52 months). There 
were no significant differences in sex [χ2 (7, N = 167) = 3.22, p = .86] or age (F7, 159 = 
0.76, p = .62) distribution across the eight conditions.  
  
Apparatus 
A two-action task, the ‘Sweep-Drawer Box’ (SDB, see Figure 1), was used. The 
SDB is a transparent box with an opening at the top where a capsule containing a 
reward (a sticker) can be inserted. After insertion the capsule falls onto an opaque 
platform where one of two spatially separated and functionally unique mechanisms can 
be manipulated in order to push the capsule to a lower level. These two manipulandi 
are, (1) a silver sweeper with a red handle (see Figure 1b) that when pushed moves the 
capsule to a hole through which the capsule falls to the lower level, and (2) a blue 
drawer with a red handle (see Figure 1d) that can be pulled outwards producing a gap 
through which the capsule falls to the lower level. Once in the lower level the capsule 
rests behind a black opaque door which can be opened to obtain the sticker. The capsule 
containing the sticker was inserted into the SDB by the experimenter with her left hand 
and on her right hand was a puppet, ‘Pip’. A puppet was used to avoid a model-based 
bias of copying the irrelevant actions of an adult model (see Wood et al., 2012). Whilst 
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there is a potential issue with the experimenter also being the controller of the puppet 
we found that children were markedly different in their reactions to Pip than they had 
been to the same experimenter in previous studies (Wood et al., 2012), instead their 
behaviour was similar to studies where a second experimenter had operated puppets 
(e.g. Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2009; Kenward, 2012). For example, 
participants exclaimed (when Pip performed irrelevant actions), ‘Silly Pip, why is Pip 
doing silly things?’ and (when demonstrating the alternate method), ‘Pip, you are 
cheating’. Although anecdotal, this suggests that the experimenter operating the puppet 
did not influence children’s copying any more than another adult operating the puppet.  
 
Procedure 
Children were tested individually at a table in a quiet area in their school. First 
the experimenter introduced the child to the puppet ‘Pip’ and completed a few easy 
tasks, such as finding stickers, to relax the child and introduce the concept of turn-
taking with the puppet. The child was then asked to sit in front of the SDB and the 
experimenter said, “Today I have brought in this toy. I would like you and Pip to take 
turns to see if you can get the sticker out. Take a really good look at it. Can you see it 
Pip? (Pip nods). Can you see it (child’s name)?” The experiment then consisted of two 
phases which involved information acquisition and the child’s subsequent task 
interaction. Which condition a participant was placed into was determined by systematic 
allocation in Phase 1 (every third child was given social information, and the other two-
thirds were given no initial social information), their subsequent behaviour in Phase 1 
and systematic allocation in Phase 2 (with distribution partly predetermined to ensure 
correct participant numbers per condition). Due to high levels of personal success at 
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solving the task there were fewer children in no-information (Phase 1) conditions than 
personal (Phase 1) conditions. This design resulted in eight conditions (see Table 1).  
In Phase 1 children were given either no information and were told, “You play 
with it first,” and progressed straight to the task interaction part of Phase 1, or were told, 
“It’s Pip’s turn first” and given a demonstration prior to interacting with the task 
themselves; the children watched as the experimenter put the capsule in the SDB and 
then used her other hand, with the puppet on, to extract the reward twice, both times 
using the same solution (see Figure 1). The puppet’s sequence of actions was as 
follows: the capsule was moved from the opaque level to the lower level using either the 
sweep or drawer solution. Immediately after the capsule fell a further five irrelevant 
actions were performed with whichever manipulandi was being used, either the drawer 
or sweeper, so that it was moved a further five times (forwards and backwards for the 
sweeper and in and out for the drawer). Then the door was opened and the capsule 
obtained.  
After extraction, a sticker was put on Pip’s pile and the experimenter said, 
“That’s a sticker for Pip.” Demonstration of the two solutions (sweep or drawer) was 
counterbalanced across all conditions. Children then had two response trials, T1 and T2, 
and could interact with the task to successfully extract the reward using either the sweep 
or drawer solution (‘success’) or fail to extract the reward (‘fail’) after three minutes. 
Three minutes allowed sufficient time for success with the SDB but did not make 
unsuccessful participants uncomfortable. If required, the child was given prompts such 
as, “You can play with it as much as you like. You won’t break it.” They were never 
explicitly told to touch any part of the SDB. If successful in T1 a sticker was added to a 
child’s pile and the child was allowed a second trial (T2). The children’s behaviour 
partly determined which Phase 2 information they received.  
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In Phase 2 all children were told, “Now it’s Pip’s turn” and watched as the 
puppet did one of four things: (a) No information (conditions 3, 6 and 7a), in which the 
puppet looked at the SDB for 20 s but made no contact with it. Halfway through Pip 
was encouraged by the experimenter, “You can do whatever you like Pip, you won’t 
break it” and after 20 s the experimenter said, “I don’t think Pip wants a turn. It’s your 
turn now,” (b) Agreeing demonstration (conditions 2 and 5), in which the puppet 
extracted the reward twice, both times using the same solution as the child had used in 
Phase 1, (c) Alternate demonstration (conditions 1 and 4), in which the puppet extracted 
the reward twice, both times using the solution that the child had not previously used in 
Phase 1, and (d) First demonstration (condition 7b), 21 children who received no 
information and were unsuccessful in Phase 1, watched the puppet extract the reward 
twice using the same solution, with solution choice counterbalanced.  
At the beginning of the task interaction trials in Phase 2 all children were told, 
“It’s your turn again. See if you can get the sticker out.” The child was allowed to 
interact with the SDB until s/he retrieved the reward successfully or three minutes had 
elapsed. If children were successful a sticker was added to their pile and they were told, 
“It’s your turn again,” until they had finished the maximum number of trials. The first 
82 children tested were given two trials (T3, T4); at this point it became apparent that 
solution alternation was occurring and so the remaining 85 children were given five 
response trials (T3, T4, T5, T6, & T7) to investigate this further. At the end of testing 
all children were told they had done very well and were rewarded with stickers 
irrespective of their level of success.  
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Table 1: Overview of the six initial-success and two initial-failure conditions 
Note. In Phase 1 children were given either (a) no information, “You play with it first” or social information (B)“It’s Pip’s turn first” and given 
a demonstration. Children then had two response trials, T1 and T2, and could interact with the task to successfully extract the reward 
(‘success’) or fail to extract the reward (‘failure’). In Phase 2 all children watched either (a) no information, (b) an agreeing demonstration, (c) 
an alternate demonstration or (d) a first demonstration (for those who had failed). Children then had two or five response trials.
 Initial-success groups  Initial-fail groups 
 
 
1 
Personal-then-
social-alternate 
2 
Personal-then-
social-agreeing 
3 
Personal-then- 
none 
 4 
Social-then- 
social-alternate 
5 
Social-then- 
social-agreeing 
6 
Social-then-      
none 
 7a 
No 
information 
7b 
None-then- 
social 
Phase 1  
Information 
 
No information 
 
No information 
 
No information 
 
 
Demonstration 
 
Demonstration 
 
Demonstration 
 
 
No information 
 
No information 
Response Trials  Success Success Success  Success Success Success  Failure Failure 
Phase 2  
Information 
 
Alternate 
 
Agreeing 
 
No information 
 
 
Alternate 
 
Agreeing 
 
No information 
 
 
No information 
 
Demonstration 
Response Trials  T3 to T7 T3 to T7 T3 to T7  T3 to T7 T3 to T7 T3 to T7  T3 to T7 T3 to T7 
Sample size 
(males) 
32 (17) 21 (10) 21 (11)  21 (10) 21 (11) 21( 10)  9 (3) 21 (7) 
Age months M (SD) 66 (4) 66 (3) 66 (3)  66 (4) 66 (3) 65 (4)  64 (3) 65 (4) 
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Coding and Inter-rater Reliability 
Each participant’s performance was scored on three separate variables for each 
response trial, (a) success (sticker capsule removal), (b) solution used and (c) number of 
irrelevant actions copied (out of five). The experimenter, LW, coded 100% of the 
sample from video tape. An independent observer coded 26% of the sample. All 
Cronbach’s Alpha scores were 0.90 or above, showing an excellent level of inter-rater 
reliability. All tests are two-tailed unless otherwise stated. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 Following a brief description of behaviour of children who were initially 
unsuccessful, the results and discussion are presented in four sections: (1) the effect of 
demonstrations of alternative solutions upon children’s subsequent solution choice, (2) 
the effect of personally acquired experience upon the imitation of subsequent socially 
demonstrated alternatives, (3) solution choice over time and (4) irrelevant action 
imitation.  
Of the 104 children who witnessed no demonstration, 30 children (29%) were 
unsuccessful. In Phase 2, these children were given either no further information 
(condition 7a, n = 9) or a demonstration (condition 7b, n = 21). In the no further 
information condition, two of the nine children went onto successfully retrieve the 
reward. In the none-then-social condition, 20 of the 21 children successfully retrieved 
the reward after the demonstration, with all copying the solution witnessed, a 
statistically significant level of fidelity (p < .001, Binomial test). Fourteen of these 20 
children copied an irrelevant action in T3, their first response trial in Phase 2. As the 
remaining two-thirds of children were able to retrieve the reward without social 
information, the SDB was challenging but within the capacity of most children.  
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Demonstrations of Alternative Solutions 
 The first research question focused on children’s behaviour following 
demonstrations of alternative methods. In Phase 1 sixty-three children received a social 
demonstration and all were successful in Phase 1 response trials. Children who 
witnessed a demonstration were significantly more successful at T1 than children who 
had not witnessed a demonstration (p < .001, one-tailed Fishers Exact Test, FET). Sixty-
two children (98%) used the same solution as they had witnessed in both T1 and T2 
responses. In Phase 2, twenty-one children were allocated to the social-then-social-
alternate condition. These children were more likely to use the demonstrated alternative 
(N = 16, 76% did so) than the originally demonstrated method (p < .05, Binomial test) 
in their first Phase 2 response (T3). This tendency to switch solutions was a result of the 
alternate social demonstration as children in the social-then-social-alternate condition 
were significantly more likely to use an alternative method in T3 than those in the 
social-then-none (N = 21, p < .001, FET) and the social-then-social-agreeing (N = 21, p 
< .001, FET) conditions, of which only 4 and 1 children respectively discovered a 
previously unused alternative.  
Witnessing a demonstration led to a significant increase in success, relative to 
those who received no demonstration, with children imitating the specific solution used 
by the model. This supports the widely held view that children are prolific social 
learners who faithfully imitate (Whiten et al., 2009). The children receiving social 
information in Phase 1 were canalised to the socially demonstrated method in their 
Phase 1 response trials. However, when children with initial social information were 
shown an alternative solution of reward retrieval in Phase 2, the majority of them 
performed the newly demonstrated solution in their first subsequent Phase 2 trial which 
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stands in contrast to chimpanzees who fail to adopt subsequent social information 
(Hopper et al., 2011).  
 
Personally Acquired Information  
 The second research question investigated whether the source of the prior 
information affected the copying of subsequent, socially demonstrated solutions. In 
Phase 1 seventy-four (71%) children who witnessed no demonstration were successful 
at retrieving the reward in both Phase 1 response trials. Forty-three used the drawer and 
31 the sweep solution, indicating no natural bias in solution choice (p = .201, Binomial 
test). Sixty-three of these children (85%) used the same solution on both trials; however, 
eleven children switched solution between T1 and T2. Therefore, children with personal 
information were significantly more likely to find more than one solution in Phase 1 
than children with social information (N = 167, p < .01, FET). These eleven children 
either had no further demonstration (personal-then-none) or a demonstration of one 
method (included in personal-then-social-agreeing). In Phase 2 thirty-two children were 
allocated to the personal-then-social-alternate condition. These children were more 
likely to use the demonstrated alternative solution (N = 24, 75% did so) than their 
personally discovered solution in their first task Phase 2 response (T3, p < .001, 
Binomial test). Multiple comparisons indicated that this tendency to switch solutions 
was a result of the social information demonstrated as children in the personal-then-
social-alternate condition were significantly more likely to use an alternative method in 
T3 than those in the personal-then-none (N = 15, p < .01, FET) and personal-then-
social-agreeing (N = 16,
 
p < .01, FET) conditions, with 2 and 1 children respectively 
discovering a previously unused alternative. 
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Children with personally acquired information were more likely than children 
with prior social information to discover multiple solutions in Phase 1. Allowing 
children to interact with artefacts before social demonstrations may encourage 
exploratory behaviour. Children with personally acquired information have been shown 
to disregard subsequent social information if it is inaccurate (Clément et al., 2004), 
unreliable (Ma & Ganea, 2010) or unsuccessful (Williamson et al., 2008). In the current 
study the difficulty or effectiveness of the initial solution acquired was not manipulated, 
yet children in the personal-then-social-alternate condition were still motivated to copy 
the alternative solution, predominantly attempting the alternative demonstrated solution 
in their first subsequent interaction with the task. This use of social information, when 
personally acquired information is sufficient and not costly, contrasts with studies of our 
closest living relatives, chimpanzees (Hrubesch et al., 2009), and many other non-
human species (Kendal et al., 2005). The demonstration appeared to be the key element 
in driving exploration as the vast majority of children with successful personally 
acquired information who received no further information, or social information that 
agreed with their personal information, did not discover the alternative solution. It could 
be argued that children who receive demonstrations of a solution in agreement with 
their prior solution may view the puppet as imitating the child. However, we deem this 
an unlikely explanation as children may be unaware that any alternatives exist and the 
puppet also includes irrelevant actions so does not faithfully imitate the child.  
 
Chapter IV Prior experience 
113 
 
 
Table 2: Number (and %) of children who alternated their solutions in Phase 2 (excluding children who discovered two methods in Phase 1). 
 
 
Phase 2: T3 and T4 
 
Phase 2: T5-T7 
 
Condition 
Completed  
T3 & T4 
(N = 125) 
Used a new 
solution in 
 T3- T4 
Two solutions 
T3 & T4 
 Completed  
T5, T6 & T7 
(N = 76) 
Used a new 
solution in T5-T7 
 
Personal-then-social-alternate 32 27       84% 19        60%  15 1 
 
Personal-then-social-agreeing 15 1           7% 1            7%  13 0 
 
Personal-then-none 16 2         14% 1            6%  15 3 
 
Social-then-social-alternate 21 18        86% 8          38%  7 0 
 
Social-then-social-agreeing 21 1          5% 0            0%  15 0 
 
Social-then-none 20 3         15% 0            0%  11 0 
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Solution Choice over Time 
Our third question addressed whether children would be motivated to 
incorporate multiple methods into their repertoire. All 137 children in the six initial-
success conditions were given at least two trials (T3 and T4) in Phase 2 and 76 of these 
children were given the opportunity to perform a further three trials (see Table 2). 
Multiple comparisons (Bonferroni corrected; p = .017) were made based on whether 
initial information had been personal or social. There was no difference between 
children in the social-then-social-alternate and the personal-then-social-alternate 
conditions in relation to which solution (original or newly demonstrated) was used at T3 
(N = 53, p = 1.0, FET) or T4 (p = .16, FET) or whether they used the same solution for 
both T3 and T4 or two different solutions over these trials (p = .17, FET). Similarly, 
children with no information in Phase 2 (personal-then-none and social-then-none) did 
not differ from each other in their likelihood of using one or two methods in Phase 2 
whether those children who discovered two methods in Phase 1 were included (p = .05, 
FET) or excluded (p = .43, FET). Children with agreeing information in Phase 2 
(personal-then-social-agree and social-then-social-agree) did not differ from each other 
in their likelihood of using one or two methods in Phase 2 whether those children who 
discovered two methods in Phase 1 were included (p = .23, FET) or excluded (p = .43, 
FET).  
Comparisons were also made based on whether children had received alternate, 
agreeing, or no information in Phase 2, regardless of the source of their initial 
information. Children who received an alternate demonstration in Phase 2 (N = 53) used 
the recently demonstrated solution, significantly more than chance at T3 (75%, p < .001, 
FET), but by T4, only 23 (43%) used the recently demonstrated solution which did not 
differ from chance (p = .41, FET). Twenty-seven of these 53 children used two 
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solutions in Phase 2 (T3 and T4 only) which was significantly different from the one 
child (out of 37) who did so from social-agreeing conditions (excluding those who 
discovered two methods in Phase 1; p < .001, FET) and the one child (out of 35) who 
did so from conditions receiving no information in Phase 2 (excluding those who 
discovered two methods in Phase 1; p < .001, FET). This difference between groups 
remained when analysing the 69 (excluding 9 that discovered two solutions in Phase 1) 
children that received five trials in Phase 2 [χ2 (2, N = 69) = 18.02, p < .001]. 
In Phase 1, children with personal information were more likely than children 
receiving social information to discover multiple methods. However, by Phase 2 there 
was no difference in whether one or two methods were employed when comparing 
across matched conditions. For example, the majority of children who witnessed a 
social demonstration of an alternate solution regardless of Phase 1 information source 
alternated between the two solutions in Phase 2. This was markedly different to children 
who received no further information or social-agreeing information who predominantly 
used their original solution. It seems that personally acquired information encourages 
initial exploration and when children witness alternative strategies they are motivated to 
incorporate these solutions into their repertoire. The children did not appear to interpret 
the new solution as a ‘correction’, but rather a possible alternative. As in Siegler and 
Opfer (2003), children adopted multiple strategies to solve a single problem. It is 
important to note the exceptions in all of these conditions: ten children from conditions 
where no alternate social information was received found an alternative solution in 
Phase 2. Thus, whilst the initial response trials of those with prior social information 
mirrored the canalisation shown in studies providing children with one or two attempts 
at a task (Flynn & Whiten, 2008b; Horner et al., 2006), the current results indicate that 
continued interaction encourages exploration (Whiten & Flynn, 2010).  
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Irrelevant Actions 
To begin this section the baseline production of the irrelevant actions is 
established. In Phase 1, of the children who were successful through acquiring personal 
information (N = 74), 19 (26%) performed an irrelevant action. Apart from one child 
who performed three irrelevant actions in T1, all others performed just one irrelevant 
action (Mdn = 0.0, IQR = 0.0, 0.0), resulting in the sweep or drawer being placed back 
to its original position, revealing a possible propensity to ‘tidy up’. Of those children 
who witnessed a demonstration including irrelevant actions in Phase 1 (N = 63), 54 
(86%) performed an irrelevant action. Thirty-three of these 54 children (61%) 
performed more than one irrelevant action (Mdn = 1.5, IQR = 1.0, 5.0). Thus, despite 
the inclusion of ‘tidying up’ as an irrelevant action, children who witnessed a 
demonstration containing irrelevant actions produced significantly more irrelevant 
actions than those who did not in both T1 (χ2 (1, N = 137) = 57.61, p < .001) and T2 (χ2 
(1, N = 137) = 49.73, p < .001).  
A critical question was whether prior task experience would reduce the copying 
of causally irrelevant actions in subsequent response trials. This was addressed in a 
number of ways looking at Phase 2 behaviour. First, would children with two alternate 
social demonstrations copy irrelevant actions when attempting the second solution or 
would viewing multiple methods enable them to extract only the critical causal 
sequence of actions? For children in the social-then-social-alternate condition there was 
no significant change in whether a child performed an irrelevant action between Phase 1 
(T2) and Phase 2 (T3; Binomial, N = 21, p = .25) and in the number of irrelevant actions 
produced between T2 (Mdn = 1.0, IQR = 0.5. 4.5) and T3 (Mdn = 1.0, IQR =1.0, 4.0, 
Wilcoxon Z = -0.91, p = .93). There was also no significant difference in the number of 
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irrelevant actions produced in T3 between children in the social-then-social-alternate 
condition and children in the social-then-none (Mdn = 1.0, IQR = 0.0, 5.0, U (41) = 
176.5, Z = -1.20, p = .23) and the social-then-agreeing (Mdn = 1.00, IQR = 0.0, 5.0, U 
(41) = 216.5, Z = -0.11, p = .92) conditions.  
Second, what actions will children with personally acquired information perform 
following subsequent social information including irrelevant actions? In the personal-
then-social-agreeing condition six children (29%), who had not performed an irrelevant 
action in Phase 1, performed an irrelevant action in T3 (following a demonstration of 
the same solution). In this condition, whilst the number of children performing an 
irrelevant action did not increase significantly (McNemar, N = 21, p = .13), the number 
of irrelevant actions produced did increase significantly from Phase 1 (T2: Mdn = 0.0, 
IQR = 0.0, 0.0) to Phase 2 (T3: Mdn = 0.0, IQR = 0.0, 1.00, Wilcoxon Z = -2.11, p < 
.05). Similarly, for the 32 children in the personal-then-social-alternate condition, the 
number of children performing an irrelevant action increased significantly from T2 (N = 
6) to T3 (N = 16; Binomial, N = 32, p < .01) as did the number of irrelevant actions (T2; 
Mdn = 0.0, IQR = 0.0, 0.0, T3; M = 0.5, IQR = 0.0, 1.0, Wilcoxon Z = -3.16, p < .01). 
Of the 24 children in this condition that attempted the alternative solution in T3, 12 
(50%) used an irrelevant action. These 12 children performed a median of 1 (IQR = 1.0, 
3.0) irrelevant action, which was not significantly different from the 16 children in the 
social-then-social-alternate condition (Med = 1.0, IQR = 1.0, 4.0, Mann-Whitney U (28) = 
86, Z = -0.53, p = .60).  
For all 137 children in the initial (Phase 1) success conditions there was no 
significant difference, in the number of irrelevant actions produced, between T3 and T4 
(Wilcoxon Z = -1.71, p = .09), and so children’s mean scores across T3 and T4 were 
investigated across conditions (see Figure 2). Considering the mean number of 
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irrelevant actions in T3 or T4, there was no main effect of Phase 2 information for those 
with personal information in Phase 1 (personal-then-social-alternate/-agreeing/-none; 
Kruskal Wallis χ2 (2, N = 74) = 3.7, p = .16) or for those with social information in 
Phase 1 (social-then-social-alternate/-agreeing/-none, T3: [χ2 (2, N = 63) = 1.27, p = 
.53]). Therefore, conditions were collapsed according to the source of the original 
information. Children with personally acquired information performed significantly 
fewer irrelevant actions (Mdn = 0.0, IQR = 0.0, 1.0) than children with prior social 
information (Mdn = 1.0, IQR = 1.0, 3.0, Mann-Whitney, U (135) = 1108.0, Z = -5.51, p < 
.001) during Phase 2 (T3 and T4). 
 
Figure 2: Median and interquartile range of mean number irrelevant actions (out of a 
possible five) in Phase 2 (Mean of T3 & T4) for the six initial-success conditions.P1 
Personal; personal information in Phase 1, P1 Social; Social demonstration in Phase 1. 
*** p < 0.001.  
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It appears that it is not prior experience itself which affects the copying of 
causally irrelevant actions but the type (personal or social) of prior experience. Those 
who had personal information in Phase 1 consistently performed fewer irrelevant 
actions than those who had social information in Phase 1. Children with prior social 
information continued to perform irrelevant actions regardless of the absence or 
presence of subsequent social information. Thus the copying of irrelevant actions was 
not affected by alternate demonstrations indicating that the children did not extract, 
from multiple alternatives, only the critical, causal sequence of actions to reach a 
desired goal (Byrne, 1999, Buchsbaum et al., 2011). We do not suggest that children are 
not capable of such efficiency but that in this context, involving different irrelevant 
actions pertaining to different solutions with the same artefact, the ability is constrained. 
Children with prior social information, who copy demonstrated actions and succeed, 
may be more likely to assume that copying of subsequent actions is a successful 
strategy in this context.  
Successful prior-personal information appeared to give children both immunity 
and susceptibility to copying causally irrelevant actions. Of the children who produced 
no irrelevant actions at Phase 1, two-thirds (social agreeing) and half (social alternate) 
did not copy irrelevant actions following social demonstration. However, the remainder 
did and did so at a rate similar to children possessing prior-social information. The 
variance of behaviour of the children with prior-personal information suggests that 
irrelevant action reproduction may well be influenced by both the functional aspects of 
the task and social context. For example, possession of prior-personal, versus prior-
social information may make children more sceptical about the function, whether social 
or causal, of observed causally irrelevant actions; possibly explaining why Williamson 
et al. (2008) and Williamson and Meltzoff (2011) found that children did not 
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incorporate subsequent (albeit opaque) irrelevant actions after a successful and easy 
experience with the task. However, for individuals in the prior-personal-social-alternate 
condition who did copy the demonstrated irrelevant actions, the unfamiliarity of the 
alternate solution may have resulted in children encoding the actions as causally 
relevant (Lyons et al., 2007) especially as more irrelevant actions were produced in this 
condition than where social information agreed with prior-personal information. As the 
task design ensured that these children already had a good understanding of the causal 
properties of the task we suggest, however, that children’s copying of irrelevant actions 
in this context was more likely a result of motivation to adopt the model’s seemingly 
purposeful (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010) or normative behaviour (Kenward et al., 2011; 
Kenward, 2012) or due to a motivation to share an experience with another (Užgiris, 
1981). This highlights the persuasiveness of social information, even when emitted by a 
puppet and this persuasiveness may be adaptive if it enables acquisition of cultural 
norms.  
 
General Discussion 
The comprehensiveness of the current study enabled valuable insight into the 
role prior experience plays in children’s social learning strategies pertaining to solution 
choice and imitation of irrelevant actions. Our results extend the field of social learning 
in a number of important ways. We found that children who are allowed to interact with 
a task before witnessing social demonstrations manipulate the task in more ways than 
those that witness an initial social demonstration. Further, after new solutions are 
discovered, whether through personal or social experience, children were motivated to 
incorporate these new solutions into their repertoire but they were not ‘converted’ to 
these alternatives, instead they switched between solutions. This multiple strategy use is 
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seen in other domains in children’s learning, such as mathematics (Siegler & Opfer, 
2003) and continues into adulthood (Dowker, Flood, Griffiths, Harriss, & Hook, 1996). 
Adopting further strategies when one already has a successful strategy may seem 
cognitively inefficient, but there are several reasons why it is beneficial. First, learning 
about a new strategy is useful in the event that an original strategy fails. Second, 
learning multiple strategies increases one’s overall knowledge of the task and provides 
generalisable knowledge regarding the properties of each strategy and the affordances 
of different manipulandi. In a tool-abundant culture the latter is valuable knowledge. 
Third, a motivation to acquire additional knowledge enables modifications over time. 
This ‘ratchet effect’ has been speculated to be the bedrock of cumulative culture, a 
process thought to be unique to humans (Dean et al., 2012; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 
2009). 
The current study also makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of the 
phenomenon of copying causally irrelevant actions. Overall, children who hold personal 
information about a task are less likely than those receiving only social information to 
incorporate causally irrelevant actions after observing them displayed by others. 
Children with initial social information faithfully copy causally irrelevant actions even 
after continued personal task interaction and despite the fact that the actions occurred 
with a transparent box (revealing the irrelevance of the actions) and after the relevant 
action (the reward capsule had been successfully moved to the lower level barrier) as 
has been found previously (Simpson & Riggs, 2011). Successful prior-personal 
information appeared to give some children immunity from copying causally irrelevant 
actions whilst other children were still susceptible to copying these actions, illustrating 
that the copying of causally irrelevant actions is an intricate phenomenon and no one 
explanation may capture its complexities. Children’s solution choice, their reasoning 
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about causality, their motivation to share an experience with a model and the pressure to 
conform to norms will all vary depending upon task difficulty (Williamson & Meltzoff, 
2011), the number of models (Asch, 1951), the characteristics of the model(s) (Wood et 
al., 2012), the audience (Haun & Tomasello, 2011) and, as has been shown in the 
current study, the prior information a child has regarding a task. These variables can be 
addressed individually or in combination and will enable a better understanding of 
children’s motivation to learn certain aspects of a task from others. Studies that 
establish the complexity of children’s social learning will shed more light on how and 
why humans stand alone in the breadth, detail, and cumulative nature of their culturally-
rich world. 
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Chapter V 
Familiar peers’ past-proficiency and children’s task 
solution choice 
 
This chapter focusses on the interaction between a model-based bias of past-proficiency 
and multiple demonstrations and personal task interactions. This chapter is to be 
submitted to PLoS ONE with the same order of authorship (Lara A. Wood, Rachel L. 
Kendal and Emma G. Flynn). 
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Abstract 
The current study investigated whether four- to six-year-olds’ tool-use task solution 
choice was influenced by a child’s prior experience with the task and/or the past-
proficiency of familiar peer models. We completed behavioural assessments of 
interactions with novel tasks provided to freely interacting classes of children in four 
primary schools. Additionally, peer and teacher predictions of each child’s proficiency 
with novel artefacts were obtained. Based on these assessments, two models from each 
of the four classes, matched on sex, age, dominance and popularity, were selected. One 
of the selected models for each class had a high past task proficiency while the other 
had a low past-proficiency. Video recordings of these trained models removing a 
reward, in one of three ways, from an artificial-fruit task using causally relevant and 
irrelevant actions, were shown to peers after the peer had either a successful, 
unsuccessful or no interaction with the task. Results indicated that children were 
motivated to incorporate multiple solutions into their repertoire, and that acquiring 
multiple methods might supersede a past-proficiency model-based transmission bias. 
However, when one model matched a child’s solution and one model offered an 
alternative solution children were biased towards selecting the solution choice of the 
model with the highest past-proficiency.  
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Introduction 
Children employ a number of transmission biases (Boyd & Richerson, 1985) or social 
learning strategies (Laland, 2004), influencing the circumstances under which children 
copy. Whilst naïve children with no prior experience of a novel artefact are prone to 
behavioural canalisation and copying of irrelevant actions (Horner & Whiten, 2005), 
children with prior experience show flexibility in their task solution choices, often 
experimenting and incorporating many solutions into their repertoire (Siegler & Opfer, 
1996; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013), switching solutions when personally-acquired 
solutions are difficult or become redundant (Williamson, Meltzoff, & Markman, 2008; 
Williamson & Meltzoff, 2011), and omitting irrelevant actions (Wood et al., 2013). 
Children also demonstrate model-based biases in their learning (Wood, Kendal, 
& Flynn, submitted) whereby traits copied by individuals are influenced by the 
characteristics of the model, such as their age or familiarity. Here, we implemented an 
experimental procedure designed to mirror a naturalistic context to address three aims: 
first, to better understand children’s solution choices given their personal experience 
with a task; second, to investigate the degree to which they behaved according to a past-
proficiency model-based bias; and third, to understand the relation between prior 
experience and a past-proficiency model-based bias. We expand on these aims in the 
following three sections.  
 
Prior Experience and Solution Choice 
When social learning studies have presented social information in the form of 
one or multiple demonstrations of the same solution, naïve children faithfully copy the 
demonstrated solution in subsequent trials (Flynn & Whiten, 2008a, 2008b; Hopper, 
Flynn, Wood, & Whiten, 2010; Horner, Whiten, Flynn, & de Waal, 2006). However, if 
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children have prior experience with a task which afforded them easy solutions, they are 
less likely to copy a subsequent, socially demonstrated, alternative technique with non-
functional actions as compared to children with a difficult prior personal interaction 
(Williamson et al., 2008; Williamson & Meltzoff, 2011). Furthermore, children who 
interact with a task before witnessing social demonstrations are more likely to discover 
multiple solutions, and after new solutions are discovered or observed children are 
motivated to incorporate these new solutions into their repertoire (Wood et al., 2013). 
This multiple solution use is seen in other domains in children’s learning, including 
mathematics (Siegler & Opfer, 1996) and continues into adulthood (Dowker, Flood, 
Griffiths, Harriss, & Hook, 1996).  
Although acquiring new solutions when one has a successful solution may seem 
inefficient, learning new solutions is useful in the event that an original solution fails, 
and it increases one’s overall knowledge of the task potentially providing generalisable 
knowledge regarding the properties of each solution. Developing skills which are 
immediately unnecessary but may assist in a changing environment are thought to 
underpin instances of contrafreeloading where children (Singh, & Query, 1960) and 
other animals (Jensen, 1963) work for ‘earned’ rewards even though identical ‘free’ 
awards are available (Inglis, Forkman & Lazarus, 1997). Moreover openness to 
adopting multiple solutions to a challenge may partially underpin cumulative culture 
which is widely held to be responsible for the success of humanity as a species (see 
Dean, Vale, Laland, Flynn, Kendal, submitted). We predicted that children who 
discover a solution through personal exploration and subsequently observe alternate 
solutions will try one of these alternate solutions on their first subsequent attempt and 
will ultimately incorporate all solutions into their repertoire. In accordance with Wood 
et al. (2013), we also predicted that children with successful prior personal experience 
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would copy significantly fewer irrelevant actions than children with unsuccessful or no 
prior experience.  
 
Past-Proficiency Model-based Bias 
When faced with divergent information from numerous individuals it is adaptive 
to have a strategy as to whose information one should copy. Children demonstrate such 
model-based biases in their learning (Wood et al., submitted). For example, children are 
more likely to imitate all actions demonstrated by an adult versus a child model when 
the model is demonstrating novel behaviour (McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011; 
Seehagen & Herbert, 2011; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012; although the opposite 
pattern is observed when the actions are familiar, Zmyj, Daum, Prinz, Nielsen, & 
Aschersleben, 2011). Children also preferentially copy models who are most similar to 
them (e.g. same- over opposite-sex models; Frazier, Gelman, Kaciroti, Russell, & 
Lumeng, 2011; Shutts, Banaji, & Spelke, 2010), perhaps because they provide the most 
relevant information.  
A model’s success in a particular environment indicates an ability to thrive 
within that environment. As stated earlier, but for emphasis, Rendell et al (2011) 
describes model-based biases relating to success. This refers to instances in which 
learning may be biased towards copying (a) if the payoff is better, (b) in proportion to 
the payoff or (c) the most successful individual. However, it is unclear whether these 
instances are occurring in the present, i.e. as the model is demonstrating the information 
which may be transmitted, or in the past i.e. that the success was demonstrated in the 
past and that some form of ‘success reputation’ is biasing subsequent information 
transmission from model to observer. Furthermore, it is not clear whether success 
relates to domain specific model success relating to the specific information which is to 
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be transferred or whether it is domain general success i.e. that the model generally has 
more success in his/her environment which may also be related to dominance and 
prestige (Henrich & McElreath, 2003).  
Therefore, we use the term past-proficiency to refer to a model’s domain-
specific ability shown in the past. As such it focusses on the potential for a model to 
have a reputation for being skilled within the domain in which the model is currently 
demonstrating. It is the influence of a model’s past proficiency that the current study 
investigates. The current study used a series of novel artefacts, so proficiency referred to 
successful interaction with novel artefacts. Therefore, our models had either a high past-
proficiency or a low past-proficiency pertaining to the degree of exploration or, where 
appropriate, successful extraction of stickers with a series of novel artefacts. Research 
has demonstrated that infants are able to discriminate between unfamiliar models who 
act successfully versus incompetently (Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2010) 
and seven-year-olds preferentially copy children rated by an experimenter as being 
competent rather than less competent (Brody & Stoneman, 1985). Indeed, from infancy 
to six-years, children consistently copy reliable, over unreliable, models for labelling 
(Koenig, Clément, & Harris, 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005b; Vázquez, Delisle, & 
Saylor, 2012) and artefact use (Birch, et al., 2008; Zmyj et al., 2010). 
Laboratory experiments with unfamiliar models enable a controlled 
investigation of social learning. However, it is also beneficial to look at children’s 
behaviour ‘in the wild’ (Flynn & Whiten, 2010). Here, studies implement a controlled 
design in a naturalistic setting, such as a classroom, thus, using familiar models. For 
example, open-diffusion studies, where a known model demonstrating a behaviour is 
introduced to a group of familiar novices, represents a realistic and ecologically-valid 
context in which to explore social learning and cultural transmission (Flynn & Whiten, 
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2012; Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012). Using this methodology Flynn 
& Whiten (2012) showed that characteristics of known peers may bias social learning; 
children interacting with a task were watched more if they were older rather than 
younger, liked over not-liked or more dominant over less dominant. In the current study 
we selected two familiar peers to serve as models. These children were either high in 
past-proficiency (high past-proficiency model; High PPM) or low in past-proficiency 
(Low PPM) relating to interaction with novel artefacts. We predicted that naïve children 
(no prior experience) who observed differing solutions would preferentially copy the 
solution choice of the High PPM over the Low PPM.  
 
Interaction between Prior Experience and Past-proficiency 
Children’s personal experience may also influence model-based biases. For 
example, children may exhibit a preference for the new modelled solution irrespective 
of model identity. Alternatively, if a model matches a child’s solution this might 
influence the child to stick to his/her original method, as seen in Wood et al., (in press). 
Finally children’s decision to try a new solution or remain with their own solution may 
be influenced by the past-proficiency of the model. By including conditions in which 
children were allowed to interact with the task before witnessing demonstrations, the 
current study investigated the interaction between prior experience and past-proficiency 
biases relating to solution choice. We made two predictions: first, children who discover 
a solution and witness two alternatives from the two models will be motivated to try all 
solutions but over time will preferentially copy the solution choice of the High PPM 
over that of the Low PPM. Second, children who discover a solution and subsequently 
observe a model matching their choice and one model offering a novel solution, will be 
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more likely to deviate from their original solution if the alternative is offered by the 
High PPM versus the Low PPM.  
 
Summary 
 The current study had three aims: first, to better understand the children’s 
solution choices given their personal experience with a task; second, to investigate a 
past-proficiency model-based bias; and, third, investigate the relation between prior 
experience and solution choice. The study required the selection of known models with 
differing levels of task past-proficiency. Children’s proficiency was assessed with novel 
tasks similar to the test task. Task past-proficiency was established through peers 
observing each other interacting with these tasks and through peer (Flynn & Whiten 
2012) and teacher (Pellegrini, et al. 2007) ratings of proficiency. To investigate whether 
proficiency ratings were confounded by dominance and popularity, children and 
teachers also rated peers/pupils on these traits. This model selection was rigorous (see 
Table 1) and so we present a concise Method and Results section for model selection 
here followed by the Method and Results section for the main experiment. 
 
Model Selection: Method 
Participants 
One hundred and ten children (59 males), aged between 56 and 80 months (M = 
65.52, SD = 6.00), were recruited from four primary school classes in County Durham, 
UK. The children had been in their classes for between eight and nine months. Five 
children were absent on the day of collecting peer ratings. Ten members of staff across 
the four classes assisted with the study. They were all female and worked full time with 
the respective classes either as the class teacher or as a teaching assistant, all are 
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henceforth described as teachers. The class sizes were as follows: class A = 23 (12 
males), class B = 27 (14 males), class C = 28 (13 males), and class D = 32 (20 males). 
There were no significant differences in the number of boys or girls in each class 
(Binomial p > .5). 
 
Apparatus 
 
Figure 1a. Easy-Reward; Sticker Pipe.150cm long white Perspex pipe with a larger 
hole (d = 10cm) at one end and 12 smaller holes (d = 3cm) along the pipe. The pipe 
was filled with shredded paper, and approximately 100 stickers. The stickers could be 
removed from the holes. This task was designed to be easy with potentially all stickers 
being accessed in a 20min session.  
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Figure 1b. Difficult-Reward; Sticker Disc. 25cm x 25cm x 5cm (h x w x d) transparent 
Perspex box with six compartments containing shredded paper and around 100 stickers. 
Each compartment had a hole (d = 3cm) at the front. On the front of the box was a 
circular transparent Perspex disk (d = 25cm) with four holes (d = 3cm). This circular 
panel could rotate, allowing for the panel hole and the compartment hole to line up for 
potential access to the stickers. Two plastic tweezers were attached by a 30cm length of 
flexible wire and could be used to obtain the stickers. This task was designed to be 
challenging with potentially only a few stickers being accessed in a 20min session.  
 
Figure 1c. No-Reward; Balls of Fun. 100cm long transparent Perspex pipe filled with 
twelve balls of differing colours, sizes and textures including three that could be used as 
whistles. The pipe had three long thin holes cut into it (l= 10cm, w= 2cm) so that 
children could touch the balls but the balls could not be removed from the pipe.
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Table 1 Overview of assessments 
Trait Name Source Method of assessment 
Proficiency 
Proficiency 
Proficiency 
No-Reward 
Easy-Reward 
Hard-Reward 
Novel tasks: 
interactions during 15-
20m of free play 
 
Behavioural assessment of interaction including order (relative to the other children) of first proximity (within 
1m and oriented towards the task), interaction (placing their hands on part of the task) and success (removing 
a sticker from the task in the reward tasks). 
Proficiency Proficiency Peers: Asked to pick 
up to five classmates 
from photos 
Asked, ‘Which five children would be really good at getting the sticker out of this box?’ 
Popularity Popularity Asked, ‘If you could take five children to a party, who would you take?’ 
Dominance Dominance Asked, ‘Are there any children who like to tell other children what to do?’ 
Proficiency 
Proficiency 
Proficiency 
Proficiency 
Proficiency 
Proficiency 
 
Teachers: Asked to 
place photos of 
children into one of 
five groups (Likert 
scale) for each of the 
six adjectives 
Inquisitive: Likely to explore this task 
Intelligent: Quick and accurate in judging and comprehending this task 
Inventive: Likely to engage in an inventive behaviour with this task 
 
Friends with a significant number of others/a smaller number of more influential individuals 
 
Often initiates conflicts with other children and dominates resources 
 
Able to acquire and monopolise resources over other individuals 
 
Popularity 
 
Popularity 
Dominance 
Aggressive 
Dominance 
Dominance 
Unaggressive 
Dominance 
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Behavioural Proficiency: Assessment and Results  
At the beginning of testing in each school the children were told that new toys 
would be available in ‘free-play’ and all children were allowed to interact with these as 
much as they liked but they could also choose a different activity if they wished. Each 
novel task was made available to the whole class during these free play 15-20min 
sessions. They were also told that cameras would be recording them, one video camera 
was placed 2m behind the task and another was placed 1m to the side of the task. The 
experimenter (LW) stood by the side camera and provided a discrete commentary 
identifying children and describing behaviours to aid subsequent coding.  
For coding, children’s order (relative to the other children) of first proximity 
(within 1m and oriented towards the task), interaction (placing their hands on part of the 
task) and success (removing a sticker from the task in the reward tasks) were recorded. 
Additionally, the frequencies of proximity, interaction and success were recorded using 
one-zero sampling, whereby the occurrence or absence of each behaviour was noted 
within 30 second intervals. Scores are expressed as the proportion of the potential 40 
thirty-second intervals that a child was in proximity to, interacting or succeeding with 
the task. Finally, children were scored for the number of different types of interactions 
with the task (e.g., for the No-Reward task a child could touch the task, insert finger 
into slit, move ball with finger, move whole tube, interact with the lid, and interact with 
the zip-ties attaching the task to a rack, and number of stickers obtained (reward tasks). 
A lower rank equated with more Task Success. 
 Pearson rank correlations for behaviour with each of the novel tasks 
demonstrated that each child’s behaviour was similar across the three tasks. Scores on 
the No-Reward task were positively correlated with scores on the Difficult-Reward task 
(r99 = .42, p < .001) and Easy-Reward task (r101 = .26, p < .01) which also positively 
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correlated with the Difficult-Reward task (r103 = 0.60, p < .001). On occasion children 
were absent during the presentation of one of the novel tasks so the scores for each task 
were kept separate. The dependent variables of performance with each of the three tasks 
was entered separately into a stepwise linear regression along with the child’s sex (male 
= 0 or female =1) and age (in months). Sex and age were not significant predictors of 
Task Success for the No-Reward task. However, for the Difficult-Reward task, age (but 
not sex) was a significant predictor (= -0.271, t101 = 3.79, p < .001) of Task Success 
with older children receiving better (lower) ranks. For the Easy-Reward task both age 
(= -0.30, t103 = -2.71, p < .01) and sex (= -6.66, t103 = -4.87, p < .001) were 
significant predictors of Task Success with older children performing better (lower 
ranks) than younger children and females performing better than males. To summarise, 
children showed behavioural consistency across the three tasks and older children and 
girls tended to be more proficient than younger children and boys.  
 
Peer Ratings: Assessment and Results  
Individually, children were presented with an artificial fruit used in previous 
social learning research (the transparent version of the Glass Ceiling Box, (GCB) see 
Horner & Whiten, 2005). Children were given a single demonstration of how to retrieve 
a sticker (by lifting a door, inserting a Velcro topped stick and attaching it to a Velcro 
sticker) by the experimenter (LW); the demonstration did not include causally irrelevant 
actions which are typically presented with this task. Then children were told it would be 
their turn after they had answered some questions about their classmates. On a table in 
front of the participants lay photos of all their classmates, and children were asked three 
questions; first, one relating to peer proficiency, “Can you tell me which five children 
would be really good at getting the sticker out of this box?”, second, one relating to peer 
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popularity, “If you could take five children to a party with you, who would you take?”, 
third, one relating to peer dominance, “Are there any children who like to tell other 
children what to do?” (For the last question children struggled to pick five, therefore the 
question was adapted so children could pick between zero and five peers). The children 
were then asked again, “Do you remember that I asked who would be really good at 
getting the sticker out? Can you pick those five children again?” This repetition was to 
ascertain whether responses were consistent over a short amount of time. For each 
question, the experimenter noted the identity of the five children and then shuffled the 
photos and randomly distributed them across the table before the next question was 
asked. At the end of the questioning children were invited to interact with the GCB and 
were then given a sticker. All children were successful and this interaction was not 
recorded but served as a means of rewarding children for their participation. 
Of the 105 children who responded 42 (40%) failed to be consistent in their 
assessment of peer proficiency, that is, they did not choose at least three of the same 
five children at the beginning and at the end of the session when asked the same 
question. Despite a similar number of boys and girls, significantly more boys (M = 
5.98, SD = 2.80) were selected as proficient than girls (M = 4.06, SD = 2.81; t104 = 3.53, 
p <.01). However, there was an interaction between sex of peer and sex of participant 
with boys choosing more boys (M = 7.37, SD = 2.14) than girls (M = 4.33, SD = 2.61; 
t103 = 6.55, p < .001) and girls choosing more girls (M = 5.65, SD = 2.58) than boys (M 
= 2.72, SD = 2.27; t103 = -6.18, p < .001). Children’s proficiency score (∑ peer 
selections) were entered into a stepwise linear regression in which sex (male = 0 or 
female =1), age (in months), popularity (∑ peer selections) and dominance (∑ peer 
selections) were entered as predictors. Age was the only significant predictor of 
proficiency rating (= 1.11, t108 = 6.92, p < .001) with older children receiving more 
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proficiency nominations than younger children. Sex (= -0.15, t108 = -1.85, p = .07) and 
popularity (= 0.14, t(108) = 1.74, p = .08) approached significance with males and 
more popular children being selected more often as proficient. Dominance was not a 
significant predictor (= 0.01, t108 = -0.14, p = .99) of proficiency. To summarise, 
children were not consistent in their choices of proficiency of their peers and tended to 
rate older, more popular, children of the same sex as themselves as proficient. 
 
Teacher Ratings: Assessment and Results  
Teacher’s ratings were used to assess the validity of measuring children’s 
proficiency with the novel tasks. Teachers were shown the transparent GCB as an 
example of a novel task and asked to place photos of the children into one of five 
groups: 1 (not at all like this child), 2 (not like this child), 3 (neither like nor not like this 
child), 4 (like this child), and 5 (very like this child). The first statements related to 
proficiency and required teachers to rank children according to: inquisitive, defined as, 
Likely to explore this task; intelligent, Quick and accurate in judging and 
comprehending this task; and inventive, Likely to engage in an inventive behaviour with 
this task. Teachers were also asked to rank children on popularity (Friends with a 
significant number of others/a smaller number of more influential individuals), 
aggressive-dominance (Often initiate conflicts with other children and dominates 
resources) and unaggressive-dominance (Able to acquire and monopolise resources 
over other individuals without using aggression). These questions were based on 
constructs developed by Freeman et al. (submitted). The scores of same-class teachers 
were significantly positively correlated with each other for each trait (Table 2) with the 
exception of some of the ratings from teachers from Class A, possibly due to the smaller 
size (N = 23). As there was agreement amongst the teachers, children received a mean 
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score for each of the six traits. As the three proficiency adjectives were positively 
correlated (inquisitive with intelligent; r110 = .44, p < .001, and inventive; r110 = .56, p < 
.001, inventive with intelligent; r110 = 0.71, p < .001) they were combined into a single 
construct of proficiency. 
Teachers’ mean proficiency ratings were entered into a stepwise linear 
regression to assess the possible predictive power of a child’s sex (male = 0 or female = 
1), age (in months), popularity, aggressive and unaggressive dominance. Age (= 0.59, 
t107 = 0.89, p = .38) and sex (= 0.11, t t107 = 1.73, p = .09) were not significant 
predictors of teacher ratings of proficiency although sex approached significance with 
girls receiving a higher rating score (M = 9.96, SD = 3.13) than boys (M = 8.80, SD = 
3.29). Teacher ratings of popularity (= 1.22, t107 = 6.02, p < .001), aggressive (= -
0.91, t(107) = 5.50, p < .01) and unaggressive dominance (= 1.48, t 107= -3.55, p < 
.001) were all significant predictors of proficiency, with increased affiliation and 
unaggressive dominance ability scores, and decreased aggressive dominance scores, 
predicting increased proficiency scores. To summarise, it appears that teachers’ 
proficiency judgements were not influenced by children’s age or sex, but corresponded 
positively with ratings of popularity and unaggressive dominance.  
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C: Teacher correlations 
Table 2: Correlations for teachers’ rating of children’s traits in each of the four classes 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
+ 
p < .075 
   Inquisitive Intelligent   Inventive Popularity Aggression Unaggressive Dominance 
 Teacher 2 Teacher 3 Teacher 2 Teacher 3 Teacher 2 Teacher 3 Teacher 2 Teacher 3 Teacher 2 Teacher 3 Teacher 2 Teacher 3 
Class A: 
Teacher 1 
0.46
+
 h 0.78* 0.59* h 0.79* h 0.37 0.22 0.49 h 0.64** 0.61* 0.62 0.49+ 0.84** 
Class B: 
Teacher 1 
0.50** NA 0.71*** NA 0.81*** NA 0.45* NA 0.66*** NA 0.60** NA 
Class C: 
Teacher 1 
0.48** NA 0.74*** NA 0.31 NA 0.72*** NA 0.88*** NA 0.50** NA 
Class D: 
Teacher 1 
0.70*** 0.51** 0.79*** 0.39* 0.83*** 0.74*** 0.56** 0.53** 0.63*** 0.39* 0.62*** 0.58*** 
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Relation between Peer and Teacher Ratings and Behavioural Proficiency  
 Success scores with the three novel tasks were entered separately as dependent 
variables into a stepwise linear regression with teacher and peer ratings, sex and age, as 
predictor variables (Table 3). For the Easy-Reward task, the model accounting for the most 
variance (31.7%) of Task Success included teacher’s proficiency ratings, sex and age; 
children with higher teacher’s proficiency ratings, girls and older children had more Task 
Success than those with lower proficiency ratings, boys and younger children respectively. 
For the Difficult-Reward task, teacher’s proficiency ratings was the only variable in the best 
model which accounted for 14.7% of the variance of Task Success; children with higher 
proficiency ratings from teachers had more Task Success than those with lower proficiency 
ratings. For the No-Reward task, no variables were significant predictors.  
 
Table 3: Linear Regression (Stepwise) predicting Task Success on novel tasks 
 
Selecting Models  
 Our original intention was to select models based on (1) behaviour with the novel 
tasks as children could witness the relative success of their peers, and (2) peer ratings of 
proficiency in order to reflect children’s perception of each other. However, children were 
not consistent in their ratings of their peers over a short time period. Conversely, children’s 
behaviour with the three novel tasks was consistent demonstrating that children’s novel task 
proficiency was robust. Furthermore, teacher ratings of proficiency correlated with 
 Easy-Reward Hard-Reward 
Variables in Equation B SE  t B SE  t 
Constant 38.54*** 9.98  5.51 22.79*** 2.19  10.42 
Teacher proficiency ratings -0.79*** 0.01 -0.33 -3.86 -0.95*** 0.22 -0.39 -43.3 
Age (months) -5.68*** 1.31 -0.36 -4.34     
Sex (Male = 0, Female =1) -0.22* 0.11 -0.17 -2.04     
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performance on both reward tasks. We, therefore, modified the design such that behavioural 
performance, supported by teaching ratings, was prioritised over peer ratings for the choice of 
models. As age and sex had correlated with peer proficiency ratings and popularity and 
dominance had correlated with staff proficiency ratings, models were age, sex, popularity and 
dominance matched within each class. 
 The High PPM was chosen from children who reached the following criteria: ranked in 
the top five children for Task Success in at least two of the novel tasks and ranked in the top five 
children for teacher proficiency rankings. The Low PPM was chosen from children who reached 
the following criteria: matched the High PPM in sex and age (within 60 days), ranked in the 
bottom ten children for teacher proficiency ratings, did not come in the top ten children for Task 
Success with any novel task and came in the bottom five for at least one novel task. This was 
possible for three of the four classes, in the fourth class (Class B) no child reached these criteria 
so a child who was ranked in the top five children for proficiency by the teachers, and was 
ranked 6
th
 and 12
th
 in two novel tasks was selected as the High PPM model and a child who was 
ranked 12
th
 from bottom (out of a possible 27) in teacher proficiency and who met the 
previously described novel task criteria, was selected. All analysis was run with data from this 
class included and excluded and the results remained the same. The models were also closely 
matched for popularity and dominance. For popularity, the range of all children’s scores was 
between 0 and 15 peer-selections. For all classes there was no more than two peer-selections 
difference between models. For dominance, the range of all children’s scores was between 0 and 
7 peer-selections. For three classes there was no more than two peer-selections difference, in the 
final class there was a difference of three peer selections (see Table 4). 
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Table 4: Overview of the eight models, two selected from each class  
    Novel Task Ranks (Class Median) Teacher Scores (Class Median) Peer Scores (Class Median) 
Class Model Sex Age 
No 
Reward 
Difficult 
Reward 
Easy 
Reward 
Proficiency Popularity 
Aggressive 
Dominance 
Non-aggressive 
Dominance 
Peer 
Proficiency 
Peer 
Popularity 
Peer 
Dominance 
A 
High M 65 3 (12.5) 3.5 (10.5) 14 (12.5) 14 (9.3) 5 (3.5) 3 (2.5) 4 (3) 11 (8) 6 (5) 2 (4) 
Low M 64 20 (12.5) 12 (10.5) 12.5 (12.5) 9 (9.3) 5 (3.5) 2 (2.5) 5 (3) 10 (8) 7 (5) 1 (4) 
B 
High F 59 12 (14) 6 (14) 10 (14) 15 (9) 5 (3) 5 (2.5) 5 (3) 7 (9) 4 (3) 3 (2) 
Low F 60 22 (14) 23 (14) 11 (14) 10 (9) 3 (3) 4 (2.5) 4 (3) 5 (9) 6 (3) 2 (2) 
C 
High M 65 4 (12.5) 2 (12.5) 1 (13) 14 (9.8) 4 (3) 3 (2.5) 4 (2.5) 8 (8) 4 (4) 3 (2) 
Low M 64 13 (12.5) 12.5 (12.5) 22.5 (13) 10 (9.8) 1 (3) 4 (2.5) 4 (2.50 8 (8) 2 (4) 1 (2) 
D 
High F 65 16 (15) 2 (15.5) 2 (15.5) 15 (8.3) 3 (3.2) 4 (3.2) 5 (3.3) 18 (8.5) 3 (5) 1 (2) 
Low F 65 11 (15) 25 (15.5) 25 (15.5) 5 (8.3) 2 (3.2) 4 (3.2) 3 (3.3) 4 (8.3) 1 (5) 4 (2) 
Note. Age = Months.  
Three tasks (No-Reward, Difficult-Reward, Easy-Reward) = sum of ranks for Task Success with lower scores corresponding better proficiency  
Teacher scores = a sum (out of 15) of the mean score across teachers; Peer proficiency, Popularity and Dominance = Sum of nominations by 
other children; Text in bold indicates anomalies to expected rankings
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Main Experiment  
Method 
Participants 
Eight children were used as models, four participants were excluded from the 
study due to experimenter error and the experiment was terminated early for three 
children as they seemed uncomfortable with continuing. The remaining 94 children (53 
males) ranged from four years nine months to six years seven months (M = 65.53 
months, SD = 5.74 months). There was no significant difference in the distribution of 
sex (χ2 (4, N = 94) = 0.55, p = .97) or age (F4, 89 = 0.30, p = .88) across the five 
conditions. 
 
Design 
 The High PPM and Low PPM were individually trained to remove a sticker 
from an ‘artificial fruit’ task using three alternative solutions that each included a 
sequence of causally irrelevant actions. Once each child was proficient s/he was video 
recorded completing the sequence of actions ending with the successful extraction of the 
sticker. Participants, initially, either interacted with this task (successfully extracting the 
sticker or not) or had no prior personal experience. They then watched the videos of the 
models retrieving the rewards using either a new solution or the same solution that the 
child had previously discovered. 
 
Apparatus 
The Sweep-Drawer-Lever Box (SDLB, see Figure 2) is a puzzle box that 
contains a reward held in place by a series of defences. Critically there are three 
separate solutions, a drawer, a sweep and a lever mechanism, that can be used to release 
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the reward. The SDLB is transparent with an opening at the top where a capsule 
containing a sticker can be inserted. The capsule falls on to an opaque green mid-level 
platform where one of three spatially separated, and functionally unique, pieces of 
apparatus can be manipulated in order to push the capsule from the mid-level to a lower 
level. These three pieces of apparatus are, (1) a silver sweeper with a red handle that 
moves the capsule to a hole through which the capsule falls to the lower level, (2) a 
silver lever used to push the capsule to a hole causing it to fall to the lower level, and 
(3) a blue drawer upon which the capsules sits and by pulling the drawer handle, a gap 
is produced through which the capsule falls to the lower level. These solutions can also 
be used in combination and therefore there are seven possible solutions: Sweep, 
Drawer, Lever, Sweep-Drawer, Drawer-Lever, Lever-Sweep and Drawer-Sweep-Lever, 
the latter four of these will be termed ‘combination-solutions’. On the lower level the 
capsule rests behind a black opaque door which can be slid to the side to remove the 
capsule.  
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Figure 2. The Sweep-Drawer-Lever Box front view (panel A) and top view (B). Model 
using the sweep (C), the lever (D) and the drawer (E).  
 
Video Demonstrations 
 The demonstrations were presented on two laptops, positioned on a table 
approximately 30cm apart. Children were initially shown three-second introductory clips 
of the models, one model for each laptop, smiling and waving. To aid the child’s recall of 
which model would be shown on which laptop, at the top of each laptop was a photograph 
(3cm x 5cm) of the corresponding model. Whether the High PPM or Low PPM model was 
presented on the left or right was counterbalanced along with the order of presentation of 
the introductory clips. The subsequent clips of the models demonstrating their task solution 
were 15s long and were shown simultaneously. A video camera was placed 60cm in front 
of the participant so that his/her head and eye orientation towards the two laptops could 
be recorded.  
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Table 5: Overview of the procedure (three phases) in the five conditions 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Condition 
None-then- 
two-alternate 
Fail-then-two-
alternate 
Personal-then- 
two-alternate 
Personal-then- 
High-PPM-same-
Low-PPM- alternate 
Personal-then- 
Low PPM-same-
High-PPM-alternate 
Phase 1 
(Participant’s interaction) 
No interaction Fail Succeed Succeed Succeed 
Phase 2 
(Models’ demonstrations) 
Two new solutions Two new solutions Two new solutions 
High same solution 
Low new solution 
High new solution 
Low same solution 
Phase 3 
(Participant’s interaction) 
Six Trials Six Trials Six Trials Six Trials Six Trials 
N 20 12 21 20 21 
Note: Words in bold font represent abbreviated terms, used in the text, for condition names.
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Procedure  
 Children were tested individually in a quiet place in their school. The 
experiment consisted of three phases, and participants were systematically allocated to 
one of five conditions (see Table 5). In Phase 1 children were given either a chance to 
interact with the SDLB or were given no information. Children given no information 
(condition 1, Table 5) moved straight into Phase 2 where participants watched the 
introductory clips of the models. They were asked to identify the models by name, after 
which they received a demonstration of one solution from the High PPM and one from 
the Low PPM simultaneously. The demonstrations were repeated for a second time, 
again simultaneously. 
Children who were assigned to the conditions involving an initial interaction 
with the SDLB were given one response trial (Phase 1); children could successfully 
extract the reward using the sweep, drawer or lever solution or fail to extract the reward. 
Those who were unsuccessful received a demonstration of one solution from the High 
PPM and one from the Low PPM (condition 2). Those who were successful were given 
one of three demonstration combinations: a demonstration of one solution from the 
High PPM and one from the Low PPM, both of which were different from the child’s 
Phase 1 solution (condition 3), a demonstration of the same solution the child had used 
by the High PPM and an alternative solution by the Low PPM (condition 4) or a 
demonstration of the same solution the child had used by the Low PPM and an 
alternative solution by the High PPM (condition 5). The solution a model type used was 
counterbalanced across all trials. A demonstration consisted of the clips being shown 
simultaneously and repeated a second time. All demonstrations contained irrelevant 
actions; after the child model had caused the sticker to fall to the lower level using one 
of the three manipulandi they moved this same manipulandi back and forth a further 
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five times. For example, if they demonstrated drawer they pulled the drawer out to 
release the capsule then pushed the drawer (1) in, (2) out, (3) in, (4) out and, (5) in.  
In Phase 3 all children were told, “It’s your turn (again).” The child was allowed 
to interact with the SDLB until s/he retrieved the reward successfully or three minutes 
had elapsed. If children were successful they were told, “It’s your turn again,” until they 
had completed six trials. At the end of testing all children were told they had done very 
well and were rewarded with stickers, irrespective of their level of success. 
 
Coding and Inter-Rater Reliability 
Each participant’s performance was scored with regard to eye orientation during 
video demonstrations and three separate variables for each response trial: (a) success 
(sticker removal), (b) solution used, (c) number of irrelevant actions copied (out of 
five). The experimenter, LW, coded 100% of the sample from video tape. An 
independent observer coded 25% of the sample for 22 variables (the three variables 
listed above for each of six trials and four variables relating to eye orientation). There 
was almost perfect agreement (Viera & Garrett, 2005) on 21 of the 22 variables (Kappa 
scores above .86 (p <.01). The remaining variable (the number of irrelevant actions on 
the final trial) had a Kappa score of .64. A second independent observer coded 100% of 
this variable with a Kappa score of .86 (p < .01). All statistical tests are non-parametric 
and two-tailed.  
 
Results 
In Phase 1, 62 (81%) of the 77 naïve children who initially interacted with the 
task were successful. One child used both the Sweep and the Lever action during his 
success. The other 61 children used a single solution: 19 used the Drawer, 12 the Sweep 
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and 30 the Lever. The higher incidence of using the Lever was significant (χ2 (2, N = 
61) = 7.71, p < .05). For all subsequent analysis Kruskal-Wallis tests were run to 
investigate whether the lever impacted upon results. At no point did the salience of the 
lever have a significant impact upon the children’s subsequent behaviour (ps > .05).  
 
Prior Experience and Solution Choice 
We predicted that children who discovered a solution and subsequently observed 
new alternate solutions from the two models would try one of these alternate solutions 
on their first subsequent attempt, but ultimately incorporate all solutions into their 
repertoire. Twenty-one children who personally discovered one solution were 
subsequently shown two novel alternative solutions. In their first response trial (T1) 
eight children (38%) used the solution demonstrated by the High PPM, seven children 
(33%) used the solution demonstrated by the Low PPM, two children (9%) used the 
solution they had initially discovered and the remaining four children (18%) used a 
combination-solution. Therefore, children were significantly more likely to deviate from 
their original solution than to use it again (p < .001, Binomial test). As children also 
used combination-solutions, post-hoc comparisons were run to see whether Phase 1 
experience (failure or none versus success) affected exploration beyond personal and 
socially demonstrated solutions. Children who were unsuccessful in Phase 1 (Fail-then-
two-alternate) were less likely to explore (use a solution not seen previously) the task 
than children who had been successful in Phase 1(Personal-then-two-alternate, Fisher’s 
Exact test, two tailed, p < .05). This was investigated further by comparing how many 
varieties of solutions (from seven possibilities) children used in their six response trials 
that they hadn’t used in Phase 1. Corrected Mann-Whitney pairwise comparisons 
indicated that, even discounting the use of the solution acquired in phase 1, children in 
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the Personal-then-two-alternate condition used significantly more solutions in Phase 2 
(M = 2.29, SD = 0.64) than children in the Fail-then-two-alternate condition (M = 1.08, 
SD = 0.67; Z2= -3.83, p < .001). There were no significant differences between the 
number of new solutions used for children in the Personal-then-two-alternate condition 
and the None-then-two-alternate condition (Z2= -3.83, p = .73).  
We also predicted that children with successful prior personal experience would 
copy significantly fewer irrelevant actions than children with unsuccessful or no prior 
experience. There were no significant differences in the total number of irrelevant 
actions across the five conditions (Kruskal-Wallis, N = 94, p = .59). For those 77 
children who had an initial successful interaction with the task, 12 (19%) performed an 
irrelevant action; two performed five or more (on the Lever and Sweep-Lever 
combination), two performed two, and eight performed a single irrelevant action, as 
though ‘tidying up’ (putting the manipulandi back in to its original position). Thus, the 
baseline for the rate of spontaneous irrelevant action production with the SDLB was 
19% of children. Across all conditions, after social information (containing the 
demonstration of irrelevant actions), there was no increase in the proportion of children 
producing an irrelevant action. The only exception to this low frequency of irrelevant 
action production was for children who were initially unsuccessful, where seven of the 
ten (70%) subsequently successful children performed an irrelevant action on at least 
one trial; however the small sample size of this group negates statistical interpretation.  
 
Past-proficiency Model-Based Biases 
Across all conditions there were 39 children who used the High PPM solution, 
38 who used the Low PPM solution which was not significantly different (Binomial, p 
= .60), 15 children used an alternative solution and two children were unsuccessful. 
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Across all six trials there was no significant difference in the number of times the High 
PPM solution (M = 2.02, SD = 2.15) or Low PPM solution was used (M = 2.29, SD = 
2.01, Wilcoxon Z = -0.70, p = .48). This section focusses on our prediction that naïve 
children (no prior success) who observe differing solutions from two models will 
preferentially copy the solution choice of the High PPM over the Low PPM. We looked 
at this across two conditions: 
Children with no initial experience (condition 1). Eighteen of the 20 children 
that had no prior interaction with the task before witnessing a demonstration went on to 
be successful at retrieving the reward from the task following a demonstration. Two 
children were unable to identify both models, one of these was unsuccessful and the 
other child was successful and used all three solutions in his trials. Of the remaining 
seventeen children, six children used the same solution as the High PPM, 11 children 
used the same solution as the Low PPM and no children used an alternative solution in 
their first trial (T1). There was no significant difference in whether the High or Low 
PPM’s solution was used in T1 (p = .33, Binomial test, ϴ = .31). Over the six response 
trials there were no significant differences between the number of times the children 
used the High (M = 1.88, SD = 2.23) and the Low (M = 3.24, SD = 2.17) PPM’s 
solution (Wilcoxon Z = -1.35, p =.18, ϴ = .94, see Figure 3). During T1 to T6, five 
children used a solution different to the two demonstrated; two used a single solution, 
one a combination-solution and two used both a previously unseen solution and a 
combination-solution on different trials. 
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Figure 3: Median and interquartile range of mean number of respective solutions used across the six trials in Phase 2.  
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Children who were initially unsuccessful (condition 2). The12 children who 
were unsuccessful at Phase 1 were given two different demonstrations, one from each 
model. As the small sample negates meaningful statistical analysis, the children’s 
behaviour will be described. Ten of the 12 children (83%) went on to be successful 
following a demonstration. Every child used one of the two solutions demonstrated and 
no child used a third or combination-solution. In their first trial (T1) three children used 
the solution demonstrated by the High PPM and seven used that demonstrated by the 
Low PPM. Seven children (one who used the High PPM solution in T1 and six who 
used Low solution in T1) continued to use the same solution for all remaining trials (T2 
to T6, see Figure 3). Conversely, three children (two who originally used the High PPM 
solution and one child who originally used the Low PPM solution) tried both solutions 
witnessed at some point in their trials (T1 to T6).  
 
Section Three: Interaction between Personal Experience and Past-proficiency: 
We predicted that children who discovered one solution and who witnessed two 
alternatives would preferentially copy the solution choice of the High PPM over the 
solution of the Low PPM. On their first attempt in Phase 3 there was no significant 
difference between whether a child used the High PPM’s solution, the Low PPM’s 
solution or their original solution (χ2 (2, N = 21) = 0.29, p = .87, ϴ = .89). Over all trials 
(T1 to T6) there was no significant difference between the number of times children 
used the High PPM’s solution (M = 1.29, SD = 1.49), the Low PPM’s solution (M = 
2.10, SD = 1.67) and their original solution (M = 2.00, SD = 1.30, Friedman’s 
2(2, N = 21) = 2.72, p = .26, ϴ = .99, see Figure 3). Seven (33%) children used 
combination-solutions at some point during the six trials.  
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We also predicted that children who discovered a solution and subsequently 
observed one personal-matching and one novel solution would be more likely to attempt 
an alternative if that alternative is demonstrated by a High PPM versus Low PPM. 
Forty-one children discovered a solution at Phase 1 and subsequently observed one 
model using the same solution they had discovered and one model demonstrating a 
novel alternative. Twenty children witnessed the Low PPM match their solution choice 
and a High PPM demonstrate a new solution. In T1 these children were more likely to 
try a new solution (N = 15) than use their original (and Low PPM matching) solution (N 
= 5, Binomial, p < .05). However, six of these children discovered an alternative 
solution. Twenty-one children witnessed the High PPM match the child’s solution and 
Low PPM demonstrates an alternative. These children were not more likely to use a 
new solution (N = 9; Low = 8, Alternative = 1) than use their original (and High PPM 
matching) solution (N = 12, Binomial, p = .66). The difference between the two 
conditions in terms of repeating their own solution approached significance (p = .058, 
Fisher’s exact, two tailed). Throughout the remaining trials (T2-6), children in the High-
same-and-Low-alternate condition continued to use their original solution (M = 3.89, 
SD = 2.22) more frequently than children in the Low-same-High-alternate condition 
(see Figure 3, M = 2.00, SD = 1.89; Z2= -2.49, p < .05). Not only were children in the 
Low-same-High-alternate condition more likely to deviate away from their originally 
discovered solution to that demonstrated by the High PPM, but they were significantly 
more likely to find the third, undemonstrated, solution than children in the High-same-
and-Low-alternate condition (χ2 (1, N = 41) = 7.55, p < .01).  
 
Section 4: Post-hoc Analysis of Children’s Attendance to the Demonstrations 
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During the demonstration phase children had a choice as to which model they 
watched. Children’s head and eye movements were recorded and coded both for the 
number of times and total duration that each demonstration was attended to. On the first 
demonstration 49 children (53%) looked at the High PPM initially and the remaining 44 
children looked at the Low PPM. On the second demonstration 43 children (46%) 
looked at the High model and the remaining 50 children looked at the Low PPM 
initially. The majority of children alternated their attendance between the two screens 
during each demonstration (head direction changes between laptops, M = 4.6, SD = 2.4). 
In the first and second demonstration only nine (10%) and ten (11%) children watched 
the High PPM exclusively and four (4%) and twelve (13%) children the Low PPM 
exclusively. A mixed-model ANOVA with Condition (N = 5) as the between subjects 
factor and Demonstration number (N = 2) as the within subjects factor showed no main 
effect of Condition (F4,87 = 0.36, p = .84), no main effect of Demonstration number 
(F1,87 = 0.71, p = .40), and no interactions between Demonstration and Condition (F4,87 = 
0.20, p = .94) upon the time spent looking at the High PPM (and therefore conversely 
the Low PPM) during the demonstration phase. In order to test whether the children’s 
attendance during the observation phase affected their subsequent behaviour, the 
dependent variable of which model’s solution (High PPM or Low PPM) was used in the 
children’s first response trial (Phase 3) was entered separately into a stepwise binary 
logistic regression along with which model was attended to first (High PPM or Low 
PPM) and cumulative duration of attendance to each model in both demonstration 
phases. The only significant predictor of Phase 3 behaviour was which model was 
attended to first (= -1.11, p < .05). Across all conditions, if the High PPM was 
attended to first, the child was significantly more likely to use the High PPM’s solution 
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first, and if the Low PPM was attended to first, the child was significantly more likely 
to use the Low PPM’s solution first.  
 
Discussion 
 Before reflecting on the main results we briefly discuss the model selection data. 
This study enabled children to gain personal experience with a task, before they 
witnessed familiar others of differing proficiency use the task. There was evidence that 
our novel tasks were able to appropriately assess the proficiency of the children. 
Additionally, the teacher’s predictive ratings of proficiency correlated with the two 
reward-related tasks suggesting that the tasks appropriately elicited the traits considered 
by the teachers to assess proficiency. These traits were originally developed for 
chimpanzees and were rated by care staff (Freeman et al., submitted) where they also 
appeared to map onto a single construct and ratings were highly consistent across 
husbandry staff. In accordance with other studies (Pellegrini et al., 2007), teacher 
ratings of characteristics reliably predicted the success of children with the novel tasks. 
Children’s ratings of proficiency were inconsistent as they failed to reliably pick 
the same peers twice for the same trait. Furthermore their ratings did not correlate with 
the children’s behaviour on the two reward-related tasks. However, the fact that children 
showed a past-proficiency model-based bias under certain test conditions indicates that 
they do have the ability to discern between models of varying historical ability and use 
this to guide their behaviour. Therefore, it could be that the current study’s methods of 
asking the children who would be good at a novel task were not appropriate. 
Alternatively, it is possible that other model-based biases overshadowed a past-
proficiency bias; children preferentially selected older, more popular peers of the same 
sex in their proficiency ratings. Indeed, in another study, of equivalently aged children, 
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children’s imitative behaviour was more influenced by a model’s age over a model’s 
knowledge state (Wood et al., 2012). In the current study, once models were matched on 
potential model-biases beyond PPM (e.g., age, sex, popularity and dominance) 
children’s behaviour in the main experiment was affected by a past-proficiency model-
based bias under conditions where one model matched the child and one model offered 
an alternative. There are a multitude of model characteristics that might elicit model-
based biases; implementing some biases will be cognitively demanding and the some 
characteristics that bias will be more subtle. There may also be a developmental shift 
with regard to how and when different model characteristics are perceived and used to 
bias children’s learning (Wood et al., submitted).  
 
Solution Choice 
Children with no prior interaction with the task showed canalisation in their 
behaviour following demonstrations from the two models; these children failed to 
discover solutions beyond those demonstrated. Previous research has demonstrated that 
children who have a difficult task experience are significantly more likely to faithfully 
imitate modelled solutions (Williamson & Meltzoff, 2011). In contrast, children who 
discovered a solution for themselves and subsequently observed new alternate solutions, 
employed by the two models, tried these alternate solutions, ultimately incorporating all 
solutions into their repertoire and discovering additional combination-solutions. This 
finding corresponds to an earlier result using a simpler version of the SDLB (without 
the lever) where personal experience prior to receiving a social demonstration, increased 
solution discovery (Wood et al., in press). A motivation to incorporate new solutions 
into one’s repertoire appears in previous research, including those in different domains 
(Siegler & Opfer, 1996) indicating that children’s acquisition of multiple solutions is 
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beneficial to learning about the specific task and to more general forms of learning. 
Learning new solutions may assist adaption in a changing environment (Inglis et al., 
1997) and therefore is an adaptive strategy.  
Generally, children did not imitate the irrelevant actions which stands in contrast 
to a number of studies showing that children around this age faithfully reproduce 
irrelevant actions (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007; McGuigan et 
al., 2007). The irrelevant action reproduction seemed to be close to ‘floor’ levels and 
this may well be why there were no group differences. The only condition that showed a 
pattern towards irrelevant action reproduction was for those children who were 
unsuccessful during their original attempt. This pattern mirrors Williamson and 
Meltzoff (2011) who showed that a difficult, versus easy, prior experience increased the 
chances of irrelevant action reproduction. Our work does support previous research that 
has shown minimal copying of casually irrelevant actions when the model is a child 
(Wood et al., 2012) and the demonstrations were via video rather than live (McGuigan 
et al., 2007). We also believe that the viewing of two demonstrations simultaneously 
may have increased the cognitive load and thus decreased the fidelity of copying a 
model’s solution. However, although the conditions of the current study may have been 
cognitively demanding, the children did still show imitation of the relevant actions. This 
selective imitation of relevant but not irrelevant actions could imply that children 
understand what is causally relevant and what is not and when a copying context is 
difficult will focus on functional and parse out non-functional aspects.  
 
Past-proficiency Model-based Biases 
Our prediction, that naïve children who observe differing solutions from two 
models will preferentially copy the solution choice of the High PPM over the Low PPM 
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was not supported. Whilst this stands in contrast to other studies where children have 
shown model-based biases for past-proficiency (Koenig & Harris, 2005b), our study had 
a different methodology; both demonstrations offered a viable solution. Therefore, we 
suggest that a failure to show a model-based bias may be due to children’s motivation to 
try any new success, irrespective of the source of that success. A similar pattern of 
behaviour has been found previously whereby functionally relevant solutions were 
imitated regardless of model characteristics (age/knowledge state) yet the reproduction 
of demonstrated irrelevant actions was affected by model age (Wood et al., 2012). If 
one has no prior information a model’s characteristics may be important when one has 
to discern which solution offered is viable or what actions within a solution are relevant 
but if both models offer a viable solution their characteristics may not influence ones 
solution choice. 
 
Interaction between Past-proficiency Bias and Solution Choice 
There was some evidence of a past-proficiency model-based bias; when the 
High PPM matched the child’s original solution the child was more likely to continue 
using this solution than when the Low PPM matched the child’s solution. When the 
Low PPM matched the child’s original solution, children were as likely to employ the 
High PPM’s solution as continue using their own and they also discovered more 
previously unseen solutions as compared to the group who had the High PPM match. A 
preference for information provided by a High PPM has been shown in studies where 
models offer differing answers but only one is ‘correct’ (e.g. calling a ball ‘a horse’ 
Birch et al., 2008; Koenig et al., 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005b; or putting shoes on 
hands rather than feet Zmyj et al., 2010) and has also been tentatively indicated in 
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human’s closest living ancestor, chimpanzees (Horner et al., 2010; Kendal et al., in 
prep).  
In contrast to those who have no prior success, if a child is successful it may be 
beneficial to evaluate their own and alternative methods and model characteristics may 
guide this. This would indicate that selectivity based on a model’s past proficiency may 
only be important when the observer is less concerned about acquiring any information 
that might lead to success but more concerned with assessing their solution and the task 
as a whole.  
We suggest that when the child and High PPM’ solutions match, that solution is 
established as a ‘good solution’ and will increase fidelity towards this solution over 
time. Conversely, when the child and Low PPM agree but the High PPM provides an 
alternate solution, the child perceives that his/her solution (and Low PPM’s solution) is 
only one of many ways to interact with this task and uses the High PPM’s solution as 
well as exploring the task.  
 
Attendance to Demonstrations 
There was no discernible pattern regarding attendance to models during 
demonstrations. However, on their first attempt children were significantly more likely 
to use the solution of the model they had attended to first. This would suggest one of 
two things; that children decide who they would like to observe, and potentially copy, 
before the start of the demonstrations or that children’s choice of who to observe first is 
random but this choice influences whom they subsequently copy. This latter explanation 
may represent a primacy effect which could be explored if there were conditions where 
children were told who to look at first or if model demonstrations were played 
sequentially rather than simultaneously.  
Chapter V Model past-proficiency (children) 
167 
 
 
Conclusion 
 The current study investigated whether children’s solution choice of a tool-use 
task was influenced by continued experience and the past-proficiency of a model. 
Children were motivated to incorporate asocially learned and socially demonstrated task 
solutions into their repertoire. When both models offered previously unseen and viable 
solutions, this motivation to acquire solutions seemed to be more salient than the 
characteristics of the models who demonstrated them. However, when certain familiar 
peers matched a child’s solution and other familiar peers offered an alternative, 
children’s continuation of their own solution was influenced by the past-proficiency of 
those peers. Children’s solution choices demonstrate the complex nature of children’s 
social learning strategies. Even at this young age, children’s learning is sophisticated in 
that they are able to remember and successfully use a number of quite different 
solutions on a single task and they seem able to track and appraise the past behaviour of 
familiar peers, compare these individuals; “A is more proficient than B”, and then use 
this to guide their behaviour. Children’s solution choices also seem adaptive because it 
potentially results in the social transmission of the most useful information, the 
extensive accumulation of knowledge, and iterative improvements in task interaction, 
over time which is thought to underpin our species unique capability for cumulative 
culture (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Children’s social learning is complex and needs to 
be viewed in a dynamic setting considering personal experience, number of solutions 
available, models and demonstrations witnessed. 
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Chapter VI  
Chimpanzees’ tool-use is biased by the proficiency of 
known conspecifics 
 
This final empirical study built upon the research presented in the previous study. Past-
proficiency model-biases in captive chimpanzees were investigated with an adapted 
design. Specifically, chimpanzees learning of a tool-use task, relative to the past-
proficiency of known conspecifics (group mates), was investigated. It is anticipated that 
the data presented in this chapter, will be submitted for publication either in a journal 
specialising in animal behaviour or one with a more general readership relating to 
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Abstract 
There is still much debate over the learning processes and transmission biases 
underpinning chimpanzees’ social learning. The current study employed a novel tool-
use paradigm in an open-diffusion setting to investigate these factors. Within their 
groups, chimpanzees had access to pairs of visually and functionally different tools 
(hook and scoop) which could be used to obtain baskets containing food. Chimpanzees 
either had no prior information regarding the task or received demonstrations from two 
models, each demonstrating a different tool. These two models differed in their prior-
proficiency as ascertained by prior interactions with novel tasks (that other group 
members observed, so potentially developing a within group proficiency reputation) and 
husbandry employees’ ratings of each chimpanzee’s general proficiency. There were no 
significant differences in success rates in the use of tools by chimpanzees from the 
model-groups and groups in which there were no models. However, the first tool 
touched by chimpanzees from the model-groups indicated a model-based transmission 
bias as individuals were significantly more likely to match the tool demonstrated by the 
model with the higher past proficiency than the lower past proficiency. The tool used 
for chimpanzees’ first attempts and first successes did not differ as a function of which 
model used the tool. It is proposed that chimpanzees’ tool-use behaviour was guided by 
an initial bias towards the model with higher past proficiency, alongside asocial 
learning. The majority of chimpanzees used both tools and some asocially learned new 
methods of reward retrieval. 
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Introduction 
Chimpanzees socially learn. That is, chimpanzees observe others and this 
influences their interactions with their environment. For example, chimpanzees are 
more likely to obtain out of reach food with a tool after a social demonstration of that 
tool than with no information (Nagell, Olguin & Tomasello, 1993; Tomasello, Davis-
Dasilva, Camak & Bard, 1987). More broadly, the ability to socially learn is thought to 
underpin the spread of different behavioural patterns in varying locations in the wild; 
hence it underpins culture in chimpanzees (Whiten et al., 1999). Despite these studies, 
what chimpanzees learn, i.e. the processes and mechanisms of the transmission of social 
information, is still a matter of some debate (see Whiten, Horner, Litchfield, & 
Marshall-Pescini, 2004 and Hoppitt & Laland, 2008 for a detailed description of social 
learning processes and mechanisms). Here mechanisms refer to the outcomes of the 
social learning rather than the cognitive mechanisms underpinning these outcomes 
(Heyes, 2012).  
Matthews, Paukner and Suomi (2010) propose that simple social learning 
mechanisms, such as stimulus enhancement, combined with asocial learning and 
reinforcement can result in behavioural traditions. Stimulus enhancement is a relatively 
rudimentary learning mechanism, defined as an increase in the probability that the 
observer will interact with stimuli of the same physical type as those with which the 
demonstrator interacts (Heyes, 1994). Stimulus enhancement alone cannot explain all 
forms of chimpanzee learning; Nagell et al. (1993) found that, whilst chimpanzees who 
observed no demonstrations were as likely to manipulate a target tool as those who 
observed a conspecific demonstration, the no-demonstration chimpanzees were less 
likely to successfully obtain a reward. The chimpanzees with a social demonstration did 
not imitate the precise two-action step of the model, suggesting an absence of 
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behavioural imitation but a presence of end-state emulation. Accordingly, it has been 
suggested that chimpanzees are more ‘goal emulators’ than ‘action imitators’ (Whiten, 
McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini & Hopper, 2009). In other circumstances chimpanzees 
copied the exact actions employed by models during reward retrieval (Whiten, 
Custance, Gomez, Teixidor & Bard, 1996; Whiten, Horner & de Waal, 2005; Whiten et 
al., 2007) but they do not do so with the same fidelity as children (Call, Carpenter & 
Tomasello, 2005; Nagell et al., 1993; Whiten et al., 1996). This plethora of research 
demonstrates that different paradigms might elicit different learning mechanisms and 
that chimpanzees might employ ‘a portfolio of alternative social-learning processes in 
flexibly adaptive ways, in conjunction with nonsocial learning’ (Whiten, et al., 2004, p. 
36). 
 The current research investigated social transmission of information using a 
novel design; two tools, a scoop tool and a hook tool were made available to 
chimpanzees. Each tool entailed its own method (hooking with the hook or scooping 
with the scoop) of obtaining an out-of-reach basket containing food. Chimpanzees 
either received no prior demonstrations of basket retrieval or received demonstrations 
from two models, each model demonstrating the use of just one of the tools. By using 
known conspecifics as models, the aim of the current study was to implement an 
experimental design which mirrored captive chimpanzees’ naturalistic settings. These 
known conspecific models differed in their past proficiency as potentially ascertained 
by group members due to (1) prior interactions with novel tasks within the group 
context and (2) husbandry employees’ ratings of each chimpanzee’s general non-social 
proficiency as observed over a period of at least 18 months. Ecological validity was 
increased by implementing an open-diffusion design whereby the models demonstrated 
to the whole group and subsequently the task was made available to the whole group 
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(Whiten et al., 2007). It is argued that diffusion experiments allow for greater 
experimental validity because they allow investigation of how behavioural variations 
spread and how faithfully they do so (Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008; Whiten & Mesoudi, 
2008).The following two sections discuss model-based-biases and solution (or tool) 
choice in this context.  
 
Model-based Biases 
It has been proposed that animals use heuristics to guide when, and from whom, 
they socially learn. These social learning strategies (Laland, 2004) may be influenced by 
the characteristics or the behaviour of the model demonstrating the behaviour. Henrich 
and Gil-White (2001) argue that ‘Natural selection favoured social learners who could 
evaluate potential models and copy the most successful among them’ (p. 165). Such 
strategies have been termed context-dependent model-based biases (Boyd & Richerson 
1985; Henrich & McElreath, 2003; Rendell et al., 2011). There have been theoretical 
models of the utility of a success bias (Baldini, 2012) but there is limited empirical 
work investigating model-based biases in chimpanzees. Wild chimpanzees show 
selective attention towards observing models of the same age or older, but not younger, 
than themselves (Biro, Inoue-Nakamura, Tonooka, Yamakoshi, Sousa, & Matsuzawa, 
2003), and captive chimpanzees’ learning of food retrieval methods is influenced more 
by older versus younger individuals (although the older chimpanzees were also more 
dominant and were rated as having higher past proficiency by husbandry staff (Horner, 
Proctor, Bonnie, Whiten, & de Waal, 2010). Dominance may also affect learning as 
behaviour demonstrated by a subordinate chimpanzee is not socially learned (Bonnie, 
Horner, Whiten, & de Waal, 2007) and that there is an ‘attendance bias’ towards 
dominant chimpanzees for learning purposes (Kendal et al., in prep.). 
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The focus of this study was the model-based bias of success. Rendell et al., 
(2011) identify three ways in which model success might bias learning. Individuals 
might copy: (1) in proportion to observed payoffs, (2) if a model’s payoff is better than 
their own, and (3) the model thought to be the most successful. However, it is unclear 
whether model success relates to the present, i.e. the model is successful at 
demonstrating the information which may be transmitted, or in the past i.e. that the 
success was demonstrated in the past and that some form of ‘success reputation’ is 
biasing subsequent information transmission from model to observer. Furthermore, it is 
not clear whether success relates to domain specific model success relating to the 
specific information which is to be transferred or whether it is domain general success 
i.e. that the model generally has more success in their environment which may also be 
related to dominance and prestige (Henrich & McElreath, 2003).  
Therefore, as stated earlier, we use the term past-proficiency to refer to a 
model’s domain-specific ability shown in the past. As such it focusses on the potential 
for a model to have a reputation for being skilled within the domain in which the model 
is currently demonstrating. A bias towards those who have shown themselves to be 
previously proficient in the same domain as the to-be-learned task requires an ability to 
track other’s behaviour over time and, with regard to that individual, adapt one’s 
behaviour accordingly. This has been demonstrated with chimpanzees that develop a 
preference for gesturing to a long-term generous versus ungenerous donor (Subiaul, 
Vonk, Okamoto-Barth & Barth, 2008). A proficiency bias also requires that 
chimpanzees are able to identify a model’s characteristics and use these to guide their 
copying. As mentioned above, there is evidence that chimpanzees are able to use such 
characteristics as they preferentially copy the choices of older, higher ranking and 
previously proficient models (Horner et al., 2010). However, it is not known whether it 
Chapter VI Model past-proficiency (chimpanzees) 
178 
 
was the age, dominance and/or prior proficiency which influenced the chimpanzees’ 
choices and the study had a limited sample size. Across species, children show a bias 
towards a model with a higher, rather than lower, past proficiency both with novel word 
learning (Koenig & Harris, 2005b; Vázquez, Delisle, & Saylor, 2012) and artefact use 
(Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter & Daum, 2010). In an 
artefact design task, human adults also use a ‘copy successful’ bias when the task is 
relatively hard (Mesoudi, 2008) but in a lower than expected frequency (Mesoudi, 
2011) and it is used to the same degree as a prestige bias which was contextually less 
useful (Atkisson, O’Brien & Mesoudi, 2012). 
In the current study we investigated whether chimpanzees’ behaviour was 
influenced by a model-based bias pertaining to known conspecifics’ previous 
proficiency. Prior-proficiency in this context related to proficiency with novel tasks 
which were similar to the test-task leading to a prior-proficiency construct in the domain 
of food retrieval. Chimpanzees had spent a minimum of 18 months in their groups and 
some chimpanzees had spent up to 36 years in each other's company. This sustained 
amount of group living and the opportunity to witness conspecifics interacting with 
novel tasks in the same domain as the test-task meant there was potential for 
chimpanzees to perceive the proficiency of others. Within each experimental group a 
chimpanzee ranked as having a higher past proficiency was chosen as a model (High 
PPM) along with a chimpanzee ranked as having a neutral-to-low past proficiency (Low 
PPM). These chimpanzees were trained to use one of two distinct tools to retrieve food. 
Once the two models were proficient, they demonstrated their tool use to the group and 
subsequently two sets of tools were made available to the whole group. We predicted that 
chimpanzees who observed differing solutions from two models would initially copy 
the solution choice of the High PPM. 
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Solution Choice over Time 
It has been proposed that chimpanzees who discover, or socially learn, one 
solution for food retrieval are unlikely to try a more efficient solution (Marshall-Pescini 
& Whiten, 2008) and when one solution is precluded, those expert in the blocked 
solution do not adopt an alternative solution (Hrubesch, Preuschoft, & van Schaik, 
2009). Similarly, Hopper, Schapiro, Lambeth and Brosnan (2011) found conservatism 
to initial social information even when an equally-easy alternative behaviour produced a 
higher value reward. However, chimpanzees in the wild exhibit flexibility in using a 
range of tools for food acquisition such as obtaining honey (Sanz & Morgan, 2007, 
2009) although the extent to which each tool is fixed for use for each stage of the 
extraction process is unknown. Captive chimpanzees, that asocially learn one technique 
for obtaining juice, permanently switched to using a more efficient technique upon 
observing a conspecific or human demonstrate this more proficient alternative 
(Yamamoto, Humle & Tanaka, 2013) and Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierrey, and 
Laland (2012) found no conservatism to initially rewarded solutions when greater 
rewards were obtainable. This suggests that solution change can occur with sufficiently 
persuasive social information. Additionally, Hopper, Spiteri, Lambeth, Schapiro, Horner 
and Whiten (2007) found that when chimpanzees received a demonstration of a difficult 
method of reward retrieval they adopted the alternative method available, indicating that 
costs to using an original method might result in solution switching as has been found in 
other species involving prior personal and subsequent social information (see Kendal, 
Coolen, van Bergen, & Laland, 2005 for a review). In apparent contrast to non-humans 
(Kendal et al. 2005), Wood, Kendal and Flynn (2013) found that, even when their 
Chapter VI Model past-proficiency (chimpanzees) 
180 
 
original personally-acquired information was sufficient, children attempted novel 
socially-demonstrated solutions and incorporated both solutions over time.  
The current study extends previous research by introducing, or ‘seeding’, two 
socially demonstrated solutions before any observer interactions. The chimpanzees can 
choose which solution to attempt first and whether to incorporate both solutions. Due to 
this novel paradigm we make no specific predictions concerning whether the 
chimpanzees will demonstrate canalisation to the first method adopted or attempt both 
methods.  
 
Summary 
The current study investigated social transmission of information using a novel 
task design to investigate social learning processes and mechanisms, past-proficiency 
model-based biases and task interaction over time. Chimpanzees’ proficiency was 
assessed through observations of interactions with tasks that were similar to the test 
task. The potential for group-members to construct a proficiency reputation occurred 
during these group interactions. In addition proficiency rankings of husbandry staff 
were collected, leading to the selection of two proficiency contrasting models in four 
groups. This model selection procedure was rigorous, thus we present a concise method 
and results, followed by the method and results for the main model-based bias 
experiment.  
 
Model Selection: Method 
Subjects 
The study included six groups totalling 54 chimpanzees (24 males) housed in six 
social groups at the Michale E. Keeling Center for Comparative Medicine and Research 
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of the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, Bastrop, TX, U.S.A. 
(KCCMR). Subjects were aged 12- to 43-years-old (M = 24.5 years, SD = 7). The group 
sizes were as follows: A = 8 (4 males), B = 8 (3 males), C =9 (6 males), D = 7 (4 
males), E = 11 (2 males) and F = 10 (4 males). The chimpanzees were not deprived of 
food or water. Approval for this study was gained from the Institutional Animal Care 
and Use Committee of the University of Texas. The KCCMR is fully accredited by the 
American Association for the Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care-International.  
 
Apparatus 
Four novel tasks were used: (1) Hard-Reward (rewards= food), (2) Easy-Reward, (3) 
No-Reward tube and (4) No-Reward mirror (see Figures 1a to 1d). Two tasks contained 
food, and two did not (see Clark and Smith, 2012 for evidence that task interactions do 
not decrease in the absence of food rewards). 
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Figure 1a: Easy-Reward task. 150cm Perspex pipe with a larger hole (diameter = 
10cm) at one end and 12 smaller holes (d = 3cm) throughout the rest of the pipe. The 
pipe was filled with chow and apple pieces. Small pieces of food could be removed from 
the smaller holes or larger pieces of food could be moved through the pipe and removed 
from the larger hole.  
Figure 1b: Hard-Reward task. 25cm x 25cm x 5cm (h x w x d) clear Perspex box with 
six compartments containing cereal. Each compartment had a hole (d = 3cm) at the 
front. On the front of the box was a circular clear disk with three holes (d = 3cm). This 
circular panel was attached with a bolt in the centre such that the panel could rotate. 
When a hole on the panel lined up with a hole on the box, food could be accessed.  
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Figure 1c: No-Reward tube task. 100cm clear Perspex pipe filled with 12 balls of 
differing colours, sizes and textures. The pipe had three slats cut into it (l= 10cm, h= 
2cm) so that balls could be touched but not be removed from the pipe.  
 
Figure 1d: No-Reward mirror task. 40cm x 40cm x 15cm (h x w x d) blue crate with a 
mirror attached to the front panel. The mirror has three holes cut into it through which 
chimpanzees could touch, two rotatable paint rollers.  
 
 
Behaviour Ratings  
In four separate 60min sessions, each task was individually made available to all 
members of each chimpanzee group. A video camera was placed 2m away from the task 
and all behaviour occurring at the window, where the task was attached, was recorded 
and coded. The experimenter (LW) was present at all times and gave a running 
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commentary of behaviour to aid with coding. The videos were coded for each 
individual’s latency to first approach to within 1m of the task (1), contact interaction 
whether with hand or mouth (2), first food reward extracted (3) and latency between 
first approach to first food reward (4). Additionally, the number of approaches (5), 
interactions (6), interactions resulting in food reward (7), types of different interactions 
(8), food rewards retrieved (9) and ratio of ‘unsuccessful’ to ‘successful’ interactions 
with food rewarded tasks were recorded (10). Finally, the cumulative time (in seconds) 
spent within a 1m radius of the task (11) and interacting with the task (12) was also 
recorded.  
Chimpanzees were ranked, relative to other chimpanzees in their group, for each 
of these behaviours, and the ranks summed to give a total rank for each task, henceforth 
called ‘Task Success’. A lower rank equated with more Task Success. Pearson rank 
correlations demonstrated that chimpanzees’ behaviour showed consistency across three 
of the four tasks (see Table 1). A sum of all behavioural scores on each of the tasks was 
significantly correlated with each other task except the No-Reward mirror task did not 
correlate with the Hard-Reward task and the No-Reward tube task. Scores for the novel 
tasks were standardised from a scale of 0 to 10 so that each chimp had a rank score 
relative to his/her group size.  
 
Table 1: Pearson correlations of summed scores on all behaviours on four novel tasks 
 Hard-Reward Easy-Reward No-Reward Tube No-Reward Mirror 
Hard-Reward __ .66*** .52*** .25
ns
 
Easy-Reward  __ .65*** .41* 
No-Reward Tube   __ .26
ns
 
No-Reward Mirror    __ 
Note. Bonferroni corrections for six comparisons * p < .009, ***p < .001 
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Husbandry Employee Ratings  
Husbandry employee (HE) ratings were collected as an alternative assessment of 
chimpanzee past proficiency with novel tasks. Three HEs (A, B and C) at the KCCMR 
facility, who have worked daily with the chimpanzees for at least 18 months, were 
asked to rate chimpanzees using a 7-point scale, with 7 being the high extreme. There 
were three traits pertaining to proficiency: Inquisitive, defined as, ‘Readily explores 
new situations and objects’; Intelligent, ‘Quick and accurate in judging and 
comprehending non-social situations’; and Inventive, ‘More likely than others to engage 
in novel behaviours, e.g. Using new devices or materials in the enclosure’. HEs were 
also asked to rate chimpanzees on three traits relating to dominance: Aggressive, ‘Often 
initiates fights or other menacing and agonistic encounters with other chimpanzees’; 
Affiliative, ‘Has affiliative bond with either a significant number of others and /or a 
small number of more powerful individuals’; Acquiring ability, ‘Is able to acquire and 
monopolise resources over other individuals’. All traits were based on constructs 
developed, and validated for use with chimpanzees, by Freeman et al. (submitted). The 
three HEs independently gave each chimpanzee similar ranks for each trait (Spearman 
rank ps < .01), highlighting internal reliability with the proposed construct of 
proficiency. The scores of Inquisitive and sum scores were correlated across HEs, but 
scores of Intelligent and Inventive were not correlated across HEs (Inventive 
approached significance for HE A’s scores with the other two HE, see Table 2). Ratings 
of the summed dominance traits are presented in the model selection table (Table 4). 
 
Table 2 HE ratings of proficiency 
 Inquisitive Intelligent Inventive Sum  
 HE B HE C HE B HE C HE B HE C HE B HE C  
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Note. Bonferroni corrections 
+
 p < .05, * p < .017, **p < .01, **p < .001 
 
Relation between Behaviour and HE Ratings 
 The rank scores of performance with the four novel tasks were standardised to a 
scale of 0 to 10 so that each chimp had a rank score relative to his/her group size. This 
enabled an assessment of the relation between HE ratings and behaviour with the novel 
tasks for all 54 chimpanzees. Chimpanzee ranks for response to each novel task (lower 
rank indicating better task performance) were separately entered as dependent variables 
into a linear regression with each HE score entered as independent variables (see Table 
3). HE A’s proficiency ratings were a significant predictor of chimpanzee behaviour for 
two tasks (Easy-Reward and No-Reward Tube) and approached significance for the No-
Reward Mirror. HE B and C’s proficiency ratings were not significant predictors for 
any of the tasks. HE C’s score approached significance for the No-Reward Mirror task; 
the more proficient a chimpanzee was rated, the poorer their actual performance. 
Performance with the No-Reward mirror task had correlated least well with the other 
tasks, perhaps explaining this anomaly. 
 
Selecting Models  
 Chimpanzees’ behaviour over three of the four novel tasks was consistent, 
demonstrating that chimpanzees’ novel task proficiency was consistent across contexts. 
This period of group task interaction prior to the main experiment also potentially 
served to cement any proficiency reputations that chimpanzees possessed. HE ratings of 
proficiency generally positively correlated with each other but only one HE member (A) 
was consistently reliable in predicting chimpanzee performance with the novel tasks. 
HE A .44** .34* .01 .25
ns
 .28
+
 .32
+
 .33* .41**  
HE C .47*** - -.05 - .26
ns
 - .36** -  
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We, therefore, prioritised behaviour with the four tasks for model selection but also 
considered HE ratings. The High PPM was chosen from chimpanzees who reached the 
following criteria: ranked in the top three chimpanzees for Task Success with at least three 
of the novel tasks and was ranked in the top three chimpanzees for HE proficiency 
rankings (Table 4). The Low PPM was chosen from chimpanzees who reached the 
following criteria: did not come in the top three chimpanzees for Task Success with any 
novel task and ranked in the bottom four chimpanzees for HE proficiency scores. There 
were four chimpanzee groups in which two models were selected. Selection criteria were 
met for three of the four groups for the High PPM. In the fourth group (D) the two 
chimpanzees who fulfilled the high PPM criteria refused to voluntarily separate from their 
group. Therefore a chimpanzee who was rated highest by HEs was selected. This 
chimpanzee had not performed as well as the other High PPMs with the tasks but he still 
performed better than other chimpanzees within his group. This chimpanzee had initially 
appeared to show neophobia to the experimenter (LW) during the novel task phase perhaps 
explaining his lack of task interaction. After additional training this model chimpanzee 
seemed comfortable with the experimenter, voluntarily separating from his group. All 
subsequent analysis was performed with the inclusion and exclusion of this group and 
results remained the same. Thus the analysis presented here includes all four groups. 
Selection criteria were met for three of the four groups for the Low PPM, but in the fourth 
group (C) the one chimpanzee who reached criteria refused to voluntarily separate from 
her group. Therefore a chimpanzee who was rated the least proficient by HEs was selected. 
This chimpanzee only came in the top three for the No-Reward Mirror task. There were no 
models in groups E and F. A summary of the characteristics of all models can be seen in 
Table 4. 
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Table 3: Linear Regression (Enter) for chimpanzee behaviour (ranks) on the four novel task 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Bonferroni corrections for each of the four comparisons 
+
 p < .05, * p < .012, **p < .01, **p < .001
 Easy-Reward Hard-Reward No-Reward Tube No-Reward Mirror 
Husbandry 
Employees 
B SE  t B SE  t B SE  t B SE  t 
A -.30** .1 -.42 -2.24 -.19 .11 -.26 -1.73 -.37*** .10 -.52 -3.75 -.25
+
 .11 -.34 -2.32 
B -.06 .19 -.05 -0.32 -.16 .20 -.11 -0.77 -.07 .19 -.05 0.35 -.06 .20 -.04 -.30 
C .26 .14 .26 1.77 .26 .14 0.26 1.75 .18 .14 .18 1.29 .32
+
 .15 .32 2.19 
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 Table 4: Overview of the eight models, two selected from each group  
Group Model Sex Age 
Easy-Reward  
Converted Rank 
Hard-Reward 
Converted Rank 
No-Reward Tube 
Converted Rank 
No-Reward Mirror 
Converted Rank  
HE Proficiency 
Score (Group M) 
HE Dominance Score 
(M= 4.1 SD =1) 
A 
High F 26 0 1.4 0 
10 5.0 (4.6) 5.1 
Low M 28 10 10 10 
4.3 4.1 (4.6) 4.8 
B 
High F 26 0 0 0 
7.1 6.0 (5.7) 5.4 
Low F 25 8.6 7.1 5.7 
4.3 2.7 (5.7) 2 
C 
High M 28 1.1 1.1 0 
3.3 6.3 (4.4) 4.7 
Low M 29 10 5.6 4.4 1.1 3.1 (4.4) 2.7 
D 
High M 27 8.3 8.3 5 
6.7 5.8 (4.4) 4.8 
Low M 24 10 6.7 7.5 
5 3.8 (4.4) 5.3 
Note. Age = Years. Four tasks (No-Reward Tube and Mirror, Hard-Reward, Easy-Reward) = Converted rank relative to group size on a scale from 0 
to 10. Lower scores correspond to a better rank; HE Proficiency Score = Mean proficiency score (out of 7) calculated from the sum of the three traits 
(7-point- Likert, 1 = least, 7 = most) across the three HEs; HE Dominance Score= Mean dominance score (out of 7) calculated from the sum of the 
three traits (7-point- Likert, 1 = least, 7 = most) across the three HEs; Text in bold indicates anomalies to expected rankings. 
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Main Experiment  
Method 
Subjects 
One chimpanzee in group C died between the model selection phase and the 
open-diffusion phase of the study leaving a sample size of 53. Eight chimpanzees were 
used as models, two in each of groups A-D. The remaining 45 chimpanzees became the 
test subjects. During training, models voluntarily separated from group members. 
Training sessions (c 15mins) involved behaviour shaping and positive reinforcement. 
The open-diffusion phase of the study took place in the chimpanzees’ large, enriched 
home enclosures (Primadomes, diameter 10m), and the chimpanzees had access to their 
inside dens at all times meaning that they chose whether or not to interact with the task. 
 
Design 
 Chimpanzees identified as high past proficiency models (High PPM) and 
neutral-to-low past proficiency models (Low PPM) were individually trained to retrieve 
fruit from an out of reach basket using one of two distinct tools. Once the two models 
were proficient they demonstrated their tool use to their group in three 1hr sessions. 
Subsequently, two sets of apparatus and tools (two per apparatus) were made available to 
the whole group in four 2.5hr sessions. The remaining two groups served as no-model 
groups. These groups allow investigation of the influence of the trained models but, as 
chimpanzees were able to acquire social information from their group members’ 
interactions with the task, they cannot be considered asocial learning control groups.  
 
Apparatus 
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The study aimed to use a version of a two-solution extractive foraging task 
(Dawson & Foss, 1965; Whiten et al., 1996). Several two-action tasks were piloted with 
chimpanzees that did not take part in the main experiment. First, there was an adapted 
form of the Slide-Drawer-Box (SDB, Wood et al., 2013) with both manipulandi at the 
front. Chimpanzees were able to be trained on both methods, however, even in dyads it 
was very hard for the observer to see what the model was doing because the 
manipulandi were small and at the front of the box, blocked by the model’s body. 
Reflecting on this, a task requiring larger apparatus was designed. Originally the two 
tools were 15cm tongs and a 15cm ladle. Chimpanzees found it hard to use these tools 
and the relatively short length of the tool meant that the food was only just out of reach 
and so the chimpanzees often attempted to use their hands to retrieve the food. The third 
revision involved the longer scoop and hook tools which required a combination of 
gross and fine motor skills.  
There were two identical tasks. Each task (Figure 2) consisted of a cart placed 
by the bars, which were covered with square mesh with 5cm
2
, outside of the 
chimpanzee’s enclosure. On the cart was a hard plastic 7cm basket with a metal handle. 
The basket was situated 40cm away from the chimpanzees’ enclosure and out of their 
reach. The edge of the cart was situated 10cm away from the bars so that the basket 
could not be dragged towards the window but had to be lifted off the cart for successful 
retrieval. Two tools per task, a scoop and a hook, were provided with the handle of the 
tool placed through the mesh. The scoop was a red 40cm steel rod with a steel garden 
hand spade (handle removed) melded on to it. The hook was a blue 50cm steel rod that 
at one end was shaped into a hook to make the final length 40cm. A 10cm piece of steel 
was welded 10cm from the handle end of the tool so that it could not be pulled into the 
enclosure (as the wire mesh fencing prevented this). Both tools could be used to obtain 
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the basket, either by scooping the bottom (scoop tool) or hooking the handle of the 
basket (hook tool). The basket was baited with a high value food reward: 2cm
2
 chunks 
of watermelon, banana or mango. Each time a reward was obtained a new baited basket 
was placed onto the cart.  
This task was again piloted and only two chimpanzees asocially learnt the task 
in a 60min period, both by dragging the basket. To prevent dragging, the baskets were 
placed on a cart which was 10cm away from the edge of the corral bars so that dragging 
would result in the basket falling between the gaps.  
             
Figure 2: Baited task with either red scoop tool scooping (left) or blue hook tool 
hooking (right) to obtain the basket containing a high value food reward.  
 
Procedure 
Training Phase. Individually, the models were trained through shaping and 
positive reinforcement. Once the model had achieved 30 successful basket retrievals 
s/he was judged a reliable model and, assuming the opposing demonstrator was fully 
trained, the observation phase began. In all four groups the High PPM model took fewer 
training sessions to reach the criteria than the Low PPM although exact data for this was 
not recorded.  
Observation Phase. Two carts were placed at each of two windows (1m x 1.5m 
with wire mesh) about 1.5m apart from each other. Each model was called to a window 
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and was handed the tool they had been trained to use. For example, in a group with the 
High PPM trained with the hook and the Low PPM trained with the scoop, at the start of 
the observation phase the High PPM approached window 1 and was handed a hook tool 
whilst a scoop tool was placed by the side of the apparatus in clear view of the other 
chimpanzees. After the High PPM’s demonstration, the Low PPM was called to 
window 2 and was handed a second scoop tool and a second hook tool was placed by 
the side of the apparatus. The first hook and scoop tools remained in sight but 
unobtainable at window 1. Each model was handed their ‘trained’ tool regardless of the 
window they approached, thus a specific tool was not associated with a particular 
window by experimenter design. In this phase, which occupied 60mins on each of three 
consecutive week days, the model was allowed to operate the tools, but on the occasions 
that other chimpanzees acquired the tool, the experimenter did not bait the basket or, if 
the basket had already been baited, the experimenter withdrew the cart so that the basket 
became out of reach even with the tool. When one model was successful the 
experimenter did not re-bait this basket until the other model was successful and thus 
the demonstrations alternated between the two chimpanzees. If the model made contact 
with the basket but failed to hook/scoop it after 5s, the experimenter assisted by 
attaching the basket to the tool. If a model failed to approach the task or successfully 
retrieve a basket within 1min of the other model’s last success the basket of the original 
model was re-baited. Through calling chimpanzee’s names, and occasional assisted 
attachment of baskets, the experimenter attempted to obtain an equal number of 
demonstrations from both models, and for each observer to witness at least ten 
demonstrations in total  
Open Diffusion Phase. The open diffusion was carried out over four sessions 
on separate days, each two-and-a-half hours long. Both carts were used and at each cart 
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the two tools were placed through the mesh. How the tools lay in relation to each other 
was counterbalanced within and between groups. Following a success the experimenter 
did not re-bait this cart until there was success at the other cart or 2mins had passed. 
This was to ensure an equal balance of the experimenter’s time at each window and cart.  
 
Coding and Inter-Rater Reliability 
There were instances whereby a chimpanzee’s interaction involved holding both 
tools or the use of the only tool available at the baited cart, i.e. another chimpanzee was 
holding the other tool. We therefore coded first interactions (henceforth ‘absolute’) and 
first interactions when both tools were available (henceforth ‘free’). Each chimpanzee’s 
performance was scored for, (a) which tool they first touched (absolute and free), (b) 
which tool they first attempted to retrieve the basket with, defined by the tool making 
contact with the basket (absolute and free), and (c) which tool they had their first 
successful retrieval of the food reward with (absolute and free). The first five attempts 
and successes of each chimpanzee were also recorded. Attempts and successes observed 
by conspecifics were recorded both prior to each individual’s first success and between 
each success. The experimenter, LW, coded 100% of the sample from video tape. An 
independent observer coded 25% of the sample. There was disagreement on 0.67% of 
the trials double coded for tool touch and attempt. This was mainly due to a need for 
clarification over whether tool touches occurred simultaneously (within a few seconds 
and resulting in holding both) or sequentially (more than a few seconds in-between and 
not holding both). All first tool touches were coded again to ensure consistency. There 
were no disagreements for tool success. 
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Results 
Demonstration Phase 
There was no significant difference between the number of High PPM (M 
=8.67, SD = 9.07) or Low PPM (M =7.70, SD = 6.49) demonstrations seen (Wilcoxon 
Z2= -.54, p = .59, d = .14). The number of successful demonstrations across all groups 
for the High PPMs (N =182) and the Low PPMs (N =182) was equal. However the Low 
PPMs had a significantly higher proportion of failed attempts (Total N = 276, Failed N 
= 94, 34%) than the High PPMs (Total N = 235, Failed N = 53, 23%, Fisher’s Exact 
Test; FET, p < .001). Thus, whilst the number of successes observed was equal the 
overall number of task interactions by the Low PPMs was greater than the High PPMs. 
Furthermore, the experimenter had to assist (model makes contact with basket but fails 
to attach after 5s so the experimenter attaches basket) the Low PPMs (M = 40.0, SD = 
11.2) significantly more than the High PPMs (M = 20.3, SD = 3.6, FET p < .001). 
 
Success Rates for the Model versus No-model Groups 
During the open diffusion phase, and across model and no-model groups, thirty-
nine (87%) of the 45 untrained chimpanzees were successful at obtaining a reward, 24 
of these did so in the first session. In the first session the model-groups had marginally 
more successful individuals (14/24; 58%) than the no-model groups (10/21; 48%) 
although this difference was not significant (FET, p = .56, d = .10). This pattern 
continued overall with 22/24 (92%) individuals of Model groups versus 17/21 (81%) 
individuals of no-model groups being successful (FET, p = .40, d = .16). Although the 
model group chimpanzees had fewer unsuccessful attempts before their first success (M 
= 2.33, SD = 0.40) than no-model group chimpanzees (M = 3.05, SD = 0.48) this 
difference was also not significant (U = 203.5, p = .26, d = .99). The rank scores of the 
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order in which each individual achieved their first success were standardised from a 
scale of 0 to 10 so that each chimp had a rank score relative to his/her group size. There 
was a significant positive correlation between order of success with a hook/scoop tool 
and performance with the four novel tasks combined (rs (43) = .55, p < .05). Hence, 
those who were more proficient with the novel tasks were more likely to be successful 
with the tool task before those who were less proficient with the novel tasks.  
 
First Interactions in Relation to Model Past-Proficiency 
We predicted that naïve chimpanzees (no prior personal experience) who 
observed differing solutions from two models would initially copy the solution choice 
of the High PPM. We assessed this by looking at each chimpanzee’s first tool touch, 
attempted tool use and successful basket retrieval. 
                         
           3a Chimpanzees from model groups       3b Chimpanzees from no-model groups 
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Figure 3: Percentage of chimpanzees matching High PPM for model-groups (1a) or 
scoop for no-model group (1b). Note: 50% equals chance (as indicated by black line). 
*** p < .001 significantly different from chance 
 
First touch. All 45 untrained chimpanzees made contact with at least one tool, 
43 of these chimpanzees did so in the first session indicating that there was no 
neophobia towards the apparatus. Across all groups there were 11 instances whereby a 
chimpanzee’s first touch involved holding both tools. There were also 12 occasions 
whereby a chimpanzee’s first touch was with the only tool available at the baited cart. In 
the four model groups, for absolute first touch, 6 chimpanzees touched both tools, 12 
matched the High PPM and 6 matched the Low PPM (Binomial for tool matching High 
PPM tool, p = .24, d = .75). For free first touch, 21 chimpanzees matched the High PPM 
and 3 matched the Low PPM (Binomial, p < .001, Figure 3). In the no-model groups 
there was no significant difference between tools for absolute first touch (hook N = 9, 
scoop N = 7, Binomial, p = .80, d = .22; both tools simultaneously N = 5) or free first 
touch (hook N = 10, scoop N = 9, Binomial, p > .99, d = .20; both tools simultaneously 
N = 2).  
First Attempt. One chimpanzee made no attempt during the open-diffusion 
phase (he was not present in the fourth session due to injury, being the only chimpanzee 
to not be present for all four sessions). No chimpanzee in the model groups used both 
tools on their absolute first attempt, 14 of the 23 (61%) matched the High PPM and 9 
(39%) matched the Low PPM (Binomial, p = .40, d = .60). On their free first attempt, 
15 of the 23 (65%) matched the High PPM and 8 (35%) matched the Low PPM 
(Binomial, p = .21, d = .86). In the no-model-groups there was no significant difference 
between hook and scoop tool absolute first attempt (hook N = 11, scoop N = 8, 
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Binomial, p = .65, d = .25; both tools simultaneously N = 2) or free first attempt (hook 
N = 9, scoop N = 12, Binomial, p = .66, d = .29). The disparity between the extent of 
High PPM tool matching for first free touch and subsequent attempt was investigated 
(see Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Chimpanzee behaviour in trials involving first free touch as categorised by 
High / Low PPM tool matching on first free touch and subsequent attempt.  
First free touch and attempt ID Behaviour in first free 
touch trial 
Matches High PPM during free touch and attempt Na Attempts 
 Lu Attempts 
 Ca Attempts 
 Da Attempts 
 St Attempts 
 Eh Attempts 
 Ke Attempts 
 Ta Attempts 
 En Attempts 
 Kp Attempts 
 Id Displaced by conspecific 
 Sa Leaves ‘voluntarily’ 
   
Matches High PPM during free touch but not attempt Ly Remains but does not 
manipulate 
 Kz Leaves ‘voluntarily’ 
 Ma Leaves ‘voluntarily’ 
 Pa Displaced by conspecific 
 Kt Expels tool  
 To Expels tool 
 Hu Expels tool 
 Ka Expels tool 
   
Matches Low PPM during free touch and attempt Bi Attempts 
 Kk Attempts 
   
Matches Low free PPM during free touch but not attempt Ta Remains but does not 
manipulate 
   
No Attempt Do Leaves ‘voluntarily’ 
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The majority (10/12) of chimpanzees whose first free touch and attempt matched 
the High PPM attempted the task during the same trial, not letting go of the High PPM 
tool they first touched. Of the other two chimpanzees, one was displaced and one left 
the window voluntarily before the end of the trial. For the eight chimpanzees who 
matched the High PPM on their first free touch but not on their first free attempt, half 
(N = 4) pushed the tool out of the mesh fencing. On these occasions the experimenter 
(LW) replaced the tool but after it was pushed out three times LW made no further 
effort to replace the tool. Two chimpanzees voluntarily left the window after their first 
touch, one remained and one was displaced. Of the three chimpanzees who matched the 
Low PPM in their first free touch, two also matched the Low PPM on their first free 
attempt, both within the same trial; one chimpanzee remained at the window for the 
remainder of the trial but never attempted a tool use.  
First Success. No chimpanzee in the model groups used both tools on their 
absolute first success and one chimpanzee’s first absolute success involved inverting the 
scoop and hooking with it. Thirteen of the remaining 21 (61%) matched the High PPM 
and 8 (39%) matched the Low PPM (Binomial, p = .38, d = .56). On their free first 
success, 12 of the 21 (57%) matched the High PPM and 9 (43%) matched the Low PPM 
(Binomial, p = .66, d = .56). In the no-model-groups there was no significant difference 
between hook and scoop tool absolute first success (hook N = 9, scoop N = 7, Binomial, 
p = .80, d = .22) or free first success (hook N = 7, scoop N = 8, Binomial, p > .99, d = 
.09; one chimpanzee hooked with the scoop).  
 
Solution Choice over Trials 
 Each chimpanzee’s absolute first five attempts and first five successes or their 
total number if less than five (see appendix for figures) were examined. Across the four 
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model-groups there was no difference between the number of successful tool uses that 
matched the High PPM (M = 2.43, SD = 1.27) and the Low PPM (M = 2.26 SD = 1.36, 
t22 = 0.34, p = .74, d = .17). The majority of chimpanzees showed a variety of tool use 
across their first five attempts. Of the 42 chimpanzees who had multiple attempts, 
significantly more chimpanzees used more than one tool solution (N = 35, 83%) than 
just one (N = 7, 17%, Binomial, p < .001, d = .99). There was no difference in this 
pattern of multiple tool use for basket retrieval attempts for chimpanzees in the model- 
versus the no-model-groups (FET, p = .43). A similar pattern was found when looking 
at the first five successes; of the chimpanzees who had more than one success, 
significantly more chimpanzees used more than one tool solution (23/31, 74%) than just 
one tool solution (8/31. 26%, Binomial, p < .05, d = .99) with no difference between 
chimpanzees in the model-groups versus the no-model-groups (FET, p > .99). Some 
chimpanzees from both the model-groups (N = 3) and the no-model-groups (N = 5) 
discovered a third solution whereby the scoop tool was turned upside down and used to 
hook the basket. On no occasion was the other tool unavailable on these occurrences. 
Six of these eight chimpanzees were female but this was not a significant sex difference 
(FET, p = .12).  
 
Post-Hoc analysis 
 We tested a number of other factors that could potentially explain tool 
preference.  
Tool efficiency. There did not seem to be a clear pattern of tool efficiency. Two 
model-groups (both with High PPM demonstrating Hook) and one no-model group 
showed no differences in the tool involved in failed attempts (ps > .05 FE). The other 
no-model group showed disproportionate failures with the scoop tool (N = 422, p < .001 
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FE) as did one model group with High PPM demonstrating scoop tool (N = 380, p < .01 
FE). The other Model group with High PPM demonstrating scoop tool showed the 
opposite pattern with a disproportionate amount of failures coming from hook (N= 471, 
p < .01 FE).  
Copying in proportion to that observed. Eleven chimpanzees saw more 
demonstrations from the High, than low, PPM; the first free touch of 9 matched the 
High PPM tool and 2 matched the Low PPM tool. Ten chimpanzees saw more 
demonstrations from the Low PPM; the first free touch of 9 matched the High PPM tool 
and two matched the Low PPM tool. Thus, there was no difference between which PPM 
was watched more and whether the first free tool touched matched the High PPM (FET, 
p > .99). Likewise, there was no significant correlation between the proportion of 
demonstrations observed involving a tool in the demonstration phase and the proportion 
of interactions involving that tool in the first five attempts (rs (21)=.22, p = .32) or first 
five successes (rs (40) =.22, p = .19).  
Methods used and novel task proficiency. Comparisons were made between 
behaviour with the four novel tasks and the number of tool methods 
(scoop/hook/inverted scoop-hook) used in the open diffusion. As might be expected 
there was a significant negative correlation between the summed novel task rank (lower 
ranking representing more interaction with the tasks) and the number of methods used 
in the open diffusion (rs (43) = -.32, p < .05); chimpanzees who were more proficient 
with the novel tasks used more tool methods, than chimpanzees who were less 
proficient. However, chimpanzees who used the method of hooking with the scoop tool 
(N = 8) did not have significantly better rank scores with the four novel tasks than those 
who did not (U = 145.5, p = .85).  
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Discussion 
Model-based Biases 
The model-based bias of past proficiency was investigated. Both models’ 
performances had been observed by group members on four tasks presented recently in 
a similar context, alongside many years of interactions with tools and various forms of 
enrichment. Therefore, there was much opportunity for group members to establish a 
proficiency schema for these models. The High PPM was also more proficient in the 
actual task; learning the task more quickly in training and exhibiting a smaller 
proportion of failed attempts and experimenter assisted attempts in the demonstration 
phase. Chimpanzees were biased towards the tool seeded by the High PPM; with 
significantly more first tool touches corresponding to the tool used by the High PPM 
than the Low PPM. This bias was evidenced despite the Low PPMs actually providing 
an increased number of tool interactions, than High PPMs, during the demonstration 
phase. This is because whilst the number of successes observed across models was 
equal the Low PPMs required a greater number of unsuccessful attempts to achieve this.  
It could be argued that another factor that co-varies with past proficiency is 
responsible for the bias towards the tool used by the High PPM. However, all model 
pairs were of a similar age, with no more than three years age difference, and in three of 
the four groups the models were the same sex. Although it was not possible to match 
individuals for dominance, there was no systematic pattern of dominance in relation to 
past proficiency. In two groups the High PPM was appreciably more dominant than the 
Low PPM, in one group the Low PPM was appreciably more dominant than the High 
PPM and in the fourth group the models were of approximately equivalent dominance.  
Whilst Horner et al. (2010) found that chimpanzees preferentially copy the 
choices of older models that are of a higher rank and who have previously been more 
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proficient at similar tasks, this study is the first to explicitly investigate the influence of 
the past proficiency of known conspecifics whilst controlling for other factors. As has 
been found with children (Chapter V), the chimpanzees’ bias towards behaviour 
demonstrated by the High PPM may indicate cognitive sophistication including 
reputation formation. Potentially, the chimpanzees track other conspecific’s behaviour 
over time and commit relative performance to memory, enabling them to compare pairs 
of models; “A is more proficient than B”, and use this to guide their behaviour. 
Alternatively, chimpanzees’ learning from individuals may be guided by an intuition 
based upon prior experience rather than memory (‘emotional book-keeping’ as 
described for reciprocal exchanges in baboons, Frank & Silk, 2009) or an appraisal of 
the chimpanzee’s performance with the test task. A bias towards learning from models 
with past proficiency in a certain domain is adaptive as their demonstrated solutions to a 
novel task are likely to be relatively proficient. When faced with divergent information 
chimpanzees were guided by the information imparted by the High PPM. Past 
proficiency may be one of many model-based biases used by chimpanzees. 
Chimpanzees’ attention and learning may be influenced by model age (Biro et al., 2003 
Horner et al., 2010), dominance (Bonnie et al., 2007; Kendal et al., in prep.), generosity 
(Subiaul et al., 2008) or a number of other physical, cognitive or interpersonal 
characteristics.  
 
Social Learning Processes and Mechanisms 
The general pattern of results indicated that chimpanzees from the model groups 
obtained success following fewer unsuccessful attempts than did chimpanzees in the no-
model groups. However, this difference was not significant, contrasting with 
chimpanzee research demonstrating statistically significant increased success following 
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a social demonstration (Nagell et al., 1993; Tomasello et al., 1987). A lack of difference 
between the model and no-model chimpanzee groups may have been a result of a lack 
of statistical power as the sample sizes were small. Alternatively, it could imply that 
there was no social learning; that the models behaviour had no effect on the 
chimpanzees. There are several reasons why this is unlikely. First, the chimpanzees in 
the no-model group were not asocial learning controls. From the moment the first 
chimpanzee in each no-model group began interacting with the task the other 
chimpanzees were potentially acquiring social information. Second, we found that 
chimpanzees who observed differing solutions from two models initially touched the 
tool seeded by the high past proficiency model, indicating an influence of the models 
upon learning.  
While the no-model group was not a true asocial control, many of the no-model 
group chimpanzees solved the task with little social information. That is, many of them 
solved the task before they observed another individual solving the task and did so after 
the same amount of attempts as chimpanzees in the model groups. Therefore, the 
tentative suggestion is that chimpanzees’ reward retrieval methods were not copied but 
initial tool choice was socially influenced. Accordingly, chimpanzees may not have 
learned the form of the action from conspecifics as previous tool-use experience may 
have informed their first attempts and successes with either tool. These chimpanzees 
regularly receive enrichment including dipping bamboo sticks into pipes that contain a 
variety of attractive foodstuffs. Thus, these chimpanzees may be practised in handling a 
long tool and pushing it away from them to obtain food (a similar phenomenon was 
discussed by Hopper et al., 2007). Because the majority of chimpanzees initially picked 
up the High PPM’s tool, the majority of chimpanzees also attempted this tool. However, 
for those whose first touch had been interrupted (e.g. they were displaced) or if they 
Chapter VI Model past-proficiency (chimpanzees) 
205 
 
made no attempt from their first touch (they walked away in that trial) their first attempt 
involved the Low PPM’s tool.  
Although chimpanzees are certainly capable of complex forms of social learning 
such as emulation and imitation (Nagell et al., 1993; Whiten, et al., 1996, 2005, 2007) I 
propose that the chimpanzees’ learning was guided by model chimpanzees’ past 
proficiency and simple social learning mechanisms, such as stimulus enhancement. This 
resulted in biased stimulus enhancement. This is stimulus enhancement because the 
model’s behaviour increased the probability that the observer interacted with stimuli of 
the same physical type as those with which s/he interacted (Heyes, 1994) and it is 
biased as the resultant attraction to a tool did not occur irrespective of the identity of the 
model (Rendell et al. 2011). The biased aspect of the stimulus enhancement is supported 
by the fact that despite the overall number of task interactions being greater for the Low 
PPMs, individuals still touched the tool used by the High PPM first, indicating that the 
salience of one or other tool must have been influenced by something other than its 
frequency of use. Although such biased stimulus enhancement did not result in group 
homogeneity of behaviour in our study, such biased stimulus enhancement fits with the 
findings of Matthews et al. (2010) that traditions can result from an interaction of 
stimulus enhancement with individual learning.  
It is possible that this biased stimulus enhancement may be underpinned by 
associative learning. Chimpanzees might associate the High PPM with more success 
(e.g. increased food reward). This association over time creates a model-based bias. 
This, however, is different from the argument put forward by Hoppitt & Laland (2008) 
that what appears to be stimulus enhancement may instead be manifestations of 
associative learning; the chimpanzees learn that a certain tool had a higher rate of 
success than another tool during the demonstration phase. In the current study, both 
Chapter VI Model past-proficiency (chimpanzees) 
206 
 
tools had an equal volume of success so it cannot be that there was a simple association 
of tool with reward but something more complex, corresponding to the identity of the 
model.  
 
Solution Choice over Time 
Boyd and Richerson (1985) suggest that learning one solution can inhibit further 
exploration of a problem, a phenomenon reported previously in chimpanzees (Hrubesch 
et al., 2009; Hopper et al., 2011; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008). However, 
chimpanzees in the current study attempted and were successful with both methods, 
even in their first five trials. Yamamoto et al. (2013) found chimpanzees replaced an 
asocially learned reward method with a subsequently socially demonstrated method. In 
their experiment, the newly adopted method was more efficient but in the current 
experiment it happened despite solutions being equivalent. Furthermore, the 
chimpanzees did not become canalised to the new tool but used both tools 
interchangeably. Our results reflect the flexible tool use demonstrated in the wild by 
chimpanzees (Sanz & Morgan, 2009). 
There are several explanations as to why chimpanzees used both methods in the 
current study. First, the social demonstration of both methods simultaneously may 
promote multiple method adoption. In previous studies just one method has been 
asocially learned (Hrubesch et al., 2009) or socially demonstrated (Marshall-Pescini & 
Whiten, 2008) before the other method was demonstrated. This sequence of prior 
asocial/social learning, followed by success, followed by social demonstration, is quite 
different from two methods being demonstrated in very quick succession before initial 
observer interaction. This could be explored further by introducing alternate methods in 
different time frames, for example, at the same time, in quick succession or with a 
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considerable time delay. Second, the use of both methods in the current study could be 
due to the fact that the alternate method was actually demonstrated rather than just 
available (Hopper et al., 2007; 2011). Thus in this study, the information provided for 
both methods meant that there was minimal cost to individuals in adopting both tool 
solutions. Third, both methods may have been asocially learned with the number of 
methods used correlating with proficiency (including exploration) with the novel tasks. 
Even if both methods were asocially learned the chimpanzees still demonstrated 
flexibility in switching from one method to another.  
Finally, biased stimulus enhancement, rather than higher fidelity mechanisms of 
social learning, may result in low fidelity to a particular method. Henrich & Gil-White 
(2001) argue that when animals use simpler mechanisms of social learning, rather than 
action imitation, proficiency model-based bias (or foraging rank-based biases) will not 
be maintained because even if chimpanzees can identify the model proficiency, they do 
not acquire the details of anyone’s technique. This might explain why the tool choice 
was socially biased but the action (reaching for the reward) seemed to be asocially 
learned for both tools. Thus, the bias to the first tool touched or used was short lived. 
Similarly, research with wild meerkats (Thornton & Malapert, 2009) demonstrated that 
simple social learning mechanisms create behavioural traditions but not necessarily 
behavioural uniformity within groups.  
 
Problem Solving Proficiency in Chimpanzees 
This study enabled assessment of chimpanzee interactions with a range of novel 
tasks. There was evidence that the tasks used enabled an appropriate assessment of 
proficiency in chimpanzees; their behaviour was consistent across three of the four 
novel tasks as has been shown with very similar novel tasks given to groups of children 
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(Wood et al., in prep; Chapter V). Chimpanzees were assessed not only for successful 
food retrieval but also on their order (relative to group mates) of first approach and 
interaction with the tasks, as well as exploratory behaviours such as number of 
approaches and interactions and types of interactions. There was a significant positive 
correlation between behaviour on the four novel tasks and order of success, relative to 
group mates, on the test-task. Similarly, work with hyenas has demonstrated that 
individuals exhibiting a greater diversity of initial exploratory behaviours are more 
successful problem solvers suggesting that the ‘diversity of initial exploratory 
behaviours is an important, determinant of problem-solving success in non-human 
animals’ (Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012, p. 4087).  
Additionally, the husbandry employees’ ratings of proficiency showed some 
degree of correlation with performance on the tasks suggesting that the tasks 
appropriately elicited the traits considered by the employees to assess proficiency. 
These traits were originally developed alongside a multitude of others which 
subsequently underwent factor analysis (Freeman Brosnan, Hopper, Lambeth, Schapiro, 
& Gosling, submitted). Freeman et al. found that these three traits also appeared to map 
onto a single construct and ratings were highly consistent across HEs. Finally, there was 
a significant positive correlation between order of success with the test task and 
combined rank for the four novel tasks; those who were more proficient with the novel 
tasks were more likely to be successful before those who were less proficient with the 
novel tasks. Taken together it seems evident that chimpanzees’ proficiency with novel 
tasks is stable over time and varying context and that this behaviour can be evaluated 
with behavioural assessments.  
 
Future Directions 
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The test-task was easy enough to be learnt asocially in a relatively short time 
period. As these chimpanzees have much experience of tools both for enrichment and 
for research purposes, the challenge is to create tasks which may take significantly more 
time to be learned asocially than socially so that more complex social learning 
mechanisms and strategies can be investigated. Equally, the difficulty of the task may 
affect the strength of a particular model-based bias because the need for the most 
effective social information becomes more important. For example, Mesoudi & O’Brien 
(2008) and Mesoudi (2008) found that when finding the most successful outcome was 
relatively easy, individuals were less likely to source social information but when it was 
harder, individuals not only sourced social information but also selected the information 
from the individual with the highest proficiency. Thus, we might expect to find that as 
task difficulty increased, chimpanzees rely more on social information (as seen in 
Callitrichids; Kendal et al., 2009), particularly the social information provided by the 
High PPM rather than the Low PPM.    
A strength of the current study was that the two tools were novel in their unique 
form and function. Whilst this enabled an investigation of the copying of tool choice 
and tool functions it also allowed for monopolisation of a single tool rather than the 
whole task. This meant that there were occasions when a chimpanzee could manipulate 
the task but only had access to one tool unlike other open-diffusion studies which have 
encountered whole task monopolisation (Lydia Hopper personal communication in 
regards to Hopper et al., 2007). Creating a paradigm where the actions of one 
chimpanzee (tool chosen) do not influence the options available to other group members 
would create neater categories of data and may have assisted in identifying model-based 
biases.  
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Another change in task design would be the addition of a third tool. This would 
allow for the investigation of whether the two model-demonstrated tools were 
preferentially selected over the no-model tool. This would help understanding of 
whether tool successes using the PPMs tool indicated a bias towards a particular model 
or a chance selection of one of the two tools. Additionally, it would further assist in our 
understanding of exploration and innovation; whilst the chimpanzees innovated a tool-
use method (rotating the scoop and using the back to hook the basket) it is hard to 
discern whether they were copying the scoop tool, the hook method, both, or neither. 
An experiment using a task with three functionally different manipulandi has been 
undertaken with children and has demonstrated a relationship between model 
proficiency and the acquisition of third, undemonstrated methods (Wood et al., in prep; 
Chapter V).  
Understanding biased learning might assist in the understanding of cultural 
transmission in wild chimpanzees. For example, it may assist in our understanding of 
why Biro et al. (2003, p.213) found that for instances of the cracking of novel nut 
species, chimpanzees in the wild were ‘highly specific in their selection of conspecifics 
as models for observation, attending to the nut-cracking activities of individuals in the 
same age group or older, but not younger than themselves’. However, in this same study 
Biro et al. found that juveniles were more likely than adults to explore and crack the 
novel nuts. Thus, there may not always be a correspondence between biases and the 
most adaptive behaviour. Additionally, chimpanzees in the wild might not have the 
opportunity to employ proficiency model-based biases because of social constraints; 
Lonsdorf and Bonnie (2010) argue that social tolerance of particular individuals may 
constrain behavioural demonstration on the part of the model and/or proximity of 
individuals to observe the behaviour. Thus, individuals may be more likely to learn 
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from those who tolerate their presence than those who have the best past proficiency. In 
working with BIZARRE (raised in Barren, Institutional, Zoo, And other Rare Rearing 
Environments; Leavens, Bard & Hopkins, 2010) captive chimpanzees one must 
acknowledge that behaviour demonstrated may reflect potential model-based 
transmission biases rather than the actual model-based strategies, if any, used in the 
wild. Accordingly, further research focussed on investigating such dynamics in the wild 
would shed further light on chimpanzees’ natural social learning abilities.  
 
Conclusions 
The current study suggests that chimpanzees’ tool-use behaviour is biased by the 
proficiency of a model. That proficiency pertains to the past and current behaviour of 
the model and implies chimpanzees employ short- or long-term knowledge regarding 
the ‘reputation’ of known conspecifics. Theoretical models of cultural evolution predict 
the evolution of flexible strategies influencing the circumstances under which 
individuals copy others and from whom they learn (Boyd & Richerson, 1985).This 
study suggests that a proficiency model-based bias is one such flexible strategy, which 
may allow populations to gain adaptive information more quickly than when learning is 
asocial or unbiased (in which individuals acquire variants in proportion to the frequency 
at which they are shown Rendell et al., 2011). Indeed, a copy successful bias found in 
humans (Mesoudi, 2008, 2011) has been used to test theoretical models of cultural 
evolution. Thus, the presence of model-based biases in chimpanzees indicates that 
chimpanzees could possess skills necessary for an adaptive socially learned behaviour 
to spread in a group and for culture to evolve. 
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Appendices 
Details 
Appendix 1. First five attempts from chimpanzees in the no- model (1a) and model (1b and 
1c) groups. Bordered boxes indicate colour coded (blue= blue hook, red = red scoop) 
demonstrations observed before each trial. Non bordered boxes indicate colour coded 
attempts (lighter shades) or successful attempts (darker shades). Purple indicate hooking 
with scoop tool. 
 
Appendix 2. First five attempts from chimpanzees in the no- model (2a) and no-model 
groups (2b and 2c)groups. Bordered boxes indicate colour coded (blue= blue hook, red = 
red scoop) demonstrations observed before each trial. Non bordered boxes indicate colour 
coded attempts (lighter shades) or successful attempts (darker shades). Purple indicate 
hooking with scoop tool. 
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 Appendix 1a: First Five attempts in no-model group chimpanzees 
ID  Seen  Attempt 1 Seen  Attempt 2 Seen  Attempt 3  Seen  Attempt 4 Seen  Attempt 5 
Ja                     
 
                    
          
  
Xe                     
 
                1   
          
  
Ju                     
 
                    
          
  
Mi                     
 
    1               
          
  
Be                     
 
        1           
          
  
Ti                     
 
                    
          
  
Je             3       
 
                    
          
  
Mu                     
 
                    
          
  
Ga     1           1   
 
    2           1   
         
1   
Le             
 
    1               
          
  
Pe                     
 
    1               
          
  
Ax                     
 
    1   1           
          
  
Ho                     
 
1                   
 
         
  
Mo             2       
  1           2       
  
         
  
So                     
  1                   
  
         
  
Bo 1           1       
  1                   
  
      
1 
  
  
Be 1            
  1                   
  1 
        
  
Bi                 
 
  
  1       1       
 
  
  2 
   
2 
    
  
Ap 1       
   
  
  1   10       
   
  
  1 
 
1 
      
  
Ma       
     
  
          
     
  
  
         
  
Ba     
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 Appendix 1b: First Five attempts in groups where High PPM used red scoop  
 Seen Attempt Seen Attempt Seen Attempt Seen Attempt Seen Attempt 
  M O 1 M O 2 M O 3 M O 4 M O 5 
LY 41 
                24 
                
               DA 24 
                13 
   
1 
  
1 
         
               CA 10 
                15 
                
               SA 
                 
                 
               LU 7 
      
3 
         7 
     
1 3 
         
               PA 12 
                3 3 
           
1 
   
       
1 
       ST 
   
5 
  
1 
          1 
                
               KH 8 
                1 
            
1 
   
               KA 5 
                
                 
               MA 8 
   
1 
    
1 
       6 1 
               
               KU 2 1 
               10 
                
               DO 6 
                10 
              Note. M = Model, O= Other conspecific
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 Appendix 1c: First Five attempts where High PPM used blue hook 
 
Seen Attempt Seen Attempt Seen Attempt Seen Attempt Seen Attempt 
  M O 1 M O 2 M O 3 M O 4 M O 5 
EH 21           1                 
 
25                             
                KE 15               
 
8                   1         
                TO 14 1      1        
 
8 1     1   2     2           
           
1 
    HU 2                
 
14 1                           
                ID 9   1      5 1     
 
7     1 6           1         
           
2 
    BI 3                
 
13                             
                KU 8               
 
4 3                           
                NA 8 2              
 
4                             
                EN 4            
   
 
4       1     1         
   
                TA 4   
            
 
6 7   
            
                KA 4               
 
3 1                           
                TH 4          1   7  
 
2                         11   
Note, M = Model, O= Other conspecific
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Note. NB= No Basket UAs = Unsuccessful attempts
 
 
Appendix 2a: First Five successes in no-model group chimpanzees 
ID Seen S1 Seen UAs S2 Seen UAs S3 Seen UAs S4 Seen UAs S5 
Ja             2               
              2               
  
              
Xe     1     2 9               
  1           6               
  
              
Ju       1                     
        1                     
  
      
1 
       
Mi   NB                         
  1                 1         
  
              
Be                             
      2                       
  
              
Ho       1   1 5               
  1     1   1 5               
  
              
Je     3   NB           NB       
                              
  
              
Mu       1                     
                              
  
              
Ga 1   2 1                     
  2   3     2                 
  
              
Le 1     2     1               
  5     1     1               
  
              
Be 3   1       1     1 
      2                 1 
                    
Bi     1         
         1   1 1       
         2 
  
1 
          Ax    2 1  1 1 
         1     1   1 3 
                       
Mo     3 1   
           1   2     
           
              
So     3 10 
                22 5 
               
2 
          
Ap 1     1 
            1   10   
            
   
1 
          
Bo 1   2 1 
            1       
            
              
Ba 3 
               2 
                             
Ma 2 
               11 
                             
Pe 2 
               6 
                             
Ti 4 
               20 
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Appendix 2b: First Five successes where High PPM used red scoop 
 
Seen 
  
Seen 
  
Seen 
 
Seen 
  
Seen 
   M O UAs S1 M O UAs S2 M O UAs S3 M O UAs S4 M O UAs S5 
Ly 41   1   1             NB       NB       NB 
  24   2                                   
  
                    
Ca 10 1   NB     1       3       1 NB         
  15                   1                   
  
                    
Pa 12 1         2               1           
  3 4 1     1                             
  
                    
Da 24   3   1 1             2 2 3           
  13 2 1       1               1       1   
  
                    
Ka 6   3 NB       NB     2       1       1   
      2               2       1           
  
                    
Ma 8         1             1               
  6 1                               1 1   
  
                    
Kh 8   1   2   1       1               1   
  1   2       2             1             
  
                    
Lu 7 3 2                                   
  9 2                                     
  
 
1 
                  Sa    2   1 1           1  
                                         
                       
St 6   2   3 2 1 
               1   3     1 2 
               
      
1 
             Do 6 5  
                   10 1   
                                       
Ku 2 1 5 
                   10     
                 Note, M = Model, O= Other conspecific, NB= No Basket, UAs = Unsuccessful attempts
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 Appendix 2c: First Five successes where High PPM used blue hook 
 
Seen 
  
Seen 
  
Seen 
  
Seen 
  
Seen 
  M O UAs S1 M O UAs S2 M O UAs S3 M O UAs S4 M O UAs S5 
Th 4                 8 1             4 2   
 
2                 2 2             6 1   
                     
Eh 21               1             NB         
 
25                                       
                     
Ka 4           1                           
 
3 1 1                                   
                     
Na 8 2 1                                   
 
4   2                                   
                    
Bi 3   1     1 1             1             
 
13         1 1     1               1     
                     
Ku 8     NB   1                   NB         
 
4 3       1                       1     
                    
Hu 2                                       
 
14 1                 1   1               
                     
Id 10                 3 1 
         
 
8 6 1           1   1 
         
  
1 
        
3 
         En 4             
             
 
4         3 1 
                                  
Ta 4             
             
 
6 7 1         
             
       
1 
             To 14 1 2 NB   1 3 
             
 
15 3 1       1 
             
  
5 
                  Ke 15 8 3       1 
             
 
10 2 2         
                2                                     
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Chapter 7 
General Discussion  
The aim of this thesis was to investigate social learning mechanisms and 
strategies relating to the characteristics of a model (the individual transmitting the 
information) and the prior experience of an observer (the individual acquiring the social 
information). Using experimental designs to mirror naturalistic settings children and 
chimpanzees were presented with artificial fruit tasks in a number of different contexts. 
This enabled an investigation of how social learning mechanisms and strategies were 
affected by the characteristics of a model, the prior experience of an observer, continued 
model demonstrations and repeated observer interactions with the task. The following 
sections discuss the findings regarding these factors, both in individual studies and 
across studies, in an attempt to synthesise the overall impact of this body of research 
upon our understanding of social learning mechanisms and strategies. 
 
Model-based Biases 
Model-based biases are biases towards information provided by a model with 
certain characteristics over another model with differing characteristics (Henrich & 
McElreath, 2003). The literature review in Chapter II outlined a significant number of 
model-based biases in children’s copying behaviour arguing for the adaptive value of 
model-based biased learning. In Chapter III, two specific biases were investigated in 
children; one that represented a self-declared proficiency (model knowledge state) and 
one that represented a group-level indication (as generally adults are perceived as more 
proficient than children, Taylor, Cartwright and Bowden, 1991) of proficiency (model 
age). Relevant actions were imitated faithfully by children regardless of the model’s 
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characteristics, suggesting that if models provide solutions children will be motivated to 
copy these solutions irrespective of model identity. Indeed, a similar pattern of 
behaviour was found in the study presented in Chapter V. When children, either with no 
experience or a personally learned successful experience, were shown two new 
solutions by peers, they copied either model in their first subsequent task interaction, 
irrespective of their relative characteristics (proficiency reputation). It seems intuitive 
that if a model provides a clearly viable solution their characteristics may become 
tangential. Instead, unbiased social learning (Boyd & Richerson, 1985), whereby the 
probability that a behaviour is acquired by an observer is proportional to the frequency 
of the demonstrations of that behaviour, occurs. Such an unbiased strategy would enable 
children to acquire behaviours common within their culture.  
Yet there were notable occasions where the characteristics of the model did 
influence children’s copying. Children who observed an adult versus a child (Chapter 
III) reproduced more causally irrelevant actions. The professed knowledge state of the 
model was less influential but there was a tendency towards higher imitation of 
irrelevant actions when demonstrated by a knowledgeable over an ignorant model. 
Additionally, the study presented in Chapter V demonstrated that fidelity to a personally 
discovered solution, and the likelihood of discovering a new solution, was influenced by 
whether solutions were presented by models with differing proficiency characteristics. 
When the higher, rather than lower, past-proficiency model matched the child’s original 
solution the child was more likely to keep using this solution. Having a higher-
proficiency model match one’s behaviour might increase confidence in one’s solution. 
This resonates with the report that adults are increasingly unlikely to adopt a different 
method with increasing confidence in their own method (Morgan, Rendell, Ehn, Hoppitt 
& Laland, 2012). Conversely, when the lower past-proficiency model matched the 
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child’s original solution and the higher past-proficiency model offered an alternative, 
children were more likely to discover previously untried and unseen solutions. Such 
motivation to explore artefacts, after proficient models demonstrate alternatives, could 
lead to improved artefact knowledge. This knowledge and exploration could result in 
improvement being made to tasks over time. Hence it could be a contributing factor in 
artefact ‘ratcheting’ resulting in cumulative culture (Tennie, Call & Tomasello, 2009).  
 These empirical studies provide evidence that young children do not source 
information indiscriminately but rather use model-based biases to guide their learning.  
This supports two arguments presented in the review (Chapter II): first, model-based 
biases are adaptive as they enable children to source behaviour from the best model 
(Henrich & McElreath, 2003). Children showed higher fidelity copying of models who 
either were more proficient, or belonged to an age group that children generally regard 
as more proficient (Taylor, Cartwright & Bowden, 1991). This adaptiveness has been 
argued more generally for biases in social learning. For example, Laland (2004) and 
Boyd and Richerson (1985) predict the evolution of flexible strategies (or transmission 
biases) enabling avoidance of unreliable information, and model characteristics seem a 
likely candidate as they influence the circumstances under which individuals copy 
others and from whom they learn.  
 Second, for certain model characteristics to bias learning children need 
cognitive skills such as behaviour monitoring and mental state understanding. Children 
demonstrated biases towards past-proficiency and knowledge-state. While there is 
evidence for mental state understanding in chimpanzees (Call & Tomasello, 2008), the 
combination of mental state understanding and the language ability necessary to 
understand a model’s declared knowledge state in Chapter III is a skill thought not to be 
possessed by other animals. Herrmann, Call, Hernández-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello 
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(2007) argue that these species-specific socio-cognitive skills give humans a supreme 
ability for living in and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. Surprisingly, children 
favoured the use of a ‘copy adults’ bias over a ‘copy task-knowledgeable individual’ 
bias (Chapter III), even though the latter could potentially have provided more reliable 
information. A similar pattern of behaviour has been found in adults whereby model 
prestige information and model success-related information were used to the same 
degree even though the former was less useful in achieving the optimum goal than the 
latter in this experiment (Atkisson, O’Brien & Mesoudi, 2012). While some model 
characteristics (e.g. age) are more physical and cognitively salient, others, such as 
professed knowledge state, are more subtle and require sophisticated socio-cognitive 
skills. An understanding of age develops earlier than an understanding of knowledge 
(Edwards, 1984; Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001) so even though five-year-olds pass 
theory-of-mind tasks there could be a delay before model knowledge-state becomes a 
stronger bias than model age. This delay may be caused by a discrepancy between a 
salient age characteristic and a cognitively demanding knowledge-state, which should 
decrease with development until knowledge-state becomes the favoured bias as its 
informativeness outweighs the costs of its application.  
While there have been many social learning experiments involving chimpanzees 
(see Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini & Hopper, 2009) there is little empirical 
research investigating model-based biases in chimpanzees. In Chapter II, comparative 
perspectives were discussed demonstrating that a wide range of animals, from fish to 
chimpanzees, demonstrate model-based biases pertaining to model’s intentions 
(Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2007), proficiency (Duffy, Pike, & Laland, 
2009), observer-similarity (Swaney, Kendal, Capon, Brown, & Laland, 2001), status 
(Bonnie, Horner, Whiten, & de Waal, 2007) and a combination of age, dominance and 
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previous proficiency (Horner, Proctor, Bonnie, Whiten, & de Waal, 2010). Furthermore, 
Kendal et al. (in prep) isolated five separate transmission biases operating 
simultaneously in chimpanzees including model-based attention biases relating to 
higher, versus lower, rank and proficiency. 
Chapter VI introduced a novel tool-use paradigm to investigate model-based 
biases in chimpanzees. The first tool touched by chimpanzees was significantly more 
likely to match the tool demonstrated by a model with a higher proficiency-reputation 
than a lower proficiency-reputation. Chimpanzees, thus, seem able to track other 
conspecifics’ behaviour over time and use this to guide their behaviour. Horner et al. 
(2010) labelled an older, more dominant chimpanzee with more past-proficiency (as 
rated by husbandry staff) as more ‘prestigious’ than a younger, less dominant and less 
previously proficient chimpanzee. As much as possible, we controlled for age and 
dominance and still found a bias for prior proficiency. To the extent that past-
proficiency may be involved in a prestige bias, it is relevant to note that Henrich & Gil-
White (2001) argue that dominance is distinct from prestige and relates to the skills and 
knowledge of a model within a given environment. Henrich & Gil-White (2001) also 
argue that many group living animals have the ability to rank the foraging ability of 
conspecifics. This ability allows individuals to target their attention preferentially 
toward models with high-quality skills. However, they also argue that marrying the 
ability to appraise models and learning differentially based on these appraisals will not 
occur in animals as they do not to imitate modelled actions. Thus, according to their 
argument, even if chimpanzees can identify model proficiency, they do not acquire the 
details of a specific model’s technique. This might explain why the chimpanzee tool 
choice was biased towards the model with the higher past-proficiency tool but specific 
methods for retrieval were not biased. However, we know that chimpanzees are capable 
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of more complex forms of social learning (Nagell, Olguin, & Tomasello, 1993; Whiten, 
Custance, Gomez, Teixidor & Bard, 1996; Whiten, Horner & de Waal, 2005; Whiten et 
al., 2007) and so there is potential for model prestige, if defined as use of past-
proficiency, to influence chimpanzees’ learning.  
There were significant differences in the way in which model characteristics 
were seen to bias learning between children and chimpanzees in this thesis. Model-
based biases demonstrated by the children were apparent when looking at the 
reproduction of modelled irrelevant actions and task exploration beyond the two 
modelled methods. Neither of these behaviours were directly addressed in the 
chimpanzee study because the model chimpanzees were not trained to perform 
irrelevant actions and there were only two tools available, both of which were socially 
demonstrated.  
When examining children’s and chimpanzee’s behaviour relating to the past-
proficiency of known conspecifics, children with no prior interaction and then social 
information (in Chapter V) are the most comparable group to the chimpanzees. These 
children did not show a model based-bias towards either model; the manipuland they 
touched first was the manipuland they attempted and were successful with first and it 
was equally likely to be the manipuland demonstrated by either model. They then used 
either method with equal frequency. This stands in contrast to chimpanzees, with no 
prior personal interaction and social information, who showed a bias towards the tool 
seeded by the higher past-proficiency model. While interesting, it is difficult to know 
what might have caused this difference in behaviour because the studies differed in a 
number of important ways: (1) the chimpanzees knew their group mates for between 1.5 
to 36 years whereas the children had known each other for between nine months to five 
years. (2) The chimpanzees had three hours of demonstrations, whereas the children had 
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two brief simultaneous video clips. (3) The task designs were very different in that the 
children used the SDLB three-action task box whilst the chimpanzees used two tools to 
access out-of-reach food.  
The aim of this body of work was not to directly compare the behaviour of 
chimpanzees with that of children but to see how each group’s behaviour might inform 
our understanding of their learning strategies. This, in turn, aids our understanding of 
cultural evolution. Humans are not unique in their ability to socially learn or to have 
social learning strategies, or indeed even to be biased towards particular model-based 
characteristics. However, this does not mean that humans and chimpanzees have 
identical model-based biases or that these biases affect these two species’ learning in the 
same way. Two potential species differences in model-based biases are proposed. First, 
socio-cognitive skills, thought to be uniquely human (Herrmann et al, 2007), enable 
humans to better ascertain who is the best model in certain contexts. For example, as 
discussed earlier, the model-based bias of knowledge-state requires mental state 
understanding and sophisticated language ability and these are unique to humans. 
However, such a skill allows humans, from a certain age, to ascertain who the best 
model is.  
Second, model characteristics bias different mechanisms differentially so that 
biased stimulus enhancement may only affect what is initially touched (Chapter VI) 
whereas biased imitation of causally irrelevant actions may affect the way in which the 
whole task is interacted with (Chapters III and V). The implication is not that 
chimpanzees are incapable of model-biased imitation. However, given the established 
literature indicating that children consistently show higher levels of imitation than 
chimpanzees (Call, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2005; Nagell et al., 1993; Whiten et al., 
1996), it is reasonable to suggest that children will be more influenced by model-based 
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biases than chimpanzees who, while able to imitate, often use lower fidelity social 
learning mechanisms.  
 
Multiple Interactions and Exploration 
The study in Chapter III demonstrated that after an initial model demonstration 
and observer interaction with a task, children’s behaviour can change following a 
second, identical demonstration and interaction. Here, children who observed 
knowledgeable models, reproduced more irrelevant actions at their second task attempt 
than at their first, while children observing ignorant models showed no change across 
their attempts. This propensity to change one’s task behaviour was more thoroughly 
explored in Chapter IV. Here, some children were presented with a reward retrieval task 
and given a social demonstration of a solution followed by further solution matching or 
solution alternate information. Rather than remaining canalised to their initial solution, 
children attempted the alternative solution, incorporating both solutions into their 
repertoire. A similar finding was found in the study presented in Chapter V whereby 
children incorporated both solutions they saw the two models perform.  
The relationship between asocial information and subsequent social information 
was also investigated in the studies presented in Chapter IV and V. Children with no 
(asocial) prior task interaction copied subsequent social information faithfully but failed 
to discover solutions beyond those demonstrated. However, children who interacted 
with the novel task before observing a social demonstration were significantly more 
likely to find more than one solution. Children with a prior personal interaction 
ultimately incorporated personal and social solutions into their repertoire, and 
discovered additional combination-solutions. This result appears to contrast with the 
large body of evidence from animals (reviewed by Kendal, Coolen, van Bergen & 
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Laland, 2005) indicating that if personal information is sufficient social information will 
be ignored. Moreover, the influence of prior personal exploration was attenuated by its 
outcome; children whose prior personal exploration had initially been unsuccessful 
were less likely to use a solution they had not seen subsequently demonstrated than 
children who had been successful in their initial personal exploration. It would appear 
that personally acquired information encourages exploration, beyond the use of social 
information, as long as this personally acquired information inspired confidence in the 
child (resulted in success).  
Taken together, the role of prior experience seems extremely important in the 
acquisition of subsequent socially demonstrated behaviour. Social information provided 
to naïve or unsuccessful children, can result in the canalisation of behaviour, potentially 
highlighting a cost of social learning. Cost in this context refers to the inability to find 
additional solutions which, as discussed earlier, provides generalisable knowledge and 
increases one’s overall knowledge of the task. However, even when children 
demonstrated initial canalisation, continued interaction encouraged a minority of 
children to discover additional solutions so the cost may be short lived. Children’s 
ability to acquire multiple strategies to a problem has implications for our understanding 
of human cultural evolution; learning multiple strategies provides generalisable 
knowledge which is beneficial in a changing environment where there is potential for 
one solution to become obsolete (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Humans have managed to 
inhabit the majority of the earth’s enormously varied land habitats. The ability to 
generalise learning in different contexts enables humans to ‘choose, regulate, construct 
and destroy important components of their environments’ (Laland, Odling-Smee & 
Feldman, 2001, p.22). This ‘niche construction’ has enabled culture to evolve. 
Additionally, learning multiple strategies increases one’s overall knowledge of the task 
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and the more knowledge one has of a task the more potential there is for modifications 
(‘ratchet effect’) which, over time, could lead to cumulative culture (Tennie, et al., 
2009).  
The chimpanzees (Chapter VI) also used both solutions over several interactions 
with the novel tool use task. Unlike children and previous work with chimpanzees 
(Hrubesch, Preuschoft, & van Schaik, 2009; Hopper, Schapiro, Lambeth and Brosnan, 
2011) very few chimpanzees, from either the model or no-model groups, showed 
canalisation to one tool-use method. There are several explanations for this. First, 
perhaps chimpanzees learned both methods asocially and asocial learning corresponded 
with the individual levels of exploratory behaviour. Support for this comes from the 
significant correlation between chimpanzee performance with the novel tasks and the 
number of tool-use methods used in the open diffusion. Thus, chimpanzees that were 
more proficient with the novel tasks (including demonstrating greater exploration) used 
more methods on the test-task, than chimpanzees that were less proficient. Second, 
considering that the majority of chimpanzees, even those from the no-model groups 
would have seen some social information, the social influence cannot be dismissed. 
Thus, the chimpanzees, like the children, could have been motivated to acquire methods 
they witnessed. Being shown both methods, rather than just one, might explain why the 
results contrast with studies that have not demonstrated an alternative to chimpanzees 
(Hopper, Spiteri, Lambeth, Schapiro, Horner and Whiten, 2007) or children (Hopper, 
Flynn, Wood & Whiten, 2010). Thus in this study, the information provided for both 
methods meant that there was minimal cost to individuals in adopting both tool 
solutions. Third, chimpanzees in the current study learnt successful retrieval in a 
relatively short amount of time and often with very little or no social information. This 
contrasted with previous studies (Hopper et al. 2010; Whiten, et al., 2007) where 
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learning seemed to require a more sophisticated learning mechanism. As discussed 
earlier, simpler learning mechanisms may result in less fidelity to a particular method 
(Henrich & Gil-White, 2001).  
 
Learning Mechanisms 
Social learning mechanisms (Whiten & Ham, 1992) range from stimulus 
enhancement to complete action imitation. Whiten, Horner, Litchfield, & Marshall-
Pescini (2004, p.36) argue that chimpanzees might employ, ‘a portfolio of alternative 
social-learning processes in flexibly adaptive ways, in conjunction with nonsocial 
learning’. In Chapter VI the chimpanzees appeared to be using biased stimulus 
enhancement in order to ‘choose’ which one of two tools to initially interact with. As 
some chimpanzees learned to use the tools with little or no social information the task 
used in Chapter VI seemed relatively easy. When tasks have been harder (as evidenced 
by chimpanzees with no social information failing to succeed at the task) chimpanzees 
use different mechanisms (e.g. goal emulation or action imitation; Tomasello Davis-
Dasilva, Camak, & Bard, 1987; Whiten, et al., 1996, 2005, 2007). Thus, there is 
flexibility in the social learning mechanisms chimpanzees use dependent on context 
relating to task difficulty. Mesoudi & O’Brien (2008) and Mesoudi (2008) found that 
when the most successful outcome is relatively easily obtained, individuals are less 
likely to source social information but, when it is harder, individuals not only source 
social information but also select the information from the individual with the highest 
proficiency. Thus, we might expect that as task difficulty increases chimpanzees rely 
more on social information and employ higher fidelity copying, potentially extending 
their model-based bias to actual methods/actions rather than just initial attraction to one 
method over another (as in Chapter VI).  
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Conversely, children have been labelled ‘blind imitators’ (Want & Harris, 2002) 
who ‘replicate both the form and the goal of an observed behaviour but fail to 
understand the affordances of the objects involved in that behaviour or the link between 
the actions and the goal they subserve’ (p.3). Indeed, various studies of social learning 
in dyads whereby a naïve (no prior task experience) child observes an unfamiliar adult 
and shows high fidelity imitation (Flynn & Whiten, 2008b; Hopper et al., 2010; Horner 
& Whiten, 2005; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007). This high fidelity copying can lead to 
the reproduction of causally irrelevant actions (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons et al., 
2007). However, the body of research presented in this thesis demonstrates that children 
are not ‘blind imitators’ and that the ecologically realistic experimental designs used 
here demonstrate an immense amount of flexibility in children’s learning mechanisms, 
especially when coupled with social learning strategies or transmission biases. This is 
discussed below.  
First, the study in Chapter III (age and knowledge state model characteristics) 
demonstrated that the identity of the model could affect social learning mechanisms 
within a single task; children observing adults imitated all modelled actions, including 
causally irrelevant actions, whereas children observing children copied the relevant door 
action but omitted the demonstrated irrelevant actions. If individuals parse out causally 
irrelevant actions but retain the relevant ones this learning mechanism may be best 
described as goal imitation rather than goal emulation or action imitation. If the term 
goal imitation is accepted, it can be said that the identity of the model affects which 
learning mechanism is used; action imitation when the model is adult, goal imitation 
when the model is a child. Similarly, the study in Chapter IV (involving multiple 
interactions and demonstrations) indicated an interaction between personally acquired 
information and social learning mechanisms; children, who acquired a solution through 
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personally acquired information, copied a subsequently demonstrated solution. 
However, these children omitted the irrelevant actions to a greater extent than children 
without prior personal (but with prior social) information. It was not that children did 
not copy the model. Instead, they used goal imitation rather than action imitation. 
Unfortunately, an attempt to replicate the child study presented in Chapter IV with 
chimpanzees proved unsuccessful because the chimpanzees did not attend to model 
chimpanzees presented via video recordings or live, possibly due to separation from the 
group or because the task was too small to be observed properly. 
Third, when each child observed two models demonstrating causally relevant 
and irrelevant actions (Chapter V), children showed the least reproduction of causally 
irrelevant actions by children. This may have been a result of the demonstration mode; 
demonstrations were shown simultaneously and via video. However, the children were 
able to copy peer-modelled causally relevant solutions showing goal imitation without 
irrelevant action reproduction. The only condition that showed a pattern towards 
irrelevant action reproduction was for those children who were unsuccessful during 
their original attempt, as was found in the study presented in Chapter IV. It seems more 
likely that confidence in one’s own performance followed by a demonstration from two 
known peers resulted in goal imitation rather than action imitation.  
In summary, it appears that the combination of successful prior personal 
interactions, and known-peer-model demonstrations (as opposed to demonstrations from 
unfamiliar adults), diminishes ‘blind’ action imitation and results in goal imitation. This 
combination of factors more accurately reflects a child’s normal learning environment. 
For example, in a nursery school a child might interact with an artefact before observing 
a degraded (i.e. noisy environment, other children playing with other toys, models not in 
plain sight) demonstration of known peers interacting with the toy. In these 
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circumstances children are far from blind imitators; they are sophisticated social 
learners who also employ a portfolio of alternative learning mechanisms in flexibly 
adaptive ways.  
 
Evaluation of Experimental Methods 
Participants 
 Four- to six-year-old children were the selected human sample because a large 
body of work investigating social learning strategies and mechanisms has been 
conducted with children of this age range (e.g. Flynn & Whiten 2008a, 2008b; Horner 
& Whiten, 2005; Koenig & Harris, 2005; McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011; 
McGuigan Whiten, Flynn & Horner, 2007). Furthermore, at this age children are 
beginning to understand the knowledge states of others (Wellman et al., 2001) and the 
relationship between age and knowledge (Edwards, 1984). In choosing such a narrow 
age range it has to be accepted that only a snapshot of development can be obtained 
(See Future Directions below). 
Chimpanzees were chosen because of their biological similarities and shared 
evolutionary history with humans. Furthermore, their behaviour in the wild reflects 
cultural behaviour and previous work with captive chimpanzees exemplifies their ability 
to socially learn complex tool use. In working with captive chimpanzees one must 
acknowledge that they are BIZARRE (raised in Barren, Institutional, Zoo, And other 
Rare Rearing Environments; Leavens, Bard & Hopkins, 2010). Leavens et al. argue 
‘that there is no rational justification for overgeneralizing from BIZARRE chimpanzees 
to the entire chimpanzee species… no single environmental context can elicit the full 
range of chimpanzees’ cognitive capacities’ (p. 101). Thus, chimpanzees’ rearing 
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environments need to be carefully considered when interpreting the results of studies 
and extrapolating regarding behaviour demonstrated in the wild.  
Work presented in this thesis demonstrated biased stimulus enhancement so one 
cannot know whether the model based bias exhibited in the captive chimpanzees would 
be stronger or weaker (or present at all) in wild chimpanzees. While the chimpanzees in 
the current study were captive, every attempt was made to use an experimental design 
that reflects learning conditions in the wild. First, the chimpanzees were permanently 
socially housed with individuals they had known for many years and, for a significant 
proportion, with whom they were related. Second, throughout the interaction with the 
novel tasks and the test-tool use task chimpanzees remained in their groups rather than 
being isolated and exposed to only one model. Third, the models were known 
conspecifics and demonstrations of tool use took place over an extended time frame and 
were live rather than video presentations.  
 
Tasks 
All experiments in the thesis utilised a variation of multi-action artefact tasks 
first implemented by Dawson & Foss (1965) and Whiten et al. (1996). Such tasks allow 
for a distinction between a number of learning mechanisms including asocial learning, 
goal emulation, action imitation and the reproduction of casually irrelevant actions 
(‘overimitation’). Building upon this design, the children’s tasks were designed to allow 
for further social learning investigation; first, the Slide-Drawer-Box was designed with 
the intention that it could be solved asocially by about two-thirds of children (and 
socially learnt by all children). This allowed for an investigation of the interaction 
between prior personal experience and subsequent social information. Second, the 
Slide-Drawer-Lever-Box, with its third manipulandi, enabled an investigation of the 
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relation between prior personal information and subsequent social information from 
differing models. Additionally, both tasks allowed for the measurement of additional 
exploration beyond already asocially learnt and socially demonstrated solutions. These 
tasks were effective in the experiments and could be used in future research.  
For the chimpanzees two novel tools were created. These tools enabled 
individuals to access food that was out of reach. Training high-past-proficiency models 
to use either tool was relatively easy compared to low-past-proficiency models. Also, 
both tools could be asocially learnt in a relatively short amount of time which made it 
hard to distinguish whether tool use represented asocial or (biased or unbiased) social 
learning. The inclusion of a third tool may have assisted with this distinction. Here, 
models could be trained on the two tools and a third tool could be available. Then 
comparisons between the use of the non-demonstrated tool could be made with the two 
demonstrated tools to distinguish between asocial and social learning. Creating tasks for 
captive chimpanzees is always challenging; they need to be novel which is not easy in 
an enriched facility, they need to be within the chimpanzees’ motor skill range and they 
need to be incredibly sturdy. To create such tasks, it seems important that different 
research labs communicate with each other regarding the successes and limitations of 
each of their designs.  
Multi-action artificial-fruits are excellent artefacts for investigating social 
learning but have their limitations. They are made of man-made materials with, at times, 
man-made components (such as doors, bolts and baskets). These man-made components 
may be commonplace in a child’s environment but not in a chimpanzees’. Thus, using 
the same tasks across species may exaggerate human social learning ability in 
comparison to other species. Second, artefact and tool-use tasks limit generalisations 
pertaining to social learning of behaviours beyond artefacts and tool-use. Much human 
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and non-human behaviour (e.g. play in children; grooming and hand-clasping in 
chimpanzees, Whiten et al., 1999) is not geared towards interacting with their natural or 
man-made environment but geared towards other goals including appropriate 
interpersonal interactions. Accordingly, much of this social behaviour may also be 
socially learnt. Understanding the mechanisms (e.g. contagion in agonistic encounters in 
captive chimpanzees; Videan, Fritz, Schwandt & Howell, 2005) and strategies 
underpinning ‘social’ social learning may be a far greater challenge, particularly in non-
human animals.  
 
Experimental Design  
As outlined by Whiten & Mesoudi (2008; Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008) there are a 
variety of useful designs when investigating social learning, each with advantages and 
limitations. This body of work used variations on linear dyadic interactions for the 
children and open-diffusion interactions for the chimpanzees. Open-diffusion represents 
an ecologically valid design whereby whole population groups may be introduced to 
novel behaviours and behavioural spread can be monitored. A variant (two models 
rather than the traditional one) of this open-diffusion method was chosen for the 
chimpanzees for this reason but also because practically it is more optimal than studies 
involving a large degree of separation of pairs or trios of individuals. The challenge of 
open-diffusion is that the analysis of behaviour is much messier (Whiten & Flynn, 
2010; Whiten & Mesoudi, 2008) as when initial observers interact with the task they are 
now also models. It is intended to undertake further complex analysis with the 
chimpanzee data to gain a deeper understanding of these effects, including Bayesian 
methods (e.g. Kendal et al. in prep.) and the use of other packages specifically written 
for such situations (e.g. Option Bias Analysis; Kendal, Kendal, Hoppitt, & Laland, 
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2009; Network Based Diffusion Analysis; Hoppitt & Laland, 2011). Group diffusion 
also entails issues of task monopolisation and intergroup conflict which may mask 
individuals’ social learning abilities. However, such issues are off-set by the likely 
reduced stress (and likely preserved cognitive abilities) experienced by individuals 
when not isolated. 
An open-diffusion design was not selected for children. This was because the 
research questions required maximum control over the child’s previous personal 
experience, the subsequent social experience and who demonstrated what and when. 
Therefore a dyadic design, in which a single child participant watched another 
individual demonstrating, was adapted and used. This design also enabled direct 
comparison with previous research using similar dyadic designs (e.g. Horner & Whiten, 
2005). The children watched different models ranging from unfamiliar adults to familiar 
peers to puppets. Children seemed comfortable when separated from their group (class) 
and dyadic learning occurs in children’s natural environment (school) so this design 
remains relatively ecologically valid for children.  
 
Future Directions 
 
Tracking the Developmental Change of Model-based Biases 
Investigating five-year-old children’s model-based biases has been fruitful. 
Moving forward, a longitudinal or ‘microgenetic approach’ (Flynn, Pine & Lewis, 
2007), whereby the development of individual children is tracked, would greatly assist 
our understanding of how socio-cognitive skills may assist with the development of 
biases relating to different model characteristics. For example, one could evaluate the 
microgenetic development of theory-of-mind skills (Flynn, 2007) alongside a 
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knowledge-state transmission bias. Additionally, the dynamics between biases 
involving multiple model characteristics could be investigated in a similar way. Such an 
investigation may assist in our understanding of what skills are necessary for biases to 
develop and thus why we might, as a species, show unique breadth in our culture.  
 
Investigating Model-based Biases in Non-goal Directed Tasks 
Our understanding of social learning mechanisms and strategies is limited by the use 
of goal-directed tasks. An interesting future direction, particularly in children, is to look 
at how model-based biases affect non goal-directed behaviour. Work in this field has 
begun; preferences (e.g. for food, clothes, toys and games) shown by children indicate 
biases towards familiar versus unfamiliar models (Shutts, Kinzler, McKee, & Spelke, 
2009), same-sex (over different-sex) peers and, unlike novel artefact behaviour, children 
over adults (Shutts, Banji, & Spelke, 2010). Further, imitation of parents is more likely 
to consist of goal directed motor skills (e.g. tool-use) whereas non-goal directed 
affective behaviours are imitated from siblings and peers (Kuczynski, Zahn-Waxler, 
Radke-Yarrow, 1987). Thus, there may be some contexts whereby model-based biases 
are consistent for goal and non-goal directed behaviour and others where the biases may 
be less strong or even reversed.  
 
Interactions of Biases 
As outlined at the start of this chapter, the combinations of characteristic model 
traits that might bias learning are almost infinite. The challenge now is not only to 
investigate biases towards certain model characteristics but the relationship between 
different model-based biases. Chapter III demonstrated that biases towards one model 
characteristic (i.e. age) might overshadow a different model characteristic (i.e. 
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knowledge state). This result not only informs us about the specific model-based biases 
but it tells us something about the potential hierarchy of implementation of transmission 
biases. Additionally the dynamic between two biases (age and knowledge state) was 
only investigated at one point in children’s development and the dynamic might alter 
during ontogeny. Research with adults demonstrated that a hierarchical strategy 
prioritised a success bias over a conformity bias although the latter was used when the 
payoff of behavioural options was indistinguishable (McElreath, Bell, Efferson, Lubell, 
Richerson, & Waring, 2008) and prestige information and success-related information 
were used to the same degree (Atkisson et al., 2012). Future research may ambitiously 
attempt to understand the dynamics between different model-based biases, context and 
cognitive development. Understanding this relationship could assist in our broader 
understanding of culture. For example Atkisson et al. (2012) argue that the equal use of 
success and prestige characteristics of models indicates that their participants are used to 
using prestige cues in their everyday lives as a short-cut to acquiring useful information.  
 
Continuing to Develop Ecologically Valid Designs  
A major aim of the research presented in this thesis was to use experimental designs 
that mirrored naturalistic settings. In doing so, the flexible way in which children learn 
has been highlighted. The field would benefit from continued development of 
paradigms that reflect children’s learning environments. For example, studies may 
allow children (1) the opportunity to choose between personal exploration and 
requesting social information, (2) the opportunity to pick which models they do and do 
not source information from, before that information is provided and (3) to source 
further social information if and when they want it. Across species, it is important to 
maximise ecological validity in experimental research and experiments involving wild 
Chapter VII Discussion 
245 
 
natural open-diffusion designs encourage this (Kendal, Galef & van Schaik, 2010). 
Research using artificial fruits in an open-diffusion design has been conducted in the 
wild with several species (Reader & Biro, 2010). However, the diminishing population 
of wild chimpanzees and the natural environment of the majority of chimpanzees 
(Goodall, 2000) create significant practical implications. A compromise may be to 
investigate social learning in semi wild chimpanzee populations. 
  
Understanding Potential Applications 
As mentioned previously, there is potential for the findings in this thesis to be 
applied to educational environments. As Gopnik (2012, p. 1623) asks in relation to 
children’s learning, ‘what is the ideal balance between individual discovery and learning 
from others, and does this balance shift in different educational and scientific contexts?’ 
The role of prior experience seems extremely important in the acquisition of subsequent 
socially demonstrated behaviour. Educational establishments could benefit from the 
dissemination of this research. For example, allowing students to interact with an 
artefact (or problem) before direct instruction might increase that individual’s overall 
knowledge of the challenge and reduce the reproduction of demonstrated irrelevant 
components. Additionally, educational institutions could benefit from an understanding 
that presenting different sources of information may not cause confusion but instead 
increase domain knowledge as has been found in approaches to mathematical problems 
(Siegler & Opfer, 2003).  
Understanding the effect of model characteristics on high-fidelity copying is 
also pertinent in educational settings. Teachers are, generally, adults and prestigious and 
have demonstrated past-proficiency. Thus, they can transmit extremely useful 
information. However, their characteristics could result in such high fidelity copying 
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that some non-efficient elements of their behaviour also become transmitted. For 
children to think critically about a task, or a subject, there may be contexts where it is 
more fruitful to present multiple sources of information from a variety of models.  
 Potentially there are also ways in which this research can be applied to chimpanzee 
conservation. First, the conservation education benefit of revealing the cognitive 
abilities of chimpanzees (whether wild or captive) may go some way to ameliorating the 
threats faced by wild chimpanzees. Second, Whitehead (2010) argues that social 
learning could be important factors in translocation success. Thus, our increasing 
understanding of learning mechanisms and model-based biases in chimpanzee learning 
could assist with the potential reintroduction of groups into the wild. For example, we 
know that behaviours can be seeded into a group in the wild (meerkats; Thornton, & 
Malapert, 2009, orang-utans; Custance, Whiten, Sambrook, & Galdikas, 2001) and the 
evidence is beginning to suggest that particular individuals may be better at transmitting 
that information to a group (Biro, Inoue-Nakamura, Tonooka, Yamakoshi, Sousa, & 
Matsuzawa, 2003; Kendal et al, in prep). Therefore, training the correct models to 
perform species specific behaviours could increase the probability that these behaviours 
are adopted.  
 
Conclusions 
The body of work presented in this thesis further demonstrates that social 
learning is not best viewed as a binary variable of absence or presence. Instead, social 
learning encapsulates a spectrum of social learning mechanisms which will be 
influenced by social learning strategies. This thesis has married theoretical perspectives 
of cultural evolution with empirical research investigating chimpanzees’ and children’s 
learning. It has been demonstrated for the first time that chimpanzees’ behaviour may be 
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guided by a sophisticated past-proficiency model-based bias. Likewise, it was found 
that children are flexible social learners that are able to adopt a number of model-based 
biases, use different social learning mechanisms in different contexts and are motivated 
to acquire adaptive additional information pertaining to a task. Alongside high fidelity 
copying, this motivation to acquire multiple methods, particularly after pertinent social 
information, could be influential in our species’ reliance on cumulative culture. Both 
species show model-based transmission biases or ‘who’ social learning strategies, show 
flexible solution choice and are able to implement different learning mechanisms in 
different contexts. Differences between children and chimpanzees' learning strategies 
may lie in differences in reliance on various learning mechanism and transmission 
biases. This area is ripe for further exploration. 
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